Dorsey v. State
| Decision Date | 18 October 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 546, No. 1998. |
| Citation | 761 A.2d 807 |
| Parties | James DORSEY, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Delaware |
Stephen B. Potter, Jennifer-Kate Aaronson, Potter, Carmine & Leonard, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, Adam Balick, Balick & Balick, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellant.
Peggy J. Hageman, Cynthia R. Kelsey, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellee.
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, HOLLAND, HARTNETT1, and BERGER, Justices (constituting the Court en Banc). HOLLAND, Justice, for the majority.
The defendant-appellant, James Dorsey, was charged with Murder in the First Degree, Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony and Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited. Following a jury trial in the Superior Court, Dorsey was convicted on all charges. Dorsey filed a Motion for a New Trial on the grounds of prosecutorial misconduct and inadmissible evidence. The Superior Court granted Dorsey's motion with respect to two convictions: Murder in the First Degree and Possession of a Firearm During Commission of a Felony.
This is Dorsey's direct appeal from the final judgment of conviction on the charge of Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited. Dorsey contends that the Superior Court erroneously denied his Motion to Suppress the State's use of the firearms as evidence. According to Dorsey, the warrant that authorized a search of his automobiles for those weapons was not supported by probable cause in violation of his rights under the Delaware Constitution and applicable statutes.
This Court has concluded that the warrant to search Dorsey's automobiles was issued without a demonstration of probable cause. The protection against unreasonable searches that is afforded to all persons by the Delaware Constitution requires the suppression of illegally seized items as evidence. Accordingly, Dorsey's conviction for Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited must be reversed.
On August 14, 1996, at 4:05 p.m., Dorsey called 911 to request police and ambulance assistance at 615 W. 5th Street, Wilmington. City of Wilmington police officers responded and found the body of Frank Williams in an upstairs bedroom. It appeared that Williams had suffered a single gun shot wound to the head. Police searched the immediate area but failed to locate a gun. Police then interviewed Dorsey, who indicated that he owned the building and rented a room to Williams. The building also housed four or five other tenants.
Later that same day, police applied for and received a search warrant for the premises known as 615 W. 5th Street. The application for that search warrant indicated that the items the police wanted to search for were "an unknown caliber handgun and ammunition" and "any clothing or items that appeared to have the presence of blood." The warrant also indicated the police would be "processing ... the house for physical evidence, to include but not limited to: videotaping, photo's [sic], latent prints, and any other evidence which may assist in the investigation of the death of Frankie Williams." The police executed the search warrant for the premises at approximately 6:00 p.m. That search warrant is not an issue in this appeal.
While still executing the search warrant for the premises described as 615 W. 5th Street, the police applied for and obtained a second warrant to search two automobiles, a 1986 Dodge 600 and a 1989 Cadillac DeVille. The two automobiles were owned by and registered to Dorsey. That search warrant is the subject matter of this appeal.
In the affidavit for the warrant to search Dorsey's vehicles, the police alleged the following facts in support of probable cause:
The application indicated the police wanted to search for "any clothing or items that appeared to have the presence of blood" and "an unknown caliber handgun."
The police executed the search warrant for the two vehicles at approximately 7:50 p.m. Seized from the 1989 Cadillac DeVille were the following items: (1) a Smith and Wesson .38 Special; (2) a Harrington and Richardson Arms .38 Special; (3) a box of .38 Special ammunition and (4) photos of the vehicle.
Dorsey filed a Motion to Suppress the evidence that was seized pursuant to the warrant issued to search his two vehicles. The Superior Court held a hearing on the Suppression Motion over the course of three different days. At the initial Suppression Hearing, the State argued that probable cause to search Dorsey's vehicles was established within the four corners of the affidavit or, in the alternative, if the search warrant failed, a warrantless search of Dorsey's vehicles was valid pursuant to the automobile exception. When the Suppression Hearing resumed a few weeks later, the State withdrew the argument that probable cause to search Dorsey's vehicles existed outside of the affidavit. Accordingly, the Superior Court considered and ruled on the sole issue of whether the affidavit in support of the search warrant established probable cause.
The Superior Court issued a written decision denying Dorsey's Motion to Suppress. The rationale for the Superior Court's ruling was as follows:
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Superior Court concluded that the warrant to search Dorsey's automobiles was supported by an affidavit establishing probable cause. Therefore, the Superior Court denied Dorsey's Motion to Suppress the evidence seized during the execution of that warrant.
The Delaware Constitution provides that a search warrant cannot be issued "unless there be probable cause supported by oath or affirmation."3
Section 6. The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, from unreasonable searches and seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or thing, shall issue without describing them as particularly as may be; nor then, unless there be probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.4
Section 2306 of Title 11 of the Delaware Code prescribes specific statutory requirements that were promulgated by the General Assembly in furtherance of the Delaware Constitution's probable cause provision:
The application or complaint for a search warrant shall be in writing, signed by the complainant and verified by his oath or affirmation. It shall designate the house, place, conveyance or person to be searched and the owner or occupant thereof (if any), and shall describe the things or persons sought as particularly as may be, and shall substantially allege the cause for which the search is made or the offense committed by or in relation to the persons or things searched for, and shall state that the complainant suspects that such persons or things are concealed in the house, place, conveyance or person designated and shall recite the facts upon which such suspicion is founded.5
Section 2307 authorizes a judicial officer to issue a warrant:
If the judge, justice of the peace or other magistrate finds that the facts recited in the complaint constitute probable cause for the search, that...
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