Donis v. Am. Waste Servs., LLC

• Decision Date: 21 July 2020
• Docket Number: SJC-12842
• Citation: 485 Mass. 257,149 N.E.3d 361
• Parties: Elmer DONIS & others v. AMERICAN WASTE SERVICES, LLC, & others.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

485 Mass. 257

149 N.E.3d 361

Elmer DONIS & others¹

v.AMERICAN WASTE SERVICES, LLC, & others.²

SJC-12842

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Norfolk..

Argued February 13, 2020.

Decided July 21, 2020.

Robert J. Cordy (Annabel Rodriguez also present), Boston, for American Waste Services, LLC, & another.

Nicole Horberg Decter (Paige W. McKissock also present), Boston, for the plaintiffs.

The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:

Ben Robbins & Martin J. Newhouse, Boston, for New England Legal Foundation.

Maura Healey, Attorney General, & Karla E. Zarbo, Assistant Attorney General, for the Attorney General.

Joseph Michalakes & Hannah Tanabe for Immigrant Worker Center Collaborative.

Kevin C. Merritt for Massachusetts Building Trades Council & another.

Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.

LENK, J.

In this appeal, we further define the remedies available to aggrieved employees under the Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, §§ 148, 150, and the Prevailing Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, §§ 26 - 27H. The employee plaintiffs assert that, for a period of several years, they were paid less than the wages required by the Prevailing Wage Act. They brought suit against their employer, American Waste Services, LLC (AWS), as well as two officers of AWS, Christopher Carney and Michael Galvin, to remedy this statutory violation. A final judgment was granted to the plaintiffs on their claims under both statutes, on the ground that by violating the Prevailing Wage Act, the defendants violated the Wage Act as well. The defendants appealed, challenging in part whether the plaintiffs could recover under the Wage Act for a violation of the Prevailing Wage Act.

We conclude that the plaintiffs may not do so. Allowing the plaintiffs to recover under the Wage Act would provide them with a duplicative means of recovering for the defendants' purported failure to pay their employees at rates required only by the Prevailing Wage Act. This would render the remedies provided by the Prevailing Wage Act meaningless. Moreover, under the Wage Act, the plaintiffs may recover directly from the officer defendants for underpayment of wages, whereas, under the applicable provision of the Prevailing Wage Act, they may not. Therefore, to preserve the Legislature's intent in enacting these separate statutes, the plaintiffs may not avoid the limitations that the Prevailing Wage Act places on their recovery by pursuing an otherwise duplicative claim under the Wage Act.³

1. Background. The essential facts are not contested. Defendant AWS is a Massachusetts limited liability company engaged in waste collection, recycling, and disposal. The officer defendants, Carney and Galvin, were the managers of AWS; Carney was its president, and Galvin its vice-president. The plaintiffs were employed by AWS as "shakers" on waste disposal trucks. They loaded waste into trucks and operated hydraulic levers to compact the material.

From 2006 to 2011, AWS had waste disposal contracts with the towns of Foxborough, Franklin, Medway, and Wrentham; Galvin, as vice-president of AWS, signed the contracts with these municipalities. All four of the contracts required compliance with the prevailing wage laws. The Department of Labor Standards issued prevailing wage determinations (PWDs) to municipalities per budget year, based on wages in collective bargaining agreements between employers and organized labor engaged in the waste services industry. During the period of the contracts at issue, prevailing wages varied by municipality, ranging from $18.15 to $24.81 per hour.

Both Galvin and Carney were responsible for overseeing services under these municipal contracts. Galvin paid or supervised payment, and averred that he complied with the Prevailing Wage Act for the town of Foxborough. Despite these assurances, all of the plaintiffs actually were paid less than the prevailing wage; they received between sixteen dollars and seventeen dollars per hour.

The plaintiffs commenced an action in the Superior Court against all of the defendants, seeking back wages due to a failure to pay the shakers on the municipalities' routes the prevailing wages for the period from 2006 to 2011.⁴ They argued that defendants Galvin and Carney, in their roles as managers, were jointly and severally liable for all damages. In July of 2015, the plaintiffs were granted partial summary judgment. The motion judge concluded that the defendants' "chronic underpayment of the [p]laintiffs constituted a plain violation of G. L. c. 149, § 27F, as a matter of law," and that the defendants' failure to pay the plaintiffs at the prescribed wage rates also constituted a violation of the Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, § 148.

