Doherty v. Leon
| Citation | 249 Ariz. 515,472 P.3d 531 |
| Decision Date | 28 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 2 CA-CV 2019-0124-FC,2 CA-CV 2019-0124-FC |
| Parties | Raymond Joseph DOHERTY, Petitioner/Appellant, v. Giovanah Lexus LEON and Dominique Leon, Respondents/Appellees. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Arizona |
¶1 In this appeal, we are asked to consider the trial court's application of two competing presumptions in a paternity action. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the court's denial of Raymond ("Ray") Doherty's "request for adjudication of paternity" based on the court's determination that the marital presumption outweighed the genetic-testing presumption under the circumstances of this case.
¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court's ruling. See Clark v. Kreamer , 243 Ariz. 272, ¶ 10, 405 P.3d 1123 (App. 2017). In early 2015, Giovanah and her then-girlfriend Dominique moved to Tucson where they were introduced to Ray and his fiancée Melanie. The two couples soon developed a friendship, and in July, Melanie approached Giovanah and Dominique who were "trying to have a family" about conceiving a child with Ray's sperm. Over the course of several conversations, Giovanah, Dominique, and Ray agreed to the sperm donation with the understanding that Ray "was helping a same-sex couple," he would not have "any parental rights," and "in return [Giovanah and Dominique would] not go after him for child support." Melanie delivered three donations of Ray's sperm and Giovanah became pregnant.
¶3 In December 2015, Dominique and Giovanah moved into Ray and Melanie's apartment, but only stayed for "two weeks" because the couple was "scared" and "uncomfortable" when Ray would get "angry" and "mean" after drinking. Thereafter, the couple "lost contact" with Ray and Melanie. The following month, Giovanah and Dominique married, and in April 2016, Giovanah gave birth to their son J.L. Dominique "is named" on J.L.’s birth certificate as the second parent. Six months later, however, Giovanah was arrested and incarcerated, and Dominique was solely responsible for J.L.’s care.
¶4 In May 2017, after an argument with Giovanah, Dominique contacted Ray and Melanie because she was concerned about her position as J.L.’s parent. Ray reassured her they were going to help her maintain her parental rights and keep J.L. safe from Giovanah. Over the next year, Ray, Melanie, and Dominique remained friends, and Dominique allowed Ray and Melanie to babysit J.L. on numerous occasions. Throughout that time, Ray and Melanie consistently referred to Dominique as J.L.’s "momma."
¶5 In January 2018, without Dominique's knowledge or a court order, Ray had J.L.’s blood drawn for a DNA test that confirmed Ray is J.L.’s biological father. Three months later, Ray and Melanie contacted the Department of Child Safety (DCS), claiming J.L. was unsafe in Dominique's care, and refused to return J.L. to Dominique. DCS placed J.L. with Dominique's parents but ultimately determined the allegation was unsubstantiated and returned J.L. to Dominique. Thereafter, Dominique ceased all contact with Ray and Melanie, and Ray subsequently filed a petition for paternity, legal decision-making, parenting time, and child support.
¶6 After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court issued an under-advisement ruling determining Ray was not a legal parent of J.L. and denying his petition. This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and 12-2101(A)(1).
¶7 Ray argues the trial court erred by ruling that he is not J.L.’s legal parent even though he is the biological father. Specifically, he maintains: (1) the "court's rejection of [his] biological paternity violates [his] fundamental rights under the Arizona and United States Constitutions"; (2) the court erred in determining the marital presumption was controlling because its "decision has the effect of converting the marital presumption into an irrefutable presumption"; (3) the court's decision expands the legal definition of legal parentage and, thus, invades the legislature's domain; and (4) the court failed to "consider [J.L.’s] best interests."1 Because these arguments overlap, our discussion of them does so as well. We review de novo a trial court's legal conclusions, see In re Estate of Newman , 219 Ariz. 260, ¶ 13, 196 P.3d 863 (App. 2008), constitutional issues, see State v. McGill , 213 Ariz. 147, ¶ 53, 140 P.3d 930 (2006), and issues of statutory construction and interpretation, see Danielson v. Evans , 201 Ariz. 401, ¶ 13, 36 P.3d 749 (App. 2001). We, however, "review findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard." Strait v. Strait , 223 Ariz. 500, ¶ 6, 224 P.3d 997 (App. 2010).
