Dorsey v. BETHEL AME

Decision Date06 June 2003
Docket NumberNo. 58,58
Citation825 A.2d 388,375 Md. 59
PartiesPaul DORSEY, et al. v. BETHEL A.M.E. CHURCH.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

Ann M. Lembo, Baltimore, for Petitioners.

James A. Dunbar (Jennifer M. Horn of Venable, Baetjer and Howard, LLP, on brief), Towson, for Respondent.

Argued before BELL, C.J., ELDRIDGE, RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL and BATTAGLIA, JJ ELDRIDGE, Judge.

In an administrative action for the approval of a development plan, the Board of Appeals of Baltimore County remanded the matter to the Baltimore County Hearing Officer for further proceedings. The petitioners then brought, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, an action for judicial review of the Board of Appeals' decision. The Circuit Court dismissed the action on the ground that there was no final administrative decision and that, therefore, the judicial review action was premature. The Court of Special Appeals ultimately dismissed the petitioners' appeal to that court on the ground that they lacked standing. The Court of Special Appeals' decision was erroneous, and we shall reverse it. The Circuit Court's decision was correct, and we shall direct that it be affirmed.

I.

The respondent, Bethel A.M.E. Church, owns a 255 acre parcel of land on Old Court Road in Baltimore County, and Bethel desires to build a new church building and related facilities on the land. Churches are permitted under the zoning applicable to the land, but the Baltimore County development regulations require that Bethel obtain County approval of its development plan before proceeding to construct the church building and related facilities. Bethel filed for approval of its plan, and a hearing before the designated Baltimore County Hearing Officer began on August 28, 2000, and continued over several days in September 2000. By agreement of the parties, the record remained open until the middle of October 2000 for the submission of memoranda.

On October 30, 2000, the Hearing Officer issued a twenty-five page "interlocutory" opinion and an order ruling in favor of Bethel on all issues except one, which related to the adequacy of the surrounding roads to carry the anticipated traffic volumes to and from the Bethel Church. The Hearing Officer ordered Bethel to submit additional evidence on the traffic issue at a subsequent hearing before the Officer.

The Greater Patapsco Community Association, Inc., by Rosalyn N. Roddy, the Association's President, took an appeal from the Hearing Officer's interlocutory decision to the Baltimore County Board of Appeals. The Association's "Petition In Support Of Appeal," filed with the Board of Appeals, argued, inter alia, that the Hearing Officer was not authorized to issue an " `interlocutory' ruling" and that the Baltimore County Code required that the Hearing Officer issue a "final decision" within fifteen days of the "final hearing" or fifteen days from the time the record became closed. The hearing before the Board of Appeals consisted of oral argument on the law, with Rosalyn Roddy, the Association's President, and Kathleen Skullney, another member of the Association, arguing that the Hearing Officer's decision was unauthorized, and with Bethel's attorney arguing to the contrary. Ms. Skullney also testified as to the nature of the Association, its geographical coverage, and its members. The transcript discloses that other protestants were present, and when the President offered to introduce them, the Board Chairman indicated that it would not be necessary and that, "[i]f there's ... no counsel ... here, no one is represented by counsel, just go around and they can appear."

In January 2001, the Board of Appeals filed an opinion holding that the Hearing Officer's interlocutory decision was authorized. The Board filed an order stating "that the matter is not ripe for appeal at this time" and ordering

"that this matter be and is hereby REMANDED to the Hearing Officer for findings in accordance with his interlocutory order. Any party then aggrieved would have the right to appeal, in full, to this Board, on all issues of the subject Development Plan."

Next, a petition was filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County for judicial review of the Board of Appeals' decision. The ten named plaintiffs in the petition, as amended, were the Greater Patapsco Community Association, Inc., Rosalyn Roddy who had argued before the Board of Appeals as the Association's President, Kathleen Skullney who had argued and testified before the Board of Appeals, and seven individuals who were residents of the area where the land is located and who stated that they "were parties to the County Board of Appeals of Baltimore County proceeding which is the subject of this petition."