Prior to the commencement of a jury trial, the parties reached a stipulated judgment against the defendants for violations of the Wage Act and Prevailing Wage Act, and breach of contract, and the plaintiffs agreed to dismiss with prejudice the related contract claims. A final judgment was entered in 2017, and the defendants timely appealed. In May of 2019, the Appeals Court affirmed the entry of judgment on the statutory claims, but reversed judgment on the plaintiffs' breach of contract claims. See Donis v. American Waste Servs., LLC, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 317, 125 N.E.3d 759 (2019). The defendants sought further appellate review, and we granted their petition, limited to the question whether the plaintiffs could recover, under the Wage Act, for the defendants' failure to pay wage rates required by the Prevailing Wage Act.

2. Discussion. The defendants contend that the motion judge erred by concluding that the plaintiffs could pursue their underpayment claims under both the Wage Act and the Prevailing Wage Act. The crux of the defendants' argument is that G. L. c. 149, § 27F, of the Prevailing Wage Act, provides a comprehensive scheme for regulating the payment of certain wage rates to the workers for whom it applies. They argue that it therefore precludes the plaintiff workers from pursuing a duplicative cause of action, including under the Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, §§ 148, 150, to recover for the underpayment of those wage rates.

In response, the plaintiffs maintain that the motion judge and the Appeals Court rightly concluded that the expansive language of the Wage Act allows employees to recover under it when employers fail to pay prevailing wage rates. Otherwise, they argue, the remedial purposes of both the Prevailing Wage Act and Wage Act would be frustrated.

a. Standard of review. "As the case was decided below on motions for summary judgment on an undisputed record, ‘one of the moving parties is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ " Arias-Villano v. Chang & Sons Enters., Inc., 481 Mass. 625, 627, 118 N.E.3d 835 (2019), quoting Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund v. Berkshire Bank, 475 Mass. 839, 841, 62 N.E.3d 56 (2016).

Whether the Prevailing Wage Act precludes the plaintiffs from proceeding under the Wage Act "is a question of statutory interpretation, and therefore one that we review de novo." Rosnov v. Molloy, 460 Mass. 474, 476, 952 N.E.2d 901 (2011). "Where two statutes appear to be in conflict, we do not mechanically determine that the more recent or more specific statute ... trumps the other. Instead, we endeavor to harmonize the two statutes so that the policies underlying both may be honored." (Quotations and citations omitted.) George v. National Water Main Cleaning Co., 477 Mass. 371, 378, 77 N.E.3d 858 (2017).

In construing the Wage Act and the Prevailing Wage Act, we "must ascertain the intent of [each] statute from all its parts and from the subject matter to which it relates, and must interpret the statute[s] so as to render the legislation effective, consonant with sound reason and common sense." Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 445 Mass. 745, 749, 840 N.E.2d 518 (2006). See Wheatley v. Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund, 456 Mass. 594, 601, 925 N.E.2d 9 (2010), S.C., 465 Mass. 297, 988 N.E.2d 845 (2013) ("our primary duty in interpreting a statute is to effectuate the intent of the Legislature in enacting it" [quotation and citation omitted] ). See also Ropes & Gray LLP v. Jalbert, 454 Mass. 407, 412–413, 910 N.E.2d 330 (2009).

b. Statutory provisions. General Laws c. 149, § 148, of the Wage Act requires that "[e]very person having employees in his [or her] service shall pay ... each such employee the wages earned by him [or her]" within a prescribed time period. "The president and treasurer of a corporation and any officers or agents having the management of such corporation shall be deemed to be the employers of the employees of the corporation within the meaning of this section." Id. Certain employees, such as "employee[s] of a hospital which is supported in part by contributions from the commonwealth," are expressly exempted from the coverage of the Wage Act. Id. Otherwise, the Wage Act provides that "[n]o person shall by a special contract with an employee or by any other means exempt himself [or herself] from [the Wage Act]." Id.

"Whoever violates this section shall be punished or shall be subject to a civil citation or order as provided in [ G. L. c. 149, § 27C ]." G. L. c. 149, § 148. General Laws c. 149, § 27C, sets forth criminal penalties for varying levels of misconduct, and provides that "[a]s an alternative to initiating criminal proceedings ... the attorney general may issue a written warning or a civil citation." G. L. c. 149, § 27C (b ) (1).

In addition to these penalties, a separate section of the Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, § 150, creates a private right of action for employees.⁵ It provides that

"an employee claiming to be aggrieved by a violation of ... [§] 148 ... may, [ninety] days after the filing of a complaint with the attorney general, or sooner if the attorney general assents in writing, and within [three] years after the violation, institute and prosecute in his own name and on his own behalf, or for himself

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