Harvard Crimson v. President and Fellows

• Decision Date: 13 January 2006
• Citation: 445 Mass. 745,840 N.E.2d 518
• Parties: The HARVARD CRIMSON, INC. v. PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE & others.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL>
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

840 N.E.2d 518

445 Mass. 745

The HARVARD CRIMSON, INC. v.PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE & others.¹

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

Argued November 7, 2005.

Decided January 13, 2006.

Frances S. Cohen(Amber R. Anderson & Sarah R. Wunsch, Boston, with her) for the plaintiff.

Jeffrey Swope, Boston (Kara A. Krolikowski with him) for the defendants.

The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:

Adam A. Rowe, Boston, for James K. Herms & another.

Leonard M. Singer, Boston, for The Student Press Law Center & others.

Present: GREANEY, IRELAND, SPINA, COWIN, & CORDY, JJ.

SPINA, J.

We consider in this case whether certain documents in the custody of the Harvard University police department (HUPD) constitute "public records" subject to mandatory disclosure under the Massachusetts public records law, G.L. c. 66, § 10.We conclude that they are not public records subject to such disclosure.²

The material facts are not in dispute.Harvard University is a private educational institution, and the HUPD provides campus security.Some officers of the HUPD have been appointed special State police officers pursuant to G.L. c. 22C, § 63, and some HUPD officers are deputy sheriffs in Middlesex and Suffolk counties.On June 2, 2003, the Harvard Crimson, Inc.(Crimson), a daily student newspaper, requested certain documents from the Cambridge police department and the HUPD, pursuant to G.L. c. 66, § 10.The Crimson subsequently made a request for documents from the Boston police department.It sought "all records, including but not limited to incident reports and correspondence, related to certain incidents listed on HUPD's weekly log of complaints."The HUPD denied the Crimson's request, asserting that it was not a public entity and, thus, was not required to comply with the mandates of § 10.Both the Cambridge and Boston police departments provided documents to the Crimson, including incident reports.

The Crimson brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief against the President and Fellows of Harvard College, the HUPD, and the chief of police of the HUPD (collectively, Harvard), seeking disclosure of the requested documents in their custody.The complaint alleged that such documents were "public records" within the meaning of G.L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth, and were subject to mandatory disclosure under G.L. c. 66, § 10.

General Laws c. 66, § 10 (a), provides, in pertinent part:

"Every person having custody of any public record, as defined in [G.L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth], shall, at reasonable times and without unreasonable delay, permit it, or any segregable portion of a record which is an independent public record, to be inspected and examined by any person, under his supervision, and shall furnish one copy thereof upon payment of a reasonable fee."

General Laws c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth, defines "public records" as:

"[A]ll books, papers, maps, photographs, recorded tapes, financial statements, statistical tabulations, or other documentary materials or data, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by any officer or employee of any agency, executive office, department, board, commission, bureau, division or authority of the commonwealth, or of any political subdivision thereof, or of any authority established by the general court to serve a public purpose, unless such materials or data fall within [certain specified] exemptions...."

Harvard filed a motion to dismiss the Crimson's complaint pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), 365 Mass. 754(1974), on the ground that, as a private educational institution, Harvard was not one of the instrumentalities of State or local government whose records were "public" within the meaning of G.L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth.A judge in the Superior Court agreed and granted Harvard's motion to dismiss, concluding that the mere fact that HUPD officers were authorized to perform certain functions by State and local police departments did not make them officers or employees of a governmental entity such that any documents they made or received were public records subject to mandatory disclosure under G.L. c. 66, § 10.Following the filing of the Crimson's notice of appeal, the case was transferred from the Appeals Court on our own motion.

The Crimson now contends that the judge erred in concluding that documents held in the custody of the HUPD did not fall within the scope of G.L. c. 66, § 10.It points out that the statutory language manifests a clear legislative intent to give the public broad access to government documents, subject only to limited exemptions that are not pertinent here.³The Crimson argues that the appointment of some HUPD officers as special State police officers or deputy sheriffs vests them with broad police powers unique to public law enforcement agencies and, therefore, the HUPD is subject to the mandates of the public records law.Further, the Crimson asserts that it should be given the opportunity to develop a factual record to explore the scope of the authority exercised by HUPD officers and to demonstrate that such individuals are "officer[s] or employee[s]" of public entities under G.L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth.Because, as acknowledged by the Crimson, this case is one of statutory interpretation, the development of a factual record is unnecessary.We conclude that the judge did not err in determining that the documents sought by the Crimson from the HUPD were not "public records" subject to mandatory disclosure under G.L. c. 66, § 10.⁴The Crimson's complaint was properly dismissed.⁵

