Dominguez v. State
| Decision Date | 26 July 2012 |
| Docket Number | NUMBER 13-10-00493-CR |
| Parties | FRANCISCO EMMANUEL DOMINGUEZ, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On appeal from the 357th District Court
of Cameron County, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINIONBefore Justices Rodriguez, Benavides, and Perkes
Appellant, Francisco Emmanuel Dominguez, was indicted for capital murder. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(2) (West 2011). He appeals his conviction for the lesser-included offense of murder, a first-degree felony. See id. § 19.02 (b)(1). Based on a jury's verdict, appellant was found guilty of murder and sentenced to twenty yearsof confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. By eight issues, including a challenge to the voluntariness of his confession and a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, appellant argues that his conviction should be reversed.1 We affirm.
After failing to arrive for work at the high school where he taught, John Edward Farr, the murder victim, was found dead in his apartment. There was no sign of forced entry and nothing in the apartment appeared to be out of order. Farr was lying in his bed on his back, dead. Farr was wearing pajamas and had been stabbed over twenty times. Farr died of severe stab wounds to the left and right internal jugular. There were no definitive defensive wounds on his body. A toxicology report revealed that Farr was intoxicated at the time of his death.
Police who arrived at the murder scene noticed that Farr's cellular phone and a laptop computer were missing. Farr's car was also missing from outside the apartment. Texas Rangers attempted to determine the location of Farr's phone in the hope that the phone would lead them to the person who killed Farr.
In the meantime, appellant's aunt contacted the Harlingen Police Department and reported that appellant admitted to killing someone. Police were dispatched tospeak with appellant's aunt. When they arrived, appellant was with his aunt, and he told one of the officers, The officer confirmed with the Texas Department of Public Safety that one of its troopers stopped appellant while he was driving Farr's car. Shortly thereafter, appellant was arrested on suspicion of murder.
The police learned from appellant's aunt that Farr was one of appellant's teachers and that Farr would give appellant money. At the time of his arrest on June 16, 2008, appellant was sixteen years old. Appellant was placed in a juvenile-detention facility until August 2008, when at age seventeen, he was certified to stand trial as an adult and transferred to an adult-detention facility. After being transferred, he gave law-enforcement officers a written statement in which he admitted to killing Farr.
Appellant's statement was admitted into evidence at trial. The beginning of appellant's statement includes a written warning and waiver of both his Miranda rights and his rights under article 38.22, section 2 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. In his statement, appellant explained that he was giving his statement "voluntarily, without fear of duress or threat, and without promise of leniency." He also explained that prior to making the statement, he was advised that he was "suspected of or charged with the offense of capital murder."
Appellant described Farr's murder and the surrounding circumstances. Appellant explained that in January 2008, he started the second semester of his freshman year at Harlingen High School South. Farr was his speech teacher. About a week into the semester, Farr arranged for appellant to be in his "Theatre Tech" class. Farr would askhim if he worked out, and he would ask him to flex his muscles. Farr said appellant could be a model or a stripper. Appellant stated that some time before spring break 2008, Farr called him on his cellular phone and told him to skip school to meet a friend of his who was a male stripper. According to his statement, appellant did so. Appellant visited Farr's apartment about ten times, and Farr would give appellant alcohol and money.
On the night of June 16, 2008, appellant called Farr and asked to borrow twenty dollars. Farr answered "yes" and told appellant to come to his apartment. After appellant drank about four mixed drinks and eight beers, Farr made multiple overt sexual advances to appellant while appellant was lifting weights. Appellant declined the advances and Farr offered him cocaine. After consuming the cocaine, appellant asked Farr if he was going to give him the twenty dollars. Farr told appellant to wait in his bedroom for the money and appellant did so. According to appellant, Farr then entered the bedroom holding a pointed object with a brown handle. Farr then attempted to molest appellant and during a struggle, appellant stabbed Farr with the pointed object. Appellant then stole some liquor from the apartment and fled in Farr's car.
Appellant attached to his written statement a drawing he made of the pointed object. It looks like an ice pick, though appellant did not use this term. On his drawing, appellant identified the "brown handle" and noted that the pointed portion measured four inches in length. Appellant signed beneath the drawing and wrote the date and time, "8-11-08 10:42 p.m."
The transcript of the hearing on appellant's motion to suppress his written statement shows that law-enforcement officers did not attempt to interrogate appellant after his arrest on June 16, 2008, because an attorney arrived at the Harlingen Police Station, stated he represented appellant, and stated no one could speak to appellant.3 On August 11, 2008, Lieutenant Rolando Castañeda of the Texas Rangers was informed that appellant had been certified to stand trial as an adult and was not represented by counsel.4 He traveled to the adult-detention facility and asked appellant if he would give a statement. Detective Frank Rolph of the Harlingen Police Department and Lieutenant Victor Escalon, Jr. of the Texas Rangers accompanied Lieutenant Castañeda when he interviewed appellant. They were present during the entire interview.
Lieutenant Castañeda testified that appellant said he wanted to talk to the law-enforcement officers the night he was arrested, but that his attorney would not let him. After being read his Miranda warnings and the warnings required under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.22, appellant spoke with the officers and gave his written statement. The record shows appellant also initialed and signed a written copy of both sets of rights. Appellant was interviewed and gave his written statement in a law library and appellant, though handcuffed, was advised he was free to take a break any timeduring his three to three-and-a-half hour conversation with the officers. Appellant was very talkative and remained calm, though not emotionless, during the conversation.
Lieutenant Castañeda testified that if appellant had told him he did not want to speak, he would not have continued the conversation. Lieutenant Castañeda admitted that at one point in the conversation he probably did tell appellant he would "talk to the District Attorney's Office without promising anything and see what happens because of his cooperation." But when asked whether he told appellant this at the outset of the conversation, Lieutenant Castañeda responded that he could not recall at what point during the interview he made this statement. In response to questioning from defense counsel about when he made the statement, Lieutenant Castañeda clarified that the start of his conversation with appellant consisted of Lieutenant Castañeda introducing himself, telling appellant he was present to hear appellant's side of the story, and reading appellant his rights after appellant said he had wanted to give a statement from the "get-go." Lieutenant Castañeda testified that he did not promise appellant a reduced sentence in exchange for his statement, and that appellant was not threatened or coerced in any way to make a statement.
Detective Rolph testified that there was no conversation with appellant about how his confession would affect his case. Lieutenant Escalon testified that he did not remember anyone telling appellant that the officers would talk to the district attorney about his cooperation.
Appellant testified at the suppression hearing and, in several respects, gave a different account of the events that preceded his statement. Appellant testified that on the day of his arrest, June 16, 2008, he told law enforcement and a magistrate judgethat he did not want to talk to any of them. He was not interrogated at that time. Appellant testified that no law-enforcement officer attempted to talk to him again until August 11, 2008, after he was certified to stand trial as an adult. When asked whether he had an attorney at the time he was certified to stand trial as an adult, appellant testified,
Appellant testified that when the law-enforcement officers came to talk to him on the night of August 11, 2008, the officers told him that they wanted to know the truth and that if he spoke to them, they would tell the district attorney to give him "less time" or "help" him "out." Appellant testified that he initially told the officers he did not want to speak, but because of their offer, he "just told them what happened from the beginning."
At the end of the suppression hearing, the trial court denied appellant's motion to suppress his written statement. The trial court found in open court that the statement was obtained in compliance with Texas...
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