Dolezal v. Carbrey

• Citation: 778 P.2d 1261,161 Ariz. 365
• Decision Date: 18 April 1989
• Docket Number: Nos. 1,CA-CIV,s. 1
• Parties: Carole Ann DOLEZAL, a single woman; Edward Dolezal and Lydia Dolezal, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Frank C. CARBREY and Lynn Carbrey, husband and wife; Forrest Holden and Jane Doe Holden, husband and wife, dba Cactus Equestrian Stables, an Arizona corporation or partnership, Defendants-Appellees. 9851, 1 9934.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona

Page 1261

778 P.2d 1261

161 Ariz. 365

Carole Ann DOLEZAL, a single woman; Edward Dolezal and Lydia Dolezal, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Frank C. CARBREY and Lynn Carbrey, husband and wife; Forrest Holden and Jane Doe Holden, husband and wife, dba Cactus Equestrian Stables, an Arizona corporation or partnership, Defendants-Appellees.

Nos. 1 CA-CIV 9851, 1 CA-CIV 9934.

Court of Appeals of Arizona,

Division 1, Department D.

April 18, 1989.

Review Denied Sept. 19, 1989.

[161 Ariz. 366] Van O'Steen and Partners by Steven J. Kuehl and W. Marc Ducker, Phoenix, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Jennings, Strouss & Salmon by William T. Birmingham, M. Byron Lewis and Michael J. O'Connor, Phoenix, for defendants-appellees Holden.

Robbins & Green, P.A. by Michael J. O'Grady, Phoenix, for defendants-appellees Carbrey.

OPINION

CORCORAN, Judge.

Plaintiffs appeal from summary judgment in favor of defendants on a negligence claim, arguing that they presented a prima facie case of negligence to the trial court and that summary judgment was improper. We agree.

Facts

On appeal from summary judgment, we view the facts and all inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to appellants. State ex rel. Corbin v. Challenge, Inc., 151 Ariz. 20, 24, 725 P.2d 727, 731 (App.1986). Appellee Frank Carbrey owned two horses, which were boarded and stabled at appellee Forrest Holden's Cactus Equestrian Stables.. One of the horses was a quarterhorse, nicknamed "Blue," which was ridden primarily by professional trainers and Carbrey's 11-year-old daughter, Allison. A "show horse" that had been trained to respond to subtle cues from its rider, Blue had won approximately 90 ribbons prior to the incident in question.

In December 1985, appellant Carole Dolezal was visiting her parents for the holidays. Carbrey, their neighbor, invited Carole to visit the stables and go horseback riding. Carole accepted the invitation and accompanied the Carbrey family to the stables on December 22, 1985. Carole told Carbrey that her riding experience was very limited and that she was a novice. Before that occasion, she had ridden a horse only two or three times and had never received formal riding instructions. Carbrey gave Carole some verbal instructions on how to ride, but did not tell her how to mount, sit, use the reins, turn, stop, or dismount. Expert testimony indicated that Carbrey's few verbal riding instructions to Carole were "like telling someone how to drive a car, sitting in the living room telling them ... and then giving them the keys.... An expert also testified that Carole did not know enough about riding horses to know what questions to ask Carbrey concerning properly mounting, riding and dismounting a horse.

Carole rode Blue in the riding arena at the stables. Allison was in the center of the arena observing Carole during the entire ride. At one point, Allison saw Carole flapping her legs against Blue's side and instructed her not to do so. Carbrey was also in the arena riding another horse. A gate was open at one end of the arena, contrary to written instructions posted on the gate that it was to be closed at all times.

After riding for approximately 25 minutes, Carole brought Blue up to Allison and attempted to dismount while Allison held the reins. As she was dismounting, Carole apparently dragged her right foot along Blue's rump and jabbed her left foot into Blue's side. Blue took a step or two forward and suddenly bolted. He ran through the open gate, up a small incline and under a metal roof extending along the front of a line of outdoor stalls. By this time, Carole had regained her seat on Blue; as Blue ran beneath the metal overhang, Carole hit her head on a post or beam. She was immediately thrown to the ground, suffering severe permanent injuries.

Carole and her parents sued Carbrey and Holden, alleging that Carbrey negligently allowed Carole to ride Blue, that he failed to properly instruct or supervise her, and that he failed to warn her about the open gate. They also alleged that Holden negligently failed to keep the gate closed, and that he failed to warn Carole of the low overhang.

Both Holden and an expert witness testified that Carole should not have been allowed to ride Blue. Another expert testified that the cause of the accident was Carbrey's lack of instructions to, and lack of supervision of, Carole, and the failure to keep the arena gate closed.

