Donoghue v. Beeler
| Decision Date | 30 January 1963 |
| Docket Number | No. 31703,31703 |
| Parties | F. C. DONOGHUE and Gladys D. Donoghue, his wife, Petitioners, v. William F. BEELER, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Murray Z. Klein and Julius H. Erstling, Miami, for petitioners.
Thomas A. Horkan, Jr., Miami, for respondent.
This cause having heretofore been submitted to the court on Petition for Writ of Certiorari upon the transcript of record and briefs to review the order of the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District, in said cause bearing date 27 February 1961 (petition for rehearing denied 15 March 1961), and the record having been inspected, it is ordered that said Petition be and the same is hereby denied.
This case is here on a petition for certiorari to the District Court of Appeal, Third District, on the basis of an alleged direct conflict with a prior decision of this court.
It appears that in September, 1958, one Peterson executed and delivered a promissory note to the petitioner's assignor. A chattel mortgage on certain bar fixtures and equipment was given as security for the note. Subsequently the note was negotiated and the mortgage assigned to the petitioner herein. The chattel mortgage and the assignment thereof were recorded in the Public Records of Dade County, Florida on September 23, 1958.
In January 1960, the respondent purchased the chattels from Peterson after complying with the provisions of the Florida Bulk Sales Law. The affidavit of the seller Peterson furnished pursuant to the Bulk Sales Law recited that all the fixtures and equipment had been paid for in full, despite the existence of the chattel mortgage held by petitioners. Thereafter there was a default in the payment due on the promissory note and the petitioners instituted this action to reform and foreclose the chattel mortgage. It appeared from the complaint that the recorded note and mortgage inadvertently described the property as being located at a street address other than the one at which it was actually located.
The respondent answered the complaint and asserted that he was a bona fide purchaser of the goods without knowledge of the chattel mortgage held by petitioners. Respondent also filed a motion for summary judgment accompanied by an affidavit in which he admitted ownership, by purchase, of the chattels described in the complaint, but asserted as a defense the erroneous address contained in the recorded mortgage and note.
The chancellor entered a summary final decree in favor of the respondent Beeler in which it was stated that the chattels involved were owned by the respondent 'free and clear of any lien of the mortgage asserted by the plaintiffs in their complaint'.
On appeal the District Court of Appeal, Third District, affirmed the summary decree in a per curiam order, without opinion. There was filed, however, a dissenting opinion by Horton, C. J., in which the facts, essentially as stated above, were set forth. Donoghue v. Beeler, Fla.App., 127 So.2d 125.
Petitioner seeks to invoke the jurisdiction of this court on the basis of an asserted direct conflict between the decision of the District Court of Appeal and the decision of this court in the case of First National Bank of Panama City v. First National Bank of Chipley, 90 Fla. 617, 106 So. 422, wherein the following principle of law was set forth regarding chattel mortgages:
The foremost question with which this Court is confronted is whether there exists a direct conflict within the meaning of Article V, Section 4 of the Florida Constitution, F.S.A. upon which our jurisdiction can be based.
In Lake v. Lake, Fla., 103 So.2d 639, this court discharged a writ of certiorari predicated on an asserted direct conflict because the decision of the district court consisted of the single word 'Affirmed'. The reasoning behind the decision in the Lake case was that this court was granted certiorari jurisdiction in 'conflict' cases so that harmony and uniformity in the law could be maintained. It was held, in effect, that since the district court had affirmed the decision of the lower court without opinion, its decision could not prima facie conflict with any decision of another district court or this court. It was also pointed out that the primary function of the court, in the exercise of its 'conflict certiorari' jurisdiction, is the 'standardization of decisions on the same point of law'; and that the Supreme Court will not, therefore, 'dig into a record' to determine the existence of a conflict.
The instant case is readily distinguishable from Lake v. Lake, supra, by virtue of the opinion of the dissenting judge filed herein. As previously pointed out, that dissent contains a summary of the facts of the case. Moreover, it should be observed that the basic facts are undisputed, and that the cause was decided by the trial court on the pleadings and on the affidavit of the respondent. The statement of the case contained in the dissenting judge's opinion is not, therefore, merely one judge's interpretation of the evidence; it is rather a recital of undisputed matters of record.
In Rosenthal v. Scott, Fla., 131 So.2d 480, another case involving the certiorari jurisdiction of this court in the basis of a direct conflict, it was held that one district court judge's special concurring opinion, although not adopted by a majority of the district court, provided an adequate factual background for the Supreme Court to enter an order returning the cause to the district court with the request that the majority of that court prepare and adopt an opinion. Likewise, in the case before us, we may consider the factual background of the case as contained in the dissenting opinion to determine whether the result reached by the majority of the court is in direct conflict with a prior decision of this court. This practice is in keeping with the Supreme Court's role of maintaining uniformity and dispelling confusion in the law. Certainly, where the undisputed facts of a cause are reported and spread upon the pages of the decisional law of the state, the result reached by the majority of the court on that state of facts is not without some impact on...
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Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc., 32357
...Lake case. In most cases the petition was simply denied without opinion--and, occasionally, with a dissenting opinion. See Donoghue v. Beeler, Fla.1963, 149 So.2d 534. In others, we have found probable conflict and have remanded the cause to the appellate court with the request that an opin......