The purpose of rule 12(b)(6) is to permit prompt resolution of a case where the allegations in the complaint clearly demonstrate that the plaintiff's claim is legally insufficient.SeeGeneral Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Abington Cas. Ins. Co.,413 Mass. 583, 584, 602 N.E.2d 1085(1992);Fabrizio v. Quincy,9 Mass.App.Ct. 733, 734, 404 N.E.2d 675(1980).In evaluating the allowance of a motion to dismiss, we are guided by the familiar principle that a complaint is sufficient "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [its] claim which would entitle [it] to relief."Nader v. Citron,372 Mass. 96, 98, 360 N.E.2d 870(1977), quotingConley v. Gibson,355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80(1957).The allegations set forth in the complaint, as well as such reasonable inferences as may be drawn therefrom in the plaintiff's favor, are to be taken as true.SeeEyal v. Helen Broadcasting Corp.,411 Mass. 426, 429, 583 N.E.2d 228(1991), and cases cited.

A fundamental principle of statutory interpretation "is that a statute must be interpreted according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be effectuated."Hanlon v. Rollins,286 Mass. 444, 447, 190 N.E. 606(1934).SeeSullivan v. Brookline,435 Mass. 353, 360, 758 N.E.2d 110(2001).Courts must ascertain the intent of a statute from all its parts and from the subject matter to which it relates, and must interpret the statute so as to render the legislation effective, consonant with sound reason and common sense.SeeChampigny v. Commonwealth,422 Mass. 249, 251, 661 N.E.2d 931(1996);Pentucket Manor Chronic Hosp., Inc. v. Rate Setting Comm'n,394 Mass. 233, 240, 475 N.E.2d 1201(1985);Tilton v. Haverhill,311 Mass. 572, 577-578, 42 N.E.2d 588(1942).A properly promulgated regulation is to be construed in the same manner as a statute.SeePurity Supreme, Inc. v. Attorney Gen.,380 Mass. 762, 769, 407 N.E.2d 297(1980).

The primary purpose of G.L. c. 66, § 10, is to give the public broad access to government documents.SeeCape Cod Times v. Sheriff of Barnstable County,443 Mass. 587, 592, 823 N.E.2d 375(2005);General Elec. Co. v. Department of Envtl. Protection,429 Mass. 798, 802, 711 N.E.2d 589(1999);Globe Newspaper Co. v. Boston Retirement Bd.,388 Mass. 427, 436, 446 N.E.2d 1051(1983).To that end, disclosure is favored by a "presumption that the record sought is public."G.L. c. 66, § 10(c).SeeBougas v. Chief of Police of Lexington,371 Mass. 59, 61, 354 N.E.2d 872(1976)(documents presumed to be public records when possessed by public entity).See alsoMatter of a Subpoena Duces Tecum,445 Mass. 685, 687-688, 840 N.E.2d 470(2006).Such purpose, however, "should not be used as a means of disregarding the considered judgment of the Legislature that the public right of access should be restricted in certain circumstances."Globe Newspaper Co. v. Boston Retirement Bd., supra.SeeWorcester Telegram & Gazette Corp. v. Chief of Police of Worcester,436 Mass. 378, 383, 764 N.E.2d 847(2002).

General Laws c. 66, § 10, expressly limits that statute's reach to every person having custody of a "public record," as that term is defined in G.L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth.⁶That clause, in turn, provides that "[p]ublic records" are those "made or received by any officer or employee of any agency, executive office, department, board, commission, bureau, division or authority of the commonwealth, or of any political subdivision thereof, or of any authority established by the general court to serve a public purpose."G.L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth.SeeHull Mun. Lighting Plant v. Massachusetts Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co.,414 Mass. 609, 614, 609 N.E.2d 460(1993).This court has construed strictly the scope of G.L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth, to preclude the public disclosure of documents held by entities other than those specifically delineated in the statute.SeeLambert v. Executive Director of the Judicial Nominating Council,425 Mass. 406, 409, 681 N.E.2d 285(1997)(records of judicial nominating council not "public records" subject to...