Imlay Tp. Primary School Dist. No. 5 v. State Bd. of Ed.

• Decision Date: 12 April 1960
• Docket Number: No. 22,22
• Citation: 359 Mich. 478,102 N.W.2d 720
• Parties: IMLAY TOWNSHIP PRIMARY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 5, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 720

102 N.W.2d 720

359 Mich. 478

IMLAY TOWNSHIP PRIMARY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 5, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 22.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

April 12, 1960.

Paul L. Adams, Atty. Gen., Samuel J. Torina, Sol. Gen., Lansing, Eugene Krasicky, Joseph G. O'Reilly, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellant.

Robert L. Taylor, Lapeer, for appellee.

Before the Entire Bench.

CARR, Justice.

Pursuant to pertinent provisions of the School Code of 1955 (P.A.1955, No. 269, § 461 et seq.), the board of education of Lapeer county transferred certain portions of plaintiff school district to the Imlay City Community School District. From such action plaintiff appealed to the State board of education, said appeal being based on section 467 of the school code as amended by P.A.1957, No. 135 (C.L.S.1956, § 340.467, as amended [Stat.Ann.1959 Rev. § 15.3467]). The State board upheld the action of the county board and thereupon plaintiff filed a petition in the circuit court for the county of Lapeer seeking reversal of the order. Said petition was filed in reliance on P.A.1952, No.197, § 8 (C.L.S.1956, § 24.108 [Stat.Ann.1952 Rev. § 3.560 (21.8)]). Defendant's motion to dismiss the appeal was denied by the circuit judge and from such order defendant, on leave granted, has appealed to this Court.

The provision of the school code under which the appeal was taken to the State board of education reads as follows:

'Any one or more resident owners of land considered for transfer from 1 district to another, or the board of any district whose territory is affected, may appeal the action of the county board of education or joint boards in transferring such land, or the failure to transfer such land, or the action taken relative to the accounting determination, to the state board of education within 10 days after such action or determination by the county board of education or the joint boards. If the county board of education or the joint boards fail to take action within the time limit prescribed in section 461, the appeal may be made to the state board of education within 10 days following the termination of the period. Such appeal shall have the effect of holding the effectiveness of the resolution from which appealed in abeyance until the appeal is acted upon by the state board of education.

'The state board of education is hereby empowered to consider such appeals and to confirm, modify or set aside the order of the county board of education or the joint boards and its action on any such appeal shall be final.'

It will be noted that the above quoted section of the school code declares that the action of the State board of education 'shall be final.' It is the contention of the plaintiff, however, that the cited provision of P.A.1952, No. 197, providing for an appeal to the circuit court, in certain cases, from a decision of any State board, commission, department, bureau or officer, authorized to make rules or to adjudicate contested cases, is applicable, and that section 8 of said statute authorized to appeal to the circuit court of Lapeer county in this case. The circuit judge sustained plaintiff's contention, pointing out in his opinion that the repealing provisions of the School Code of 1955 make no reference to the administrative procedures act adopted by the legislature three years before and that repeals by implication are not favored. The conclusion was also expressed that the matter of detaching territory from one school district and attaching it to another is properly for determination by a court rather than by an administrative agency.

On behalf of appellant it is urged that the circuit court was in error in denying the motion to dismiss. It is argued that the school code being later in enactment must prevail, and any matter covered by the prior statute inconsistent with such code must be regarded as superseded thereby. It is further contended that the control of education and matters pertaining thereto is vested in the State rather than in local authorities, that the school code constitutes the charter of the plaintiff district, that plaintiff may not in consequence challenge the provision with reference to the finality of the action of the State board of education, and that the proceeding before said board was not a 'contested case,' as declared in the Administrative Procedures Act of 1952 to be subject to judicial review.

