Dorbolo v. State
| Decision Date | 18 July 1979 |
| Parties | Jay DORBOLO, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Delaware |
Upon appeal from Superior Court. Affirmed.
Richard E. Fairbanks, Jr., Asst. Public Defender, Wilmington, for defendant below, appellant.
James A. Natalie, Jr., Deputy Atty. Gen., Wilmington, for plaintiff below, appellee.
Before McNEILLY, QUILLEN and HORSEY, JJ.
Defendant, Jay Dorbolo, appeals his Superior Court jury convictions of two charges of felony theft and one charge of conspiracy, contending that the Trial Court erred in admitting inculpatory oral statements made by defendant without a sufficient showing of a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to remain silent and his right to the assistance of counsel during interrogation.
Prior to trial defendant moved to suppress the inculpatory oral statements made by him after informing the interrogating officers that he wished to remain silent and to have the Public Defender present during questioning. Following an evidentiary suppression hearing held outside the presence of the jury, the Trial Judge, announcing his ruling from the bench, denied the motion with the following observations:
"To sum it all up, I credit the testimony of Officer Rees. After being advised of his rights, and he admits that that happened, that he was aware of his rights, he said, "I'm willing to talk to you, but I won't sign a statement until I consult with a lawyer. " I make this finding in part because of my assessment of the Defendant's demeanor. He is like Miss Campo, young, but is very much unlike her in personality and in form of sophistication. He strikes me as glib and flip. He is a person who was aware that he was wanted for this charge for three months, or at least two months. I think he said three months. He was making arrangements on his own to make sure that he had bail when the time came for him to be placed in custody. I don't think he was intimidated at all. I think, frankly, he just outfoxed himself a little. I think he was playing games with the police. I don't know whether he thought in his own mind that only a written statement could be used, and not an oral statement. There is no point in trying to figure out what was going on in his own mind. I think he was playing games, thought he was helping himself, and it turns out he made some admissions. Under the circumstances, I find no reason to suppress those admissions.
While it is a red light and a danger signal when one hears that there was any mention of a lawyer, one looks closely. I don't believe this is the situation where the police just ignored an absolute request for a lawyer, but rather happened as Officer Rees said it happened. I don't think this is a case where there was a slick officer taking advantage of an ignorant defendant who is under pressure, but simply the defendant decided that he would talk for his own reasons, but that he wouldn't sign any statements until he talked to a lawyer.
The question comes down to what was the obligation of the officers. I think they have no affirmative obligation to cease questioning at that point because the Defendant indicated a willingness to talk. The Defendant admits that he knew that he had been advised of his rights, understood them. There was no statement on his part that he was misled in any way. The rights say nothing about written statements, but really are slanted, I would submit, more towards oral statements. So the Defendant was probably caught in his own sophistication in that area. I think the case is distinguishable from the ones that are cited by the defendant, where there was a request to see a lawyer and a very different kind of defendant and police officers used some kind of a ruse to get the defendant to talk in spite of that request. So on the factual basis, the motion to suppress the incriminating statements is denied. Of course, if there is testimony on the issue, I will instruct the jury appropriately, if there is dispute in the trial itself as to whether any admission was actually made. I will allow them to ultimately find that fact."
The threshold question in this appeal is whether defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to remain silent and his right to counsel. The Trial Judge found the defendant had made a knowing and voluntary waiver, and thereafter he submitted the issue to the jury. See State v. Rooks, Del.Supr., 401 A.2d 943 (1979).
Under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) the requirements of warnings and waiver of rights became a fundamental mandate of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination. The giving and understanding of the Miranda warnings is not in dispute. *
The sole issue before this Court is that of waiver:
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...co-defendant) to agents of the State."6 We note that Delaware police have occasionally given the fifth warning. See Dorbolo v. State, Del.Supr., 405 A.2d 106, 108 n. 1 (1979); State v. Oakes, Del.Supr., 373 A.2d 210, 213 n. 6 (1977). Neither Dorbolo nor Oakes requires the fifth Miranda warn......
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