Dorenfield v. State, 6734; Motion No. 11414.
Decision Date | 30 May 1934 |
Docket Number | No. 6734; Motion No. 11414.,6734; Motion No. 11414. |
Citation | 73 S.W.2d 83 |
Parties | DORENFIELD v. STATE ex rel. ALLRED. |
Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Quo warranto proceeding by the State, on the relation of James V. Allred, against Julius Dorenfield, Jr., in which R. L. Holliday was a party. From an adverse order, Julius Dorenfield, Jr., appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. On certified questions.
Questions answered.
White, Taylor & Gardner and Ocie Speer, all of Austin, for appellant.
R. L. Batts and Dan Moody, both of Austin, and James V. Allred, Atty. Gen., and Elbert Hooper and Scott Gaines, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee.
For the purposes of this opinion, the statement of the nature and result of this suit is adopted from the brief for appellant, Dorenfield, in the following words:
The material facts, controlling a proper determination of the questions certified, are recited in the certificate of the Court of Civil Appeals as follows:
We answer to the certified questions that the Speaker of the House of Representatives was not legally vested with power and authority to remove respondent Holliday from his office as a member of the Texas relief commission; and that the action of the Speaker as detailed in the certificate was wholly ineffectual to remove respondent.
The law necessitating the above answers is clear and plain. We find no conflict in the carefully considered authorities.
The voters of Texas, having adopted a constitutional amendment, authorizing the Legislature to cause bonds to be issued to furnish relief to needy and unemployed people, the Legislature by an amended act, under which respondent Holliday was appointed, provided for the creation of "the Texas Relief Commission." Chapter 37, Acts, First Called Session, 43d Leg., 1933, page 118 (Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. arts. 842b, 5190a; Vernon's Ann. P. C. art. 107c).
Section 3 of section 11 of that act (Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. art. 5190a, § 3) among other matters, provided:
By section 1 of section 11 (Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. art. 5190a, § 1), the Legislature provided: "Said Commission shall cease to exist on August 26, 1935."
Respondent was one of the three members of the commission who was duly appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives; and he qualified by taking the constitutional oath of office.
Language could hardly make plainer than does section one of the act that respondent then became a state officer for a term to end on August 26, 1935. The Legislature did not stop with giving respondent a certain tenure of his office, but it expressly declared its intent for the Speaker to name a successor to respondent after his removal, only in the event of his "removal for cause."
Section 17 of article 16 of the Constitution commanded respondent, he "being one of the officers within this state," to continue to perform the duties of his office until his successor was duly qualified. Part 2, Vernon's Annotated Texas Constitution, p. 648.
The Constitution made it the mandatory duty of respondent to continue in his state office until August 26, 1935, he having meanwhile neither resigned nor died, until he was removed ...
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