Doering v. Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders

• Decision Date: 14 September 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-5748,87-5748
• Citation: 857 F.2d 191
• Parties: , 12 Fed.R.Serv.3d 41 Christine DOERING v. UNION COUNTY BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS, G. Richard Malgran, Walter Boright, Edward J. Slomkowski, Charlotte De Filippo, Brian Fahey, Robert J. Lapolla, Paul J. O'Keefe, Sandra Flack, Lisa Montana, Joseph Salemme, Marilyn Blacker, Joseph Triarsi, Esq. as Agents, Officers, Employees of the County of Union, New Jersey, and in Their Representative Capacities and Individually. Appeal of L.T. VINCENTI.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Page 191

857 F.2d 191

57 USLW 2181, 12 Fed.R.Serv.3d 41

Christine DOERING v. UNION COUNTY BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS, G. Richard Malgran, Walter Boright, Edward J. Slomkowski, Charlotte De Filippo, Brian Fahey, Robert J. Lapolla, Paul J. O'Keefe Sandra Flack, Lisa Montana, Joseph Salemme, Marilyn Blacker Joseph Triarsi, Esq. as Agents, Officers, Employees of the County of Union, New Jersey, and in Their Representative Capacities and Individually Appeal of L.T. VINCENTI.

No. 87-5748.

United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.

Argued May 6, 1988.

Decided Sept. 14, 1988.

L.T. Vincenti, Elizabeth, N.J., pro se.

Ann F. Kiernan (argued), Jamieson, Moore, Peskin & Spicer, Princeton, N.J., for Christine Doering.

Kenneth I. Nowak (argued), Zazzali, Zazzali & Kroll, Newark, N.J., for Sandra Flack.

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, STAPLETON and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, Jr., Circuit Judge.

Appellant is a lawyer against whom the district court imposed attorney's fees totalling approximately $25,000 as sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.

We will affirm the district court's conclusion of a Rule 11 violation, based on its subsidiary finding that the complaint prepared by appellant is legally frivolous. We will also affirm the district court's calculation of the lodestar amount. We will, however, vacate that aspect of its order imposing a particular monetary sanction without consideration of numerous possible mitigating factors, and remand the case for further proceedings.

I.

From January 7 through March 8, 1985, Christine Doering ("Doering") worked for Union County, New Jersey in the position of a rape crisis counselor and administrator at the Union County Rape Counseling Center. As a result of several incidents resulting in mutual dissatisfaction on the part of both Doering and her employer, she resigned her position by letter dated February 25. On that same day, her employer wrote Doering a letter that did not terminate her employment but did relieve her of her counseling duties.

Appellant L.T. Vincenti ("Vincenti") thereafter filed on Doering's behalf a civil rights complaint in federal district court, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1983 and 1985 (1982), against the Union County Board of Chosen Freeholders and the county officials who supervised and administered the rape crisis center. The complaint alleged violations of Doering's first and fourteenth amendment rights. After a number of pre-trial conferences (including, apparently, several unsuccessful attempts at settlement) and discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment and attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 11. In two detailed and thoughtful opinions, the district court granted defendants' motions. Doering v. Union County Board of Chosen Freeholders et al., No. 86-1238, slip op. (D.N.J. May 4, 1987), reprinted in Appellant's Appendix at 17-34 ("Doering I "); Doering v. Union County Board of Chosen Freeholders et al., No. 86-1238, slip op. at 1-12 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 1987), reprinted in Appellant's Appendix at 3-14 ("Doering II").

In granting the motion for attorney's fees, costs and sanctions, the district court held that "[Doering's] First Amendment claims of deprivation of free speech and association and free exercise of religion are so clearly without merit as to be termed unreasonable." Doering I, reprinted in Appellant's Appendix at 34. It relied on Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978) and Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 101 S.Ct. 173, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980), for the proposition that a prevailing defendant may recover fees in a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988 if the action is "meritless in the sense that it is groundless or without foundation." Doering I, reprinted in Appellant's Appendix at 33 (quoting Hughes, 449 U.S. at 14, 101 S.Ct. at 178). It then found not only that defendants were entitled to recover costs and fees from Doering under Sec. 1988, but that Vincenti had violated Rule 11. Id. The court thereafter exercised its discretion to impose costs on Doering herself under Sec. 1988, ¹ but ordered Vincenti to pay defendants' attorney's fees as a sanction for violating Rule 11. Doering II, reprinted in Appellant's Appendix at 5-6.

