Dossin's Food Products, Inc. v. Michigan State Tax Commission

• Decision Date: 07 June 1960
• Docket Number: No. 41,41
• Citation: 360 Mich. 312,103 N.W.2d 474
• Parties: DOSSIN'S FOOD PRODUCTS, INC., a Michigan corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MICHIGAN STATE TAX COMMISSION, Defendant and Appellee.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 474

103 N.W.2d 474

360 Mich. 312

DOSSIN'S FOOD PRODUCTS, INC., a Michigan corporation Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MICHIGAN STATE TAX COMMISSION, Defendant and Appellee.

No. 41.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

June 7, 1960.

Berry, Moorman & King, Detroit, for plaintiff and appellant.

Nathaniel H. Goldstick, Corp. Counsel, Bert R. Sogge, Julius C. Pliskow, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Detroit, for City of Detroit, amicus curiae.

Before the Entire Bench.

KELLY, Justice.

Appellant, claiming that the Administrative Procedure Act (P.A.1952, No. 197) ¹ granted the right to appeal, filed its petition in the Wayne county circuit court seeking review of the Michigan State Tax Commission's determination of appellant's 1958 personal property tax.

Defendant, Michigan State Tax Commission, filed its motion to dismiss, alleging that P.A.1952, No. 197, does not apply to the State Tax Commission; that instead the General Property Tax Act applies and, therefore, appellant's remedy for any alleged impropriety in the hearing before the commission would be by way of an original proceeding in mandamus in the Supreme Court and not by appeal to the circuit court.

Appellee's motion to dismiss was granted. Plaintiff appeals.

The General Property Tax Act (P.A.1893, No. 206, as amended) establishes the State tax commission as the final reviewing body and supervisory authority in assessment matters. Hudson Motor Car Co. v. City of Detroit, 282 Mich. 69, 80, 81, 275 N.W. 770, 113 A.L.R. 1472; Moran v. Grosse Pointe Township, 317 Mich. 248, 256-259, 26 N.W.2d 763; Helin v. Grosse Pointe Township, 329 Mich. 396, 404, 45 N.W.2d 338. It is subject to review by appeal to the Supreme Court on either a question of jurisdiction, or no the question of whether the action of the commission, or a member thereof, has been performed as provided in the act. Hudson Motor Car Co. v. City of Detroit, supra, 282 Mich. 83, 275 N.W. 775. The General Property Tax Act prescribes the procedure to be followed by the commission. C.L.1948, §§ 211.150, 211.151, C.L.S.1956, § 211.152 (Stat.Ann.1950 Rev. §§ 7.208, 7.209, Stat.Ann.1959 Cum.Supp. § 7.210).

The legislature defined the Administrative Procedure Act (P.A.1952, No. 197) to be:

'An Act to prescribe the rights of the public in the administrative procedure before state administrative agencies; to provide for the promulgation of procedural rules and regulations; to provide for the hearing of contested cases, and rules of evidence with respect thereto; and to provide for decisions and orders of state agencies.' The act defines 'agency' as follows:

"Agency' means any state board, commission, department, bureau or officer, authorized by law to make rules or to adjudicate contested cases, except the workmen's compensation commission, the employment security commission, the department of revenue, the public service commission and those in the legislative and judicial branches.'

Section 8 of said act (C.L.S.1956, § 24.108 [Stat.Ann.1952 Rev. § 3.560(21.8)]) provides that 'any person aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case' may file 'a petition (for review) in the circuit court in the county wherein appellant resides or has its principal place of business in Michigan or in the circuit court for Ingham county, within 30 days after personal service of the final decision of the agency.'

The General Property Tax Act is a 'specific statute' dealing with taxation. The Administrative Procedure Act is a 'general statute' referring generally to administrative hearings and appeals therefrom. In determining whether P.A.1952, No. 197, directly or impliedly repeals the definite provisions of the property tax law, we shall apply the well-recognized rule of statutory construction holding that the repeal of a specific statute by a general statute will not be implied or assumed.

