Does v. Covington County School Bd. of Educ.
| Decision Date | 10 May 1996 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 94-D-440-N. |
| Parties | John DOES 1, 2, 3 and 4, Plaintiffs, v. The COVINGTON COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
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Stanley J. Murphy, Tuscaloosa, AL, Ray O. Noojin, Jr., Hare, Wynn, Newell & Newton, Birmingham, AL, for plaintiff.
Allen G. Woodard, Laird, Woodard & Baker, Andalusia, AL, Mark S. Boardman, Kristi A. Dowdy, Boardman & Tyra, P.C., Birmingham, AL, for defendants.
DE MENT, District Judge.
Before the court is the defendants' motion for summary judgment filed November 21, 1994, the responses and replies thereto. In this case, the plaintiffs allege that the Covington County School Board of Education and several school officials are liable under a supervisory theory for their failure to prevent and stop a third-grade teacher from sexually abusing them. The plaintiffs contend that the defendants' inactions violated their rights secured by the United States Constitution, federal statutes and state laws.
The defendants contend that summary judgment should be granted in their favor based upon immunity defenses. They further assert that, as a matter of law, their actions or omissions did not violate the plaintiffs' legal rights. After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, the applicable case law and the evidentiary materials, the court finds that the defendants' motion is due to be granted in part and denied in part. The court also will reserve ruling on several issues as discussed herein.
Subject matter jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (civil rights jurisdiction) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction). The court also has supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over the plaintiffs' state law claims. The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue.
On a motion for summary judgment, the court is to construe the evidence and factual inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Summary judgment can be entered on a claim only if it is shown "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). As the Supreme Court has explained the summary judgment standard:
The plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The trial court's function at this juncture is not "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (citations omitted). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510; see also Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 933 (11th Cir.1989).
The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion and of establishing, based on relevant "portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions in the file, together with affidavits, if any,'" that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. Once this initial demonstration under Rule 56(c) is made, the burden of production, not persuasion, shifts to the nonmoving party. The nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by his own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).
In meeting this burden the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is a metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). That party must demonstrate that there is a "genuine issue for trial." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356. An action is void of a material issue for trial "where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party." Id.; see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2510-11.
Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, as the non-moving parties, the court finds the following facts controlling in this action:
The plaintiffs are male students who attend or have attended W.S. Harlan Elementary School in Lockhart, Alabama. Because the plaintiffs are minor children, they bring this action through their parents and/or step-parents as next friends.1 In recognizing the vulnerability and tender age of each plaintiff, as well as the sensitive issues involved in this case, the court has allowed the plaintiffs to proceed without disclosure of names.2
The plaintiffs commenced this action against the following defendants: the Covington County School Board of Education ("Board of Education"); the five members of the Board of Education, sued individually and in their official capacities; Terry Holley, sued individually and in his official capacity as Principal of the W.S. Harlan Elementary School; and Dale Odom, sued individually and in his official capacity as Superintendent of Education for Covington County, Alabama (collectively "defendants").
Count I of the complaint asserts a violation of the Substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as enforced by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count II predicates liability under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, §§ 901-909, as amended, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688. Count III alleges supplemental state law claims of sexual abuse and harassment, outrage, negligence,3 and sexual assault. The plaintiffs, who have requested a non-jury trial, seek injunctive and monetary relief under the federal causes of action, damages under the state tort claims, and attorneys' fees and costs.
The plaintiffs contend that a male third-grade teacher sexually harassed and abused them for periods of a year or more. As pleaded in the complaint, the sexual abuse "included acts of sodomy and other forms of sexual assault," which occurred in the classroom, on school outings, in school buses and at the teacher's home. Pl.s' Compl. at ¶¶ 7-8. Michael Smith ("Mr. Smith"), the teacher in question, had criminal charges brought against him for his alleged sexual abuse.4
The plaintiffs further plead that the Board of Education and its members, as well as the Principal and Superintendent, had actual and/or constructive notice of the propensity of Mr. Smith to engage in inappropriate sexual behavior with male students. The plaintiffs further assert that despite this knowledge, the defendants failed to protect the plaintiffs from harm. The stepmother of John Doe 4 testified at her deposition that she personally complained to Principal Holley on several occasions about her fear that Mr. Smith may, or had already, engaged in inappropriate sexual conduct toward her stepson:
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