Dorsey v. Wroten
| Decision Date | 16 March 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 703,703 |
| Citation | 370 A.2d 577,35 Md.App. 359 |
| Parties | Harold H. DORSEY v. Paul M. WROTEN et ux. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
William J. Pittler, P. A., Baltimore, for appellant.
Raymond E. Beck and Charles D. Hollman, with whom were Cable, McDaniel, Bowie & Bond, Westminster, on the brief, for appellees.
Argued before THOMPSON, MOYLAN and MOORE, JJ.
Harold H. Dorsey, the appellant, appeals from an order refusing to set aside an unenrolled consent decree and the granting of a petition to enforce the decree by the Circuit Court for Carroll County. We find that the trial court abused its discretion by denying appellant's petition to set aside the decree; we reverse.
On February 7, 1975, the appellant entered into a contract with the appellees, Paul M. and Patricia L. Wroten, for the sale of a parcel of land, owned by the appellant, in Carroll County, Maryland. As a part of the contract, the appellant further agreed to construct a house. Due to a dispute between the appellant and the developers of the subdivision, which contained the subject property, over a restrictive covenant, a conflict arose between the appellant and appellees concerning completion and possession of the house under construction. As a result of this, a Bill of Complaint for Specific Performance was filed in the Circuit Court for Carroll County by the appellees. Appellant answered this bill of complaint and filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, which was denied. The case was set for trial on February 23, 1976.
When the case was called, the attorneys for each side approached the bench and requested a 'settlement type conference' in the judge's chambers. After it was explained to him that the attorneys were attempting to work out a settlement, the trial judge stated that there were no other cases scheduled for the remainder of the day so the lawyers could confer with their clients and attempt to work out a settlement; if one could not be reached, then they could return to the courtroom and try the case. Each attorney conferred with his client individually. After the discussion with his attorney, the appellant maintained reservations about the settlement. Appellant and his attorney met with the attorney for the appellees. There is a discrepancy in the testimony as to whether the appellant actually agreed to the final settlement, but the trial judge found that he did, which we accept. At approximately 12:00 p. m., the lawyers met a second time with the trial judge and informed him that a final settlement had been reached. The trial judge requested that a consent decree be prepared and presented to him. At 3:15 p. m. the appellant informed his attorney that he would not agree to a consent decree. Counsel for the appellant met a third time with the trial judge and informed him that the appellant no longer agreed to a settlement. The trial judge stated that he considered the matter settled and that he would sign the 'consent' decree when it was presented. On February 26, 1976, the 'consent' decree was signed.
It is well established that courts will look with favor on compromise or settlement of lawsuits in the interest of efficient and economical administration of justice and the lessening of friction and acrimony. Chertkof v. Harry C. Weiskittel Co., 251 Md. 544, 550, 248 A.2d 373 (1968). While a settlement agreement is subject to the general rules of contract such as the adequacy of consideration, a consent decree adds a critical element to the contractual act-judicial conclusiveness. Kirsner v. Fleischmann, 261 Md. 164, 170, 274 A.2d 339 (1971). A consent decree is entered under the eye and with the sanction of the court and should be considered a judicial act not open to question or controversy in a collateral proceeding. State, ex. rel. Cox v. Maryland Electric Railways Co., 126 Md. 300, 304, 95 A. 43 (1915). The only question that can be raised concerning a consent decree is whether in fact the decree was entered by consent. Prince George's County v. Barron, 19 Md.App. 348, 349, 311 A.2d 453 (1973).
In Mercantile Trust Co. v. Schloss, 165 Md. 18, 24, 166 A. 599 (1933), the Court of Appeals refused to grant a motion to dismiss an appeal on the ground that the decree was a consent decree from which no appeal would lie. The Court, after examining correspondence between the parties, was unwilling to say that the decree, as signed, was agreed to by all the parties. It stated that the proper practice would be for the chancellor to state in the decree that it is being passed by consent or have the consent of the parties endorsed therein. 1 Id. at 25, 166 A. 599. Of course, it would be an abuse of discretion for the chancellor to state in the decree that it was being consented to when it was not.
In the case at bar, even though the appellant orally agreed to a settlement agreement, it is obvious that he withdrew that consent before the final meeting with the trial judge. It is also apparent that both the trial judge and the appellees had full knowledge that the appellant was not consenting to the decree two days before it was signed. We find that the trial judge abused his discretion under Maryland Rule 625 a by denying the motion to set aside the unenrolled consent decree, where the court at the time of the entry of the decree knew that the appellant did not so consent. 2
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Stuples v. Baltimore City Police Dept.
...480, 483-84, 147 A.2d 221 (1958); Weaver v. Realty Growth Investors, 38 Md.App. 78, 81-83, 379 A.2d 193 (1977); Dorsey v. Wroten, 35 Md.App. 359, 361-63, 370 A.2d 577 (1977); Fritz v. Fritz, 34 Md.App. 600, 602, 368 A.2d 502 (1977); Cromwell v. Ripley, 11 Md.App. 173, 176-77, 273 A.2d 218 T......
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Barnes v. Barnes
...468, 885 A.2d 894 (2005). In distinguishing between a consent order and a settlement agreement, this Court said in Dorsey v. Wroten, 35 Md. App. 359, 361, 370 A.2d 577 (1977): While a settlement agreement is subject to the general rules of contract such as the adequacy of consideration, a c......
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Jones v. Hubbard
...act: judicial conclusiveness." Kirsner v. Fleischmann, 261 Md. 164, 170, 274 A.2d 339, 343 (1971); see also Dorsey v. Wroten, 35 Md.App. 359, 361, 370 A.2d 577, 579 (1977) ("[A] consent decree adds a critical element to the contractual act—judicial conclusiveness."). Looking at the actions ......
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In re Blessen H., 71, September Term, 2005.
...even though it had not been signed by the court when she sought to do so. Id. at 484, 610 A.2d at 777.8 Similarly, in Dorsey v. Wroten, 35 Md. App. 359, 370 A.2d 577 (1977), which we cited approvingly in Chernick, 327 Md. at 483-484, 610 A.2d at 776, the parties agreed to mediate their disp......