In the case of Mayor of Port Huron v. City Treasurer of Port Huron, 328 Mich. 99, at pages 111, 112, 43 N.W.2d 77, at page 82, we held:

'In Boyer-Campbell Co. v. Fry, 271 Mich. 282, , 260 N.W. 165, 171, 98 A.L.R.827, we said:

"'Statutes will be construed in the most beneficial way which their language will permit to prevent absurdity, hardship or injustice; to favor public convenience and to oppose all prejudice to public interests.' 2 Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Const. (2d ed.), § 490.' A special statute shall be given effect as an exception to the general statute in order to carry out the legislative intent. Board of Education v. Blondell, 251 Mich. 528, 232 N.W. 375. When a general intention is expressed and also a particular intention which is incompatible with the general one, the particular intention shall be considered as an exception to the general one. Attorney General ex rel. Owen v. Joyce, 233 Mich. 619, 207 N.W. 863; Heims v. School District No. 6 of Davison Tp., 253 Mich. 248, 234 N.W. 486, and cases therein cited. Also see, Reed v. Alger, Secretary of State, 327 Mich. 108, 41 N.W.2d 491. In Attorney General ex rel. Owen v. Joyce, supra, we held that the special act providing that the board of supervisors might fill vacancies in the office of road commissioner was not repealed by a later general act which provides for the filling of vacancies and appointments of county offices by the probate court, county clerk and prosecuting attorney, the later act not containing a repealing clause. We quoted the following:

"An act will not be construed to repeal or modify earlier legislation, if, giving such effect to the act, an apparent purpose would appear to disturb an established system of written law, covering a vital field in our system of government.' 25 RCL p. 919.

"The principle that the law does not favor repeals by implication is of especial application in the case of an important public statute of long standing which should be shown to be repealed either expressly, or by a strong and necessary implication.' 25 RCL p. 920.

"'When a general intention is expressed, and also a particular intention which is incompatible with the general one, the particular intention shall be considered an exception to the general one.' I Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction, p. 532, § 275."

The above quotation from Mayor of Port Huron v. City Treasurer of Port Huron, supra, was reiterated with approval in State Highway Commissioner v. Detroit City Controller, 331 Mich. 337, 363, 49 N.W.2d 318.

The legislature was undoubtedly aware of the fact that this Court has repeatedly refused to permit review of property tax matters by procedures not provided in the general property tax act. See W. A. Sturgeon & Co. v. Board of Assessors of City of Detroit, 159 Mich. 199, 202, 123 N.W. 593; Sunday Lake Iron Co. v City of Wakefield, 323 Mich. 497, 509, 35 N.W.2d 470; Haggerty v. City of Dearborn, 332 Mich. 304, 319, 51 N.W.2d 290.

In granting the motion to dismiss, the trial court stated:

'The rights of the taxpayer must be zealously guarded but the practical operations of government may not be unduly frustrated or impeded. Therefore, the legislature necessarily must have shown by clearly unmistakable language a legislative intention to superimpose the procedural requirements of Act 197 together with the alternative method of judicial review before this court would be impelled to the petitioners' view, so compelling is the public need for continuity of services which must be paid for by tax revenues.'

We agree with the trial court in the whole that the legislature did not intend to repeal the provisions of the General Property Tax Act by enacting the Administrative Procedure Act. The trial court did not err in entering the order of dismissal.

Affirmed. No costs, a public question involved.

DETHMERS, C. J., and CARR and KAVANAGH, JJ., concurred with KELLY, J.

SOURIS, Justice (dissenting).

The spectre of administrative tribunal finality confronts us again. Once again we are asked to say that the Administrative Procedure Act, P.A.1952, No. 197 (C.L.S.1956, § 24.101 et seq., Stat.Ann.1952 Rev. and Stat.Ann.1959 Cum.Supp. § 3.560 (21.1) et seq.), does not apply to the 'final decisions' of an administrative agency which is not among those expressly excluded from the provisions of the act. Once again we are asked to interpret legislative language in such fashion (strained, in my view) that administrative action in precluded from the judicial review by our circuit courts expressly provided by said act. Judged by what this Court recently said in its majority opinion in Imlay Township Primary School District v. State Board of Education, Mich., 102 N.W.2d 720, petitioner here is foredoomed.

That the legislature intended to include the State tax commission as one of the agencies governed by the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act is scarcely open to question, in view of the following language contained in the first section of said act:

'Sec. 1. For the purposes of this act:

'(1) 'Agency' means any state board, commission, department, bureau or officer, authorized by law to make rules or to adjudicate contested cases, except the workmen's compensation commission, the employment security commission, the department of revenue, the public service commission and those in the legislative and judicial branches.'

In the Administrative Procedure Act our legislature said that any person aggrieved by a 'final decision' of an administrative agency (other than those few expressly excepted) is entitled to a judicial review...