Dornath v. Emp't Appeal Bd.
| Docket Number | 21-1948 |
| Decision Date | 31 March 2023 |
| Citation | 988 N.W.2d 687 |
| Parties | Kyle A. DORNATH, Appellant, v. EMPLOYMENT APPEAL BOARD, Appellee, Winger Contracting Company, Intervenor-Appellee. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Jason R. McClitis of Blake & Uhlig, P.A., Kansas City, Kansas, for appellant.
Rick Autry, Employment Appeal Board, Des Moines, for appellee Employment Appeal Board.
Gayla R. Harrison of Harrison, Moreland, Webber & Simplot, P.C., Ottumwa, for appellee Winger Contracting Company.
McDermott, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which all participating justices joined. Christensen, C.J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Requirements for ongoing training to sharpen skills or stay current with developments are, for many, faits accomplis in fields that require accreditation. In this case, we're presented with the question whether the law entitles a worker to unemployment insurance benefits when he is required to attend a weeklong training without compensation from his employer.
Kyle Dornath is an apprentice electrician. As part of his apprenticeship program, he is required to attend occasional classroom training sessions that take place during the work week. Dornath's employer, Winger Electric, requires him to be a part of the apprenticeship program and excuses him from his usual duties to attend the trainings.
In May 2020, Dornath attended a weeklong training as part of his apprenticeship curriculum. Winger Electric didn't pay him for the week he was in training. Under Iowa law, full-time employees are generally eligible for state unemployment benefits when they do not work but are able to work, available for work, and actively seeking work. Iowa Code § 96.4(3) (2021). Dornath, believing he met the law's criteria, filed a claim for unemployment benefits.
The department of workforce development denied his claim. Dornath appealed to the employment appeal board, which affirmed the department's denial. Dornath then sought judicial review with the district court, which likewise affirmed the denial. In this appeal, Dornath asks us to reverse these decisions and grant his claim for unemployment benefits.
We review challenges to a state agency's unemployment benefits decision under the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, Iowa Code chapter 17A. Titan Tire Corp. v. Emp. Appeal Bd. , 641 N.W.2d 752, 754 (Iowa 2002). We will grant appropriate relief if we determine that "substantial rights of the person seeking judicial relief have been prejudiced" by the agency action. Iowa Code § 17A.19(10). We defer to the agency's views on those "particular matters that have been vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency." Id. § 17A.19(11)(c ). In our review of the district court's decision, we "apply the standards set forth in section 17A.19(10) and determine whether our application of those standards produce the same result as reached by the district court." Auen v. Alcoholic Beverages Div. , 679 N.W.2d 586, 589 (Iowa 2004).
Dornath focuses on three provisions in that statute, urging that the Board's decision (1) is based on "an erroneous interpretation of a provision of law" not within the agency's discretion; (2) "is not supported by substantial evidence in the record" when viewed in its entirety; or (3) is "[o]therwise unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion." Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(c ), (f ), (n ).
To establish a right to unemployment benefits, Dornath must show that he was available for work under Iowa Code section 96.4(3) or, if he can't, that he was partially or temporarily unemployed under section 96.1A(37), paragraph (b )(1) or paragraph (c ). Failing to establish any of these alternative grounds renders Dornath ineligible for unemployment benefits.
Our analysis of whether Dornath is eligible for unemployment benefits begins with Iowa Code section 96.4. It spells out the basic eligibility requirements as follows: "An unemployed individual shall be eligible to receive benefits with respect to any week only if the department finds that ... [t]he individual is able to work, is available for work, and is earnestly and actively seeking work." Id. § 96.4(3). Neither Dornath's ability to work nor his earnest pursuit of work are in doubt; he was able to work and already employed. The question is whether Dornath was "available for work" while he attended the classroom training. Id. Dornath bears the burden to prove that he meets the statute's eligibility requirements. Id. § 96.6(2).
Dornath argues that he was available for work the week he attended the training.
His typical work schedule comprised four days—Monday through Thursday, 6:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. The training he attended went from Monday through Friday, 8:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. Winger Electric didn't schedule him for any regular work that week even though, as Dornath points out, the training class schedule didn't completely overlap his regular work hours.