No one could testify with certainty why Blue bolted. One expert testified that "any opinion as to what caused the horse to spook in this particular instance would be nothing short of speculation," but that Carole's improper dismount may have been the cause and that proper dismounting technique "should have been explained to her." One of Blue's trainers testified that Blue could have understood Carole's improper dismount (i.e., dragging her foot across Blue's rump) as a cue to start walking. Carbrey himself testified that Blue may have been frustrated by Carole's improper riding and dismount. Carbrey admitted failing to warn Carole not to drag her heel as she dismounted.

Carbrey moved for summary judgment, claiming that he owed no duty to Carole, and that the accident was unforeseeable in light of Blue's previously gentle nature. The trial court granted the motion without explanation. Holden then moved for summary judgment on similar grounds, and the trial court granted his motion as well, again without explanation. The Dolezals filed timely notices of appeal from both judgments, and the appeals were consolidated.

A negligence claim requires the plaintiff to prove (1) the existence of a legal duty obligating the defendant to adhere to a certain standard of conduct to protect others from unreasonable risks, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) a causal connection between the breach and injury, and (4) actual injuries or damages. Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500, 504, 667 P.2d 200, 204 (1983), citing W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 30, at 143 (4th ed. 1971). The question whether a defendant owes a duty is one of law to be decided by the court. Markowitz v. Arizona Parks Bd., 146 Ariz. 352, 354, 706 P.2d 364, 366 (1985). Although summary judgment is not usually granted in negligence cases, it is appropriate when no dispute exists as to any material facts, only one inference can be drawn from those facts and, based upon those facts, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Nicoletti v. Westcor, Inc., 131 Ariz. 140, 142, 639 P.2d 330, 332 (1982).

Because we are presented with questions concerning the liability of two defendants, we address each defendant separately.

Frank Carbrey

Carbrey argues that he either owed no duty, or if he did, he did not breach it as a matter of law. He contends that his conduct was reasonable, and that Blue's actions and Carole's resulting accident were unforeseeable. He relies on testimony that Blue was gentle, predictable, and had never before suddenly bolted. The Dolezals argue that Carbrey owed a duty to Carole, and that reasonable minds could differ on whether the accident was foreseeable; therefore, a jury should be allowed to decide whether Carbrey was negligent.

The most logical approach to analyzing questions involving negligence is to begin with the first element: duty, which is decided by the court. Markowitz, 146 Ariz. at 356, 706 P.2d at 368. In discussing duty, the supreme court stated:

The question is whether the relationship of the parties was such that the defendant was under an obligation to use some care to avoid or prevent injury to the plaintiff. If the answer is no, the defendant is not liable even though he may have acted negligently in light of the foreseeable risks.

146 Ariz. at 356, 706 P.2d at 368. The supreme court has noted the confusion surrounding the concept of duty and the standard of conduct. See Markowitz; Coburn v. City of Tucson, 143 Ariz. 50, 691 P.2d 1078 (1984); Beach v. City of Phoenix, 136 Ariz. 601, 667 P.2d 1316 (1983). The following language from Prosser, cited in Coburn, is helpful:

[T]he problems of "duty" are sufficiently complex without subdividing it ... to cover an endless series of details of conduct. It is better to reserve "duty" for the problem of the relation between individuals which imposes upon one a legal obligation for the benefit of the other, and to deal with particular conduct in terms of a legal standard of what is required to meet the obligation. In other words, "duty" is a question of whether the defendant is under any obligation for the benefit of the particular plaintiff; and in negligence cases, the duty [if it exists] is always the same--to conform to the legal standard of reasonable conduct in the light of the apparent risk. What the defendant must do, or must not do, is a question of the standard of conduct required to satisfy the duty....

143 Ariz. at 52, 691 P.2d at 1080, quoting W. Prosser & W. Keeton, Law of Torts § 53, at 356 (5th ed. 1984). The Coburn court then stated:

Thus, the duty remains constant, while the conduct necessary to fulfill it varies with the circumstances. Beach v. City of Phoenix, supra. We see no benefit and considerable danger in attempting to analyze cases such as this in terms of whether the city did or did not have a duty to post stop signs, erect traffic control lights, remove bushes or give warning.

143 Ariz. at 52, 691 P.2d at 1080. The question here is whether Carbrey was under any obligation for the benefit of the plaintiff, Carole, and not whether Carbrey had a specific duty to ascertain her level of riding ability, teach her how to dismount, or supervise her riding or dismount. Carbrey's attempt to break down the sequence of events that ultimately resulted in Carole's injuries, in terms of whether he owed a duty at each stage in time, or whether his conduct met that duty, confuses duty and conduct. See Markowitz.

Arizona follows the Restatement of Torts § 518 (1938) (old § 518) in determining a...