Dormire v. Wilkinson

• Decision Date: 10 April 2001
• Docket Number: No. 00-3383,APPELLANT-RESPONDENT,APPELLEE-PETITIONER,00-3383
• Citation: 249 F.3d 801
• Parties: (8th Cir. 2001) DAVE DORMIRE,, v. RAYMOND WILKINSON, Submitted:
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 801

249 F.3d 801 (8th Cir. 2001)

DAVE DORMIRE, APPELLANT-RESPONDENT, v. RAYMOND WILKINSON, APPELLEE-PETITIONER.

No. 00-3383

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

Submitted: April 10, 2001

Filed: May 10, 2001

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.

Before Wollman, Chief Judge, Murphy, Circuit Judge, and Carman ¹ , Judge.

Murphy, Circuit Judge.

After the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions for attempted robbery, first degree assault, and two counts of armed criminal action and denied him post conviction relief, Raymond Wilkinson filed a habeas petition in federal court. The district court granted his petition, and the State appeals. We reverse.

Wilkinson was arrested in connection with four armed robberies at a rest stop on Interstate 55 in Pemiscot County, Missouri. A suspect had been described by victims as an African American man driving a maroon sports car. Police saw such a car at the rest stop and learned it was registered to Wilkinson. The Pemiscot County sheriff's office put the area under surveillance, and Deputy Sheriff Rodney Ivie spotted Wilkinson's car and followed him as he left the area. Ivie stopped Wilkinson, arrested him, and read him his Miranda rights. Ivie also searched the car and discovered a hand gun under the driver seat. Ivie then transported Wilkinson to the sheriff's office.

After Wilkinson arrived at the sheriff's office, Ivie again read him his rights from a written form. Wilkinson read the form and stated that he understood his rights, but he declined to sign the waiver portion of the form. Wilkinson asked Ivie if he could call his girlfriend, and Ivie told him that he could not. Wilkinson then asked "Could I call my lawyer?" Ivie answered "yes" to that question. Wilkinson did not say anything further about wanting a lawyer, and Ivie asked him about the robberies. Wilkinson initially denied any involvement, then stated that the crimes had been committed by a couple from Arkansas to whom he had loaned his car. He finally told authorities that he was responsible for all the robberies, and signed a written form which contained his statements.

At a hearing the day before trial, Wilkinson moved to suppress his statements to Ivie on the basis that his confession had been obtained in violation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Ivie, who was the sole witness at the hearing, testified that he had never refused Wilkinson permission to call a lawyer, and that he would have allowed Wilkinson to call counsel if he had asked to do so. He also testified that he would have stopped taking Wilkinson's statement if Wilkinson had indicated that he did not want to continue. There was no evidence that Wilkinson requested termination of the interrogation at any time. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and a jury subsequently convicted Wilkinson of all four counts. He was sentenced to four consecutive terms of fifteen years imprisonment.

Wilkinson filed a motion for post conviction relief under Missouri Supreme Court Rule 29.15, but it was denied as untimely. On consolidated appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, as well as the denial of his motion for post conviction relief. See State v. Wilkinson, 861 S.W.2d 746 (Mo.Ct.App. 1993). The state court rejected Wilkinson's contentions that he had invoked his right to counsel and that his rights to counsel and due process of law had been violated by use of his confession. Id. at 749. The court considered Supreme Court decisions on right to counsel, namely Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), and Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91 (1984), as well as a Missouri case construing them, State v. Reese, 795 S.W.2d 69 (Mo.1990) (en banc). Reese had explained that a defendant's rights under Edward and Smith "attach only if the defendant indicates a desire for the assistance of counsel in his dealings with the police." Id. at 749 (a position not inconsistent with the subsequently decided Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994)). The Missouri Court of Appeals determined that Wilkinson "never requested a lawyer to assist him in his dealings with the police," but "merely asked if he could call one." Id. Because "[h]e was given th[e] opportunity [to call an attorney] and, for reasons only known to him, declined to do so," the court concluded that Wilkinson's confession was not taken in violation of his constitutional rights. Id.

Wilkinson then filed a petition in federal district court for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, alleging four grounds for relief. The district court granted relief on his claim that his conviction was obtained by use of a confession taken in violation of his Miranda rights. It held that the state court decision correctly recognized the clearly established Supreme Court precedent, but that it had unreasonably applied that law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The district court cited Edwards for the proposition that once an accused requests counsel, any interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. Wilkinson's question "Could I call my lawyer" was seen by the district court as an unambiguous request for counsel requiring an end to interrogation. The court granted Wilkinson's petition and ordered that his conviction and sentence be vacated, and the State appeals from the judgment.

Our review of Wilkinson's petition is limited by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), which provides that federal courts are prohibited from granting habeas relief on "any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim . . . resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Here, the state court correctly identified and cited the holdings of Miranda and its progeny, and habeas relief can only be justified if the state court decision was "unreasonable in applying the governing legal principle to the facts of the case." Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 166 (2000).

Miranda v. Arizona established that "a suspect subject to custodial interrogation has the right to consult with an attorney and to have counsel present during questioning, and that the police must explain this right to him before questioning begins." Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457 (1994) (citing Miranda). The Court further held in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981), that if an accused expresses his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, he cannot be subjected to further interrogation until a lawyer has been made available unless the suspect himself initiates further communication with the police. In Davis, 512 U.S. at 459 (...