¶8 First, we disagree with the underlying premise of Ray's argument—that when the genetic-testing presumption applies, it controls over the marital presumption under both the state and federal constitutions and Arizona statutes. Specifically, he maintains that "[a]lthough the marital presumption exists for married couples, same and opposite sex, it does not protect them from challenges to paternity from the natural parents."
¶9 "[T]he constitution permits states to distinguish between the rights of differently situated parents." In re Pima Cty. Juv. Severance Action No. S-114487 , 179 Ariz. 86, 93, 876 P.2d 1121, 1128 (1994). "[P]arents with an existing parental relationship, either in fact or law, are entitled to the highest constitutional protection." Id. A biological putative father, however, "must first take steps to establish a parent-child relationship before he may attain the same protection," id. at 94, 876 P.2d at 1129, the first of which is to establish paternity, see A.R.S. § 25-401(4) (). This is so because a married couple's "rights and responsibilities relating to their child begin at birth, or before, and primarily relate to custody and support, which automatically vest." Pima Cty. No. S-114487 , 179 Ariz. at 94, 876 P.2d at 1129 ; see also McLaughlin v. Jones , 243 Ariz. 29, ¶¶ 19, 23, 33, 401 P.3d 492 (2017) (). Contrary to Ray's argument that "biological parents are entitled to parental rights whether they want those rights or not," a biological father who is not married to the biological mother "has no immediate right to custody and no corresponding, legally enforceable responsibility to provide support unless paternity is judicially established." Pima Cty. No. S-114487 , 179 Ariz. at 94, 876 P.2d at 1129 ; see also A.R.S. § 25-803(C). As such, the trial court's order did not "sever" Ray's parental rights, as he contends; instead, it determined that he failed to establish them in the first place.
¶10 Additionally, despite Ray's suggestion to the contrary, there is no hierarchy among the statutory presumptions in a paternity action. Section 25-814(C) provides that "[i]f two or more presumptions apply, the presumption that the court determines, on the facts, is based on weightier considerations of policy and logic will control." In this case, the trial court found that the marital and genetic-testing presumptions were both established. Having made that determination the court weighed the two presumptions, which is precisely what the statute requires.
¶11 We agree with the trial court's finding that Dominique had established the marital presumption and that it was not rebutted, factually or as a matter of law. As to the nature and scope of that presumption, we find McLaughlin ’s discussion of the rights afforded same-sex couples in relation to those afforded couples of the opposite sex to be instructive. Same-sex couples are entitled to " ‘the same terms and conditions’ of marriage," which means all of the "statutory benefits linked to marriage." McLaughlin , 243 Ariz. 29, ¶¶ 15-16, 401 P.3d 492 (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges , 576 U.S. 644, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605, 192 L.Ed.2d 609 (2015) ). Our supreme court recognized that another panel of this court had concluded that "a female same-sex spouse could not be presumed a legal parent under § 25–814(A)(1) because the presumption is based on biological differences between men and women and Obergefell does not require courts to interpret paternity statutes in a gender-neutral manner." Id. ¶ 8 (citing Turner v. Steiner , 242 Ariz. 494, ¶¶ 15-18, 398 P.3d 110 (App. 2017) ). And, it acknowledged that the presumption of paternity under § 25-814(A)(1) "refers to a father's legal parental rights and responsibilities rather than biological paternity." Id. ¶ 11. Therefore, the court recognized that as written, the statute applies only to husbands in opposite-sex marriages, it does not apply to wives of biological mothers. Id. ¶ 12. "However, in the wake of Obergefell , excluding [wives in same-sex marriages] from the marital paternity presumption violates the Fourteenth Amendment." Id . ¶ 13. "Because the marital paternity presumption does more than just identify biological fathers, Arizona cannot deny same-sex spouses the benefit the presumption affords." Id . ¶ 21.
¶12 Ray argues, however, that the trial court invaded the domain of the legislature "by applying ... non-existent statutory concepts to this paternity proceeding." He maintains the legislature has yet to "enact a statute providing for artificial insemination" that mandates "parental rights ... attach to a married couple to the exclusion of a biological parent." But, the absence of such a statute undermines rather than bolsters Ray's position. None of the four presumptions of paternity listed in § 25-814(A) condition their application on the manner of conception. "We presume the legislature says what it means," Chavez v. Ariz. Sch. Risk Retention Tr., Inc. , 227 Ariz. 327, ¶ 9, 258 P.3d 145 (App. 2011),...
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