Dorsey v. State
Decision Date | 16 January 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 3D01-679.,3D01-679. |
Citation | 806 So.2d 559 |
Parties | Dwayne Curtis DORSEY, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender and Andrew Stanton, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Paulette R. Taylor, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before COPE and GERSTEN, JJ., and NESBITT, Senior Judge.
The State charged Defendant, Dwayne Curtis Dorsey, with battery on a law enforcement officer and resisting an officer with violence. Dorsey entered a plea of not guilty and the case proceeded to trial by jury. The jury found Dorsey guilty of the resisting with violence charge and acquitted him of the battery charge. Judgment was entered and Dorsey was sentenced as a Habitual Violent Felony Offender to five years imprisonment. On appeal, Dorsey argues that two erroneous rulings during the jury selection process entitle him to reversal of his conviction and remand for retrial. We affirm the order under review.
Dorsey's first claim of error goes to venireperson Edwin McLean. During voir dire, McLean testified as to several mixed experiences with the police. McLean assured the court that these experiences would have no impact on his decision making in the instant case. This dialogue included the following exchange.
Despite McLean's mixed experiences, defense counsel moved to dismiss McLean for cause, based on his affiliation with the police and his initial response that the affiliation might affect him. The State maintained that McLean had adequately clarified his earlier statement. The trial court denied the cause challenge and the defense exercised a peremptory challenge against McLean.
Dorsey maintains that the trial court erred in declining to excuse McLean for cause on the basis of incompetency. We disagree. McLean expressed certain beliefs but also stated that he could set aside his personal views and follow the law in light of the evidence presented. It is true that in Price v. State, 538 So.2d 486, 489 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), we observed the practical truth that "a juror who is being asked leading questions is more likely to `please' the judge and give the rather obvious answers indicated by the leading questions, and as such these responses alone must never be determinative of a juror's capacity to impartially decide the cause to be presented."
In the instant case, however, the record reflected a broad range of experiences, both positive and negative. The trial judge's decision was based on more than the response outlined above. McLean specifically related an incident where he was pulled over by a metro police officer and had an unfavorable experience where he thought the officer wrongly wrote him a ticket, kept him waiting for 45 minutes, and then when he went to court, the officer could not identify McLean's vehicle. Mc-Lean's impression was that the officer was basically rude when he told her that she did not have her headlights on. The fact that the same juror had both favorable and unfavorable experiences with the police makes a difference in looking at the merits of the cause challenge, and makes the trial court's ultimate decision entirely proper. McLean's testimony, when considered in full, leaves no reasonable doubt as to the propriety of the trial court's conclusion that this potential juror possessed the state of mind necessary to render an impartial decision.
The trial court was in the best position to assess the challenge at issue. See Gore v. State, 706 So.2d 1328, 1334 (Fla.1997)(Trial court did not abuse its discretion, in a murder trial, in declining to excuse venire members challenged for cause on basis of incompetency; while challenged venire members expressed certain biases and prejudices, each also stated that they could set aside their personal views and follow the law in light of the evidence presented, and trial court was in a better position to assess their credibility.) See also Lusk v. State, 446 So.2d 1038, 1041 (Fla.1984) ( ). Accordingly, we find no error in the court's ruling as to this venireperson.
Dorsey also maintains that the trial court erred in permitting the State to exercise a peremptory strike against venireperson Tamika George. When the State sought to exercise the challenge against George, the following transpired:
The trial judge thereafter stated that he did not consider the challenge pretextual. He observed Defense counsel again questioned the authenticity of the prosecutor's challenge. In response to which, the court asked the prosecutor, "are you telling me as an officer of the Court that that [disinterest] was your observation of this juror and that is why you wish to have her excused?" The prosecutor responded affirmatively. The court thereafter concluded that it was going to take the prosecutor at her word, and allow the challenge.
Relying on Wright v. State, 586 So.2d 1024 (Fla.1991), Dorsey argues that the trial court's decision permitting the State to exercise a peremptory strike against George mandates reversal. In Wright, the Supreme Court ruled that a peremptory challenge based on body language would be unacceptable unless observed by the trial judge and confirmed by the judge on the record.
We believe that Dorsey's reliance on Wright is misplaced. Our opinion in English v. State, 740 So.2d 589 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999),...
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Dorsey v. State
...party and was neither observed by the trial court nor otherwise supported by the record. In the case before us, Dorsey v. State, 806 So.2d 559 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002), the Third District answered this question in the affirmative, concluding that our holding in Melbourne v. State, 679 So.2d 759 (......
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Brown v. State, 3D00-3246.
...response. Merced's acknowledgment that his mother had some domestic violence problems was not dispositive. See Dorsey v. State, 806 So.2d 559, 561 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)(prospective juror's answers, when considered in full, left no reasonable doubt that he could render an impartial decision). F......
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