Because the district court's decision to require Vincenti to pay defendants' attorney's fees "was based on the filing of a frivolous complaint," Doering II, reprinted in Appellant's Appendix at 6, the court felt that "it [wa]s appropriate that the fee award encompass all aspects of the litigation." Id. It therefore calculated a lodestar amount, based on submissions from defendants' counsel, id. at 6-11, which it refused to adjust upwardly. Id. at 11. The court rejected the argument that the award should take into account ability to pay. Id. at 12. It also rejected Vincenti's arguments for a full evidentiary hearing on the Rule 11 issue, for recusal of the district court, and for in camera review of a state ethics complaint filed by Doering against Vincenti. Id. at 12-14.

Vincenti now appeals the imposition of sanctions. ²

II.

The traditional American rule is that each party to litigation bears its own costs, including attorney's fees. See Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975). Congress has, however, over the years enacted numerous statutory exceptions to the general rule against fee-shifting. Through rules and interpretation, courts have gradually expanded these exceptions.

Underlying these various fee-shifting statutes and rules are policies that seek to foster the filing and litigation of meritorious claims. To that end, one purpose is the compensation of plaintiffs for the actual costs incurred in vindicating legal rights that advance important public policies. The availability of such compensation enables these plaintiffs to act as private attorney generals and enhances the probability that their claims will be litigated. A far different purpose--deterrence of frivolous lawsuits--is also served by the rule, which provides for compensation to defendants to reimburse them for legal fees that they should not have been forced to incur.

Rule 11 provides in relevant part that

[t]he signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.... If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 (emphases added). We have stated that, by awarding attorney fees to prevailing defendants in an effort to discourage plaintiffs from bringing baseless actions or making frivolous motions, the Rule's primary purpose is not "wholesale fee shifting but [rather] correction of litigation abuse." Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 483 (3d Cir.1987); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 advisory committee notes ("The word 'sanctions' in the caption ... stresses a deterrent orientation in dealing with improper pleadings, motions or other papers."). The standard developed by courts for imposition of sanctions under Rule 11 is stringent because such sanctions 1) are "in derogation of the general American policy of encouraging resort to the courts for peaceful resolution of disputes," Eastway Construction Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F.Supp. 558, 564 (E.D.N.Y.1986), modified and remanded, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.), cert. denied --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 269, 98 L.Ed.2d 226 (1987); 2) tend to "spawn satellite litigation counter-productive to efficient disposition of cases," Gaiardo, 835 F.2d at 482; and 3) "increase tensions among the litigating bar and between [the] bench and [the] bar." Eastway Construction Corp., 637 F.Supp. at 564. This Court and others have interpreted its language to prescribe sanctions, including fees, only in the "exceptional circumstance", Gaiardo, 835 F.2d at 483, where a claim or motion is patently unmeritorious or frivolous. See, e.g., Lieb v. Topstone Industries, Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 157 (3d Cir.1986) ("Rule 11 therefore is intended to discourage pleadings that are 'frivolous, legally unreasonable, or without factual foundation, even though the paper was not filed in subjective bad faith.' ") (quoting Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 831 (9th Cir.1986)); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1275 (2d Cir.1986) ("[R]ule 11 is violated only when it is 'patently clear that a claim has absolutely no chance of success.' ") (quoting Eastway Construction Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir.1985)), cert. denied sub nom. County of Suffolk v. Graseck, 480 U.S. 918, 107 S.Ct. 1373, 94 L.Ed.2d 689 (1987).

Thus, although this provision does contain an element of compensation in the "amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing," Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11--A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181, 202 (1985) ("Sanctions "), its primary purpose is deterrence of abuses of the legal system. Fee-shifting is but one of several methods of achieving the various goals of Rule 11. See Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 Harv.L.Rev. 1013, 1020 (1988) ("[T]he vast majority of courts agree that the rule's...