Doe v. Wigginton

• Decision Date: 19 April 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93-5801,93-5801
• Citation: 21 F.3d 733
• Parties: John DOE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John T. WIGGINTON, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 733

21 F.3d 733

John DOE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John T. WIGGINTON, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 93-5801.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Submitted Feb. 1, 1994.

Decided April 19, 1994.

John Doe, pro se.

Connie V. Malone, Office of Gen. Counsel, Corrections Cabinet, Frankfort, KY (briefed), for defendants-appellees.

Before: MILBURN and GUY, Circuit Judges; and BROWN, Senior Circuit Judge.

RALPH B. GUY, Jr., Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff John Doe, proceeding pro se, appeals the magistrate judge's dismissal, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, of his 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action for money damages and declaratory and injunctive relief. Doe was incarcerated in Kentucky until after the commencement of this case; defendants are officials and officers of the prisons at which Doe was incarcerated. Doe argues that his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated by a Kentucky rule which makes at-request HIV testing available only to inmates who satisfy certain specified criteria. Doe also maintains that his "constitutional right to privacy" was violated when a prison officer learned from Doe's medical file that Doe is HIV positive. Although we disagree in part with the basis of the magistrate judge's decision, we agree with the result he reached. We therefore affirm.

I.

Doe was received at the Kentucky State Reformatory in January 1989. During his initial medical screening, Doe requested that his blood be tested for the presence of HIV antibodies. The processing nurse denied this request because Doe did not meet the testing criteria established by Kentucky Corrections Cabinet Policy 13.5. That policy provides in relevant part:

TESTING FOR THE PRESENCE OF HIV ANTIBODIES

No routine testing will be undertaken. The physician may order the test for an individual under the following circumstances.

a. The inmate presents clinical symptoms.

b. The inmate provides a presumptive history of exposure.

c. A pregnant inmate reporting a history of intravenous drug use, prostitution or sexual activity with an intravenous drug user.

Doe was transferred to the Luther Luckett Correctional Complex in March 1989. Between that date and March 1991, Doe was treated for a number of ailments by the institution doctor, defendant Dr. Baisas. In March 1991, Doe asked Baisas to test his blood for the presence of HIV antibodies. Doe told Baisas that he wanted to be tested because he had slept with a number of drug-addict prostitutes in Cincinnati prior to his incarceration. On the basis of this disclosure, Baisas ordered that Doe be tested. Doe tested positive for the HIV virus, and was referred to a specialist at an outside hospital for treatment. Further tests indicated that Doe's immune system had seriously deteriorated by the time his infection was discovered.

In April 1991, Doe was transferred back to the Kentucky State Reformatory. During Doe's initial processing, a corrections officer, defendant Sergeant Abbott, asked him a number of routine questions relating to his current medical condition. When Doe refused to answer these questions, Abbott opened Doe's medical records file, which was stamped "confidential." Abbott then briefly discussed Doe's HIV positive status with him. A few other people were in the room during this discussion, but Doe does not know whether these people were able to hear or understand Abbott's remarks about his illness. Doe likewise does not know whether Abbott told anyone about his illness, but speculates that another corrections officer, Lieutenant Godfrey, may have learned of it because Godfrey responded to a grievance that Doe filed about his processing.

In May 1991, Doe filed a pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, alleging that the implementation and enforcement of Policy 13.5 violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Doe filed a second Sec. 1983 action in June 1991, alleging that his Fourteenth Amendment "right to privacy" was violated by the Kentucky State Reformatory's initial screening process and by Sergeant Abbott's perusal of his medical records. In each of these actions, Doe named as defendants those prison officials and officers he deemed responsible for the alleged violations of his constitutional rights. Doe sued these persons in their "official and/or personal capacities," and sought declaratory, injunctive, and money damages relief in each action. In October 1991, Doe was released from prison. Doe's two actions thereafter were consolidated, and the parties consented to have a United States magistrate judge preside over the case. Defendants subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment. The magistrate judge granted this motion and dismissed the case. This appeal followed.

II.

The magistrate judge held that the Eleventh Amendment barred Doe's claims "to the extent that the defendants are sued in their official capacities." ¹ The Eleventh Amendment provides:

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or subjects of any foreign State.

This language has been interpreted not literally, but broadly, in light of the historical context in which the Amendment was ratified. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11-20, 10 S.Ct. 504, 505-509, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890) (recounting the history of the Eleventh Amendment's ratification); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 660, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1354, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) ("The historical basis of the Eleventh Amendment ... represents one of the more dramatic examples of this Court's effort to derive meaning from the document given to the Nation by the Framers nearly 200 years ago.") The Supreme Court thus has held that, under the Eleventh Amendment, "an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another State." Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663, 94 S.Ct. at 1355. Moreover, "[i]t is ... well established that even though a State is not named a party to the action, the suit may nonetheless be barred by the Eleventh Amendment[,]" if the suit is somehow deemed to be against the State. Id.

Whether a suit against State officials in their official capacity is deemed to be against the State depends on whether the plaintiff seeks "retroactive" or "prospective" relief. Id. at 668-69, 94 S.Ct. at 1358-59. Retroactive relief compensates the plaintiff for a past violation of his legal rights. Id. at 668, 94 S.Ct. at 1358. This compensation usually takes the form of money damages. ² Because "a plaintiff seeking to recover on a damages judgment in an official-capacity suit must look to the government entity itself[,]" Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3105, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985), the State "is the real, substantial party in interest" with regard to a claim for retroactive relief, and thus "is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal defendants." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464, 65 S.Ct. 347, 350, 89 L.Ed. 389 (1945). In other words, since a official-capacity claim for retroactive relief is deemed to be against the State whose officers are the nominal defendants, the claim is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

In contrast, prospective relief merely compels the state officers' compliance with federal law in the future. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 668, 94 S.Ct. at 1358. In the watershed case of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60, 28 S.Ct. 441, 453-54, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), the Court explained why claims for prospective relief are deemed to be against only the nominal defendant officers, and not against the State:

The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional, and if it be so, the use of the name of the State to enforce an unconstitutional act to the injury of complainants is a proceeding without the authority of and one which does not affect the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an illegal act upon the part of a state official in attempting by the use of the name of the State to enforce a legislative enactment which is void because unconstitutional. If the act which the state [officer] seeks to enforce be a violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such enactment comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. ³

Thus, official-capacity claims for declaratory relief are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, even if the officers' future compliance with federal law would have some "ancillary" effect upon the State treasury. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 668, 94 S.Ct. at 1358.

Here, Doe's claims for money damages against the prison officials in their official capacity are claims for retroactive relief, and hence are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 663, 94 S.Ct. at 1355-56 ("[A] suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment."). Doe's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief against the defendants in their official capacity, however, do not seek to remedy a past constitutional violation, but instead seek to prevent future ones. (See app. at 30-31; 46-47; 59-60.) Since these claims only seek "compliance in the future," they are claims for prospective relief. They accordingly are not deemed to be against Kentucky, and hence are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 668, 94 S.Ct. at 1358; Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60, 28 S.Ct. at 453-54. The magistrate judge erred by holding to the contrary.

The material facts relating to Doe's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief are not in dispute, because the parties manifest no...