Bethel filed in the Circuit Court a motion to dismiss the petition for judicial review on the ground that the administrative decision was not final and, therefore, was not ripe for judicial review. The petitioners responded by arguing that the Board of Appeals' decision was final, as the entire case was remanded to the Hearing Officer and there was nothing further for the Board of Appeals to do. Bethel, in reply, contended that, as a pre-condition for judicial review, it is the administrative decision which must be final and not simply the Board of Appeals' decision. Following oral argument, the Circuit Court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground that the action for judicial review "is premature." The plaintiffs then filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. The notice of appeal was in the names of the Association and the individuals, and was signed by the President of the Association and by all of the other eight individuals who had signed the petition for judicial review.

In the Court of Special Appeals, the appellee-respondent Bethel, in addition to its brief defending the Circuit Court's decision, filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the Association was the only party to the proceeding before the Board of Appeals and that the nine individuals who had signed the petition for judicial review and the notice of appeal were not parties before the Board of Appeals. According to Bethel, the Association, which was allegedly the only party to the administrative proceedings, was not a party to the judicial review action and the appeal. Bethel maintained that the individuals, because they allegedly had not been parties to the administrative proceedings, lacked standing to bring the judicial review action and to prosecute an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.

The Court of Special Appeals on March 4, 2002, filed an opinion which it designated as "Reported." In that opinion, the intermediate appellate court held that the Association was a party throughout the proceedings, was a party to the judicial review action and the appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, and therefore had standing to maintain the appeal. Bethel's motion to dismiss was denied as to the Association. The Court of Special Appeals' March 4th opinion, however, held that the individuals lacked standing to bring the judicial review action and maintain the appeal because, according to the appellate court, they had not been parties to the hearing before the Board of Appeals. The Court of Special Appeals granted Bethel's motion to dismiss the individuals' appeal. Finally, the March 4th opinion held that the Association was entitled to judicial review of the Board of Appeals' final decision remanding the case, that the judgment of the Circuit Court would be reversed, and that the case would be remanded to the Circuit Court for a decision on the merits of the Association's judicial review action.

Bethel filed in the Court of Special Appeals a motion for reconsideration, asserting that the Association was not a party to the judicial review action and was not included in the notice of appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. The Court of Special Appeals, in an "Unreported" opinion filed on May 13, 2002, withdrew its opinion of March 4, 2002, held that the Association was not a party to the judicial review action or the appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, and dismissed the appeal "as to all appellants."

The appellants in the Court of Special Appeals filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari which we granted. Dorsey v. Bethel A.M.E., 370 Md. 268, 805 A.2d 265 (2002). As earlier indicated, we shall hold that the individual petitioners were parties before the Board of Appeals, had standing to bring the judicial review action, had standing to maintain the appeal, and are proper parties in this Court.1 We shall further hold that the Circuit Court correctly dismissed the action as premature.

II.

In dismissing the appeal on the ground that the nine individual petitioners lacked standing in the judicial review action because they were allegedly not parties before the Baltimore County Board of Appeals, the Court of Special Appeals committed several errors.

A.

First, it is clear that the individual petitioners were parties in the Circuit Court, were aggrieved by the Circuit Court's dismissal of their action, did sign a timely notice of appeal, and were properly parties-appellants in the Court of Special Appeals. As parties in the Circuit Court aggrieved by a final judgment of the Circuit Court, they were entitled to appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. See Maryland Code (1957, 2001 Repl.Vol., 2002 Supp.), Art. 25A, § 5(U), which provides in relevant part as follows:

"Any party to the proceeding in the circuit court [in an action to review a County Board of Appeals' decision] aggrieved by the decision of the court may appeal from the decision to the Court of Special Appeals in the same manner as provided for in civil cases."2

If the Court of Special Appeals' holding as to standing had been correct, namely that the individual appellants-petitioners lacked standing to maintain the judicial review action because they were not parties...

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