Moran v. Grosse Pointe Tp.

• Decision Date: 08 April 1947
• Docket Number: No. 72.,72.
• Citation: 317 Mich. 248,26 N.W.2d 763
• Parties: MORAN v. GROSSE POINTE TP. et al.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

317 Mich. 248

26 N.W.2d 763

MORAN

v.GROSSE POINTE TP. et al.

No. 72.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

April 8, 1947.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE Appeal from Circuit Court, Wayne County; Frank B. Ferguson, judge.

Suit by Serena M. Moran, a resident of the Village of Grosse Pointe Park, Wayne County, Mich., against Grosse Pointe Township and another, to recover taxes levied against plaintiff's property and paid under protest. From an order dismissing the suit, the plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Before the Entire Bench.

Fred A. Behr and John R. Watkins, both of Detroit (Clarence J. Boldt, Jr., of Detroit, of counsel), for plaintiff and appellant.

Julius L. Berns, of Detroit, for Grosse Pointe Tp., and Adolph L. Damman, Treasurer, defendants and appellees.

Glenn M. Coulter, of Detroit (Jack Newcombe, of Detroit, of counsel), for intervening defendant and appellee, Board of Education of Rural Agricultural School Dist. No. 1.

Gerald K. O'Brien, Pros. Atty., of Detroit, for intervening defendants and appellees, Wayne County and John J. Kozaren, County Treasurer.

BUTZEL, Justice.

Plaintiff, a resident of the village of Grosse Pointe Park, Wayne County, Michigan, brought suit against Grosse Pointe Township and its treasurer to recover taxes levied against her property and paid under protest. The property consists of the northerly half of lot 20, lots 21 and 22 of the Windmill Pointe subdivision of private claim 696, and part of private claim 126 and 127, 379 and 570 lying south of Jefferson Avenue, City of Detroit and Village of Grosse Pointe Park, Michigan, according to the plat thereof in Liber 37 of Plats, pages 5 and 6, Wayne County register's office. The record does not describe the property in detail but it does show that a residence is located thereon, that it abuts Lake St. Clair, and that after allowance for depreciation, it was assessed at $146,010; plaintiff claims that it should not have been assessed at more than $75,000. The public maps show that there is but a limited amount of lake frontage beyond the city of Detroit in Wayne County. The record does not show what restrictions, if any, exist as to the use of property, building lines, the limited market for such properties due to the scarcity of potential owners with large incomes, the difficulties as well as costs of service, upkeep, or other elements that may make such elaborate homes less attractive and more difficult to dispose of at the present time. Neither does the record show the initial cost of such homes and the amounts spent on improvements, if any.

In accordance with Act No. 206, §§ 29 and 30, Pub. Acts 1893, as amended by Act No. 326, Pub. Acts 1907, 1 Comp. Laws 1929, §§ 3417 and 3418, Stat.Ann. §§ 7.29 and 7.30, and Act No. 234, Pub. Acts 1941, Comp.Laws Supp. 1945, § 3417, Stat.Ann. 1946 Cum.Supp. § 7.29, plaintiff, dissatisfied with the assessment, submitted a written complaint and appeared before the board of review for the township. She claimed that the assessment was arbitrary, grossly excessive, discriminatory, fraudulent, invalid and made in utter disregard of the true cash value of the premises involved; and, further, that numerous other parcels (not fronting on the lake shore) were grossly under-assessed, thus throwing an extra tax burden upon plaintiff's property. A hearing was had, but the board of review refused to change the assessment.

Thereupon, in accordance with Act No. 206, § 152, Pub. Acts 1893, as amended, 1 Comp.Laws 1929, § 3547, Stat.Ann. § 7.210, plaintiff filed a written complaint with the board of State tax commissioners, and after a hearing the relief as prayed for was denied. Plaintiff thereupon paid under protest the sum of $2,473.41, the amount levied, and brought the instant suit to recover this sum.

She claims that the supervisor in the first instance based the assessment (with but a few exceptions) on the amounts fixed by the assessment roll of 1939, and that he has since merely copied these assessments as revised only by the application of an allowance for depreciation of buildings and by a further percentage reduction recommended by the board of State tax commissioners and adopted by the present supervisor (1945) and his predecessors in office. Plaintiff claims that this was not a proper or sufficient exercise of judgment as to the true cash value of the property, that market factors influencing the true cash value of the properties were intentionally and fraudulently ignored in the preparation of the 1945 assessments, resulting in gross overassessments of the properties of plaintiff and some others and under-assessment of properties not fronting on the lake, compared with their true cash values; and that this amounts to a fraudulent and illegal discrimination against plaintiff and places an undue, excessive, discriminatory and unlawful share of the public burden on plaintiff and her property. She claims that the correct assessment should not have been in excess of $75,000.

Thirty-two other related cases, instituted by other property owners against the same defendants, are pending. In each of them, similar charges are made. The cases have not been consolidated but, by agreement, the present case is to be regarded as a test suit, and if plaintiff prevails, the plaintiffs in the other cases are to recover the amounts to be found due. Otherwise, the defendants will be entitled to dismissal of each companion suit.

At the trial of the case, attorney for plaintiff in his opening address made similar charges as heretofore stated, but when pressed for an answer as to whether there was any fraud in the actions of the board of review or the State tax commission, his answer was in the negative, qualified, however, by the statement that it was fraud to the extent that the respective bodies followed the result arrived at by the supervisor and so vehemently denounced by plaintiff. The trial court after carefully considering the charges in the declaration as amplified by counsel's opening statement entered an order of dismissal. Plaintiff appeals.

Plaintiff has followed the proper and necessary procedural steps before bringing suit by seeking relief first from the board of review and then the State tax commission, then paying the alleged illegal taxes under protest and bringing suit for recovery of the amount paid. There is no question but that assessment on property shall be made at its true cash value. Art. X, § 7, Constitution of the State of Michigan. Ascertaining the true cash value, however, presents many difficulties. A single sale or two of property does not determine the true cash value, as there may be peculiar and temporary economic conditions that determine a price and this may be particularly true in case of highly expensive and valuable property for which there is little demand, if any, at least for the time being. But recently in Conroy v. City of Battle Creek, 314 Mich. 210, 219, 22 N.W.2d 275, 278, we discussed the difficulties of valuation and appraisal of urban properties, and approved of the hiring of experts to revalue and reappraise the city's properties. What we said therein is equally true of the valuation and appraisal of very valuable and expensive suburban homes located on the lake shore near the city. We stated:

‘Proper percentages for depreciation, careful study of local values as affected by costs, recent cash sales, as well as all other elements must be considered. The valuation of real estate and improvements has always been difficult and presents many problems, and even with the applied science for valuation and appraisal, the true value cannot be obtained with mathematical exactitude, but by the application of these modern rules as developed, a much fairer degree of accuracy is arrived at than existed theretofore.’

The words ‘cash value’ as defined by 1 Comp.Laws 1929, § 3415, Stat.Ann. § 7.27, is the usual selling price that could be obtained for it at the time of assessment, but not the price obtainable at a forced or auction sale. As stated in Twenty-Two Charlotte, Inc. v. City of Detroit, 294 Mich. 275, at page 283, 293 N.W. 647, at page 650:

‘Where property is singular in character and sales are separated by many years, there is no usual selling price in the sense the expression is used to describe the focus of buyers and sellers of commodities actively exchanged in an open market. Nor did the legislature intend that a single event be conclusive. In the valuation problem the assessing...