It will be noted that plaintiff acted under the provision of the school code granting the right of appeal to the State board of education, and that it is the decision of the latter board that was sought to be reviewed in the circuit court of Lapeer county. On behalf of plaintiff it is argued that the school code does not because of the provision therein with reference to the action of the State board being final preclude an appeal as provided in the Administrative Procedures Act of 1952. The practical situation appears to be that we have in the controversy two enactments of the State legislature that are not entirely in harmony, and hence the problem is to determine which prevails.

The power of the legislature to invest the State board of education with authority to entertain and decide questions of the nature here involved, relating to the detaching of territory from one school district and attaching it to another, is not open to question. Article XI, § 6 of the State Constitution creates the State board of education, grants it general supervision of certain educational institutions, and provides that its duties shall be prescribed by law. Statutes have been enacted from time to time by the legislature imposing duties and granting powers with reference to matters affecting the educational system of the State, the validity of which has not been considered as open to question. The function involved in the instant controversy, vested in said board by the school code of 1955, is subject as to the manner of its performance to legislative authority. Board of Education of the City of Detroit v. Superintendent of Public Instruction, 319 Mich. 436, 29 N.W.2d 902.

It has been repeatedly recognized by this Court that the control of the public school system is a State matter, vested by the Constitution in the legislature. In MacQueen v. City Commission of City of Port Huron, 194 Mich. 328, 336, 160 N.W. 627, 629, it was said:

'Fundamentally, provision for and control of our public school system is a state matter, delegated to and lodged in the state Legislature by the Constitution in a separate article entirely distinct from that relating to local government. The general policy of the state has been to retain control of its school system, to be administered throughout the state under state laws by local state agencies organized with plenary powers independent of the local government with which, by location and geographical boundaries, they are necessarily closely associated and to a greater or less extent authorized to co-operate. 'Education belongs to the state."

In Child Welfare Society of Flint v. Kennedy School District, 220 Mich. 290, 296, 189 N.W. 1002, 1004, the Court, after referring to certain provisions of the State Constitution, said, in part:

'The legislature has entire control over the schools of the state, subject only to the provisions above referred to. The division of the territory of the state into districts, the conduct of the school, the qualifications of teachers, the subjects to be taught therein, are all within its control. In Attorney General v. Lowrey, 131 Mich. 639, 644, 92 N.W. 289, 296, it was said:

"The school district is a state agency. Moreover, it is of legislative creation. It is true that it was provided for in obedience to a constitutional requirement; and, whatever we may think of the right of the district to administer in a local way the affairs of the district under the Constitution, we cannot doubt that such management must be in conformity to the provisions of such laws of a general character as may from time to time to passed, and that the property of the district is in no sense private property, but is public property, devoted to the purposes of the state, for the general good, just as almshouses and courthouses are, although confided to local management, and applied to uses which are in a sense local, though in another sense general."

Of like import are Ira School District No. 1 Fractional v. Chesterfield School District, 340 Mich. 678, 66 N.W.2d 72; Sturgis v. County of Allegan, 343 Mich. 209, 72 N.W.2d 56; Jones v. Grand Ledge Public Schools, 349 Mich. 1, 84 N.W.2d 327.

It was within the power of the legislature to vest authority in the State board of education to review the action of the county board, and to make its decision final. A similar provision of a prior statute with reference to authority granted to the superintendent of public instruction was involved in Bridgehampton School District, etc. v. Superintendent of Public Instruction, 323 Mich. 615, 36 N.W.2d 166. It was there held that such provision was not nullified by an amendment to the Judicature Act of 1915 by P.A.1947, No. 21, granting the right to appeal from orders or decisions of State boards, commissions and agencies.

As noted, the present school code was enacted after the Administrative Procedures Act of 1952. Furthermore, said code relates to the matter of education, the establishment of the means therefor, and the functioning of various boards and officers vested with duties in connection therewith. In such aspect it is special in nature whereas the Administrative Procedures Act of 1952 relating to State agencies, with certain exceptions, is general, and the procedure with reference to appeals from orders thereby is of like nature. In case of conflict between two such legislative enactments the special statute or code must prevail. This is the commonly accepted view in dealing with such conflicts. In Attorney General ex rel....