Yet Dornath testified that it was not possible for him to go to the training and also to work full-time that week. The agency (and the district court) took Dornath's testimony at face value and determined that his attendance at training that week was "full time," leaving him unable to also perform services for his employer full time. Dornath in this appeal attempts to explain away his statement as inartful (referring to it as "gotcha testimony") and as refuted by other evidence. But we find nothing inaccurate in Dornath's admission. Although we consider all evidence in reviewing an agency decision, including evidence contrary to the agency's finding, "support for the agency finding can be gathered from any part of the evidence." Hy-Vee, Inc. v. Emp. Appeal Bd. , 710 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 2005) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Burns v. Bd. of Nursing , 495 N.W.2d 698, 699 (Iowa 1993) ). We defer to the agency's factual findings if "substantial evidence" in the record supports them. Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f ) ; Sladek v. Emp. Appeal Bd. , 939 N.W.2d 632, 637 (Iowa 2020). The board's conclusion that he was unavailable for work finds substantial support in the record.
A. Partially Unemployed. But failing to prove availability isn't fatal to Dornath's claim. Employees may still establish a right to benefits under two exceptions included in section 96.4(3). Under these exceptions, Dornath need not prove ability to work or availability for work if he can show that he was (1) partially unemployed while working at his regular job under Iowa Code section 96.1A(37)(b )(1) or (2) temporarily unemployed under section 96.1A(37)(c ). We review agency legal interpretations under the errors-at-law standard and do not defer to the board when it interprets statutory language. Sladek , 939 N.W.2d at 637.
In determining whether a claimant is "partially unemployed," we look to the definition of that term in section 96.1A(37)(b ). As relevant here, it states that a claimant is partially unemployed when, "[w]hile employed at the individual's then regular job, the individual works less than the regular full-time week and ... earns less than the individual's weekly benefit amount plus fifteen dollars." Id. § 96.1A(37)(b )(1). Focusing on the phrase "works less than the regular full-time week," the board reasoned that either (1) the training constituted work for Winger Electric, in which case Dornath performed services for his employer on a full-time basis that week, or (2) the training did not constitute work, in which case Dornath was not working at all —not merely less than in a regular week. Under either line of reasoning—working full-time or working no time—Dornath was not partially unemployed.
Accepting for the moment Dornath's argument that the training class constituted "work" for Winger Electric, we find no error in how the board and district court interpreted the phrase "less than the regular full-time week." Id. § 96.1A(37)(b )(1). Under the agency's regulations, full-time week refers to hours or days "established by schedule, custom, or otherwise" for "a week of full-time work for the kind of service an individual performs for an employing unit." Iowa Admin. Code r. 871—24.1(135)(c ). Simply because the training class in total ran slightly shorter than his average workweek does not itself establish that the training class was less than full time. The training spanned an entire five-day work week, for seven and a half hours each day, overlapping closely the days and hours of Dornath's regular schedule—even when accounting for his usual four-day schedule.
The district court also explained how Dornath's argument could be viewed as internally inconsistent. If, as he argues, his training class really constitutes work for Winger Electric, then the days and hours of his training week are exactly "a week of full-time work for the kind of service an individual performs for an employing unit." See id. (defining full-time week ). Dornath's own argument, under this lens, means that he was not "partially unemployed" by Winger Electric when he attended training full-time all week.
On the other hand, if Dornath was not performing services for Winger Electric when attending the training, then he performed no services that week and was totally unemployed. See Iowa Code § 96.1A(37)(a ) (defining totally unemployed ). This brings us back to the question of availability under section 96.4(3) because total unemployment—unlike partial and temporary unemployment—is not one of the exceptions that exempt a claimant from having to prove ability and availability for work. In other words, if Dornath was totally unemployed that week, he would have been required to prove that he was both able and available to work. Id. § 96.4(3). And as we discussed above, the agency properly determined that Dornath was unavailable for work while he attended the training class. Dornath thus fails to...
To continue reading
Request your trial