Draprop Corp. v. City of Ann Arbor, Docket No. 223619.
| Decision Date | 28 November 2001 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 223619. |
| Citation | 247 Mich. App. 410,636 N.W.2d 787 |
| Parties | DRAPROP CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF ANN ARBOR, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Honigman, Miller, Schwartz and Cohn, L.L.P. (by Susan K. Friedlaender), Bingham Farms, for the plaintiff.
Office of the City Attorney (by Kristen D. Larcom), Ann Arbor, for the defendant.
Before NEFF, P.J., and O'CONNELL and R.J. DANHOF1, JJ.
This historic preservation case, concerning defendant city of Ann Arbor's designation of two apartment buildings owned by plaintiff Draprop Corporation as historic property, is on appeal for the second time. In each instance, the trial court granted summary disposition in favor of defendant, finding the historic designation proper under the Local Historic Districts Act (LHDA), M.C.L. § 399.201 et seq., and defendant's ordinances. In the first appeal, a panel of this Court reversed the grant of summary disposition for defendant and, without retaining jurisdiction, remanded for further factual findings. Draprop Corp. v. Ann Arbor (Draprop I), unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued March 13, 1998 (Docket No. 198235). On remand, the trial court again granted summary disposition in favor of defendant. Plaintiff appeals by leave granted. We now reverse and remand.
We hold that defendant's historic district designation of plaintiff's properties is invalid because the "Individual Historic Properties Historic District" as constituted does not comply with requirements under the LHDA for local historic districts.2 We find no basis for designation of the properties as part of any other properly established historic district within the city. We reverse the grant of summary disposition for defendant and remand for entry of an order granting plaintiff's motion for partial summary disposition.
Plaintiff is the owner of two apartment buildings in Ann Arbor, which are not contiguous properties and are not contained within any of the eight "traditionally" designated historic districts in the city. Rather, in 1994, the apartment buildings were designated on the basis of their "historical significance" to be included in an individual properties historic district, along with seventy-one other properties, by a city ordinance3 adding the buildings to the Ann Arbor Register of Historic Places, which defendant contends is an historic "district" created by a 1988 ordinance4 to include individual properties throughout the city.5 Plaintiff opposed the historic district designation of each building and filed a complaint in the circuit court, seeking to invalidate the city's historic preservation ordinance and the historic designation of the two apartment buildings. Defendant filed a motion for summary disposition. The trial court found plaintiff's challenge, based on constitutional due process and taking grounds, without merit and granted summary disposition for defendant.
On appeal, a panel of this Court determined that there were genuine issues of material fact concerning whether the two apartment buildings were located within an historic district pursuant to the LHDA, thus precluding summary disposition. Draprop I, supra. In so holding, the Draprop I panel stated:
Under the LHDA, the Legislature permits local units, such as defendant, to establish historical districts in order to achieve the goals of historic preservation. Nothing in the LHDA enables defendant to pass an ordinance permitting it to select individual, isolated homes or buildings randomly located throughout the city limits that have historical significance. Rather, both the LHDA and defendant's ordinance require that historic preservation occur through the formation and amendment of historic districts—not individual historic buildings.
The Draprop I panel, while not retaining jurisdiction, remanded the case to the trial court for a resolution of the factual question whether the buildings were in an historical district and a determination whether defendant had "operated within the ambit of the LHDA and its own historic preservation ordinance in designating plaintiff's properties as historically significant." Id.. The panel did not reach the merits of plaintiff's constitutional challenges. Id.
On remand, the parties filed cross-motions for summary disposition. The trial court granted defendant's motion and denied plaintiff's motion, finding no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether plaintiff's properties are in an historic district and concluding that defendant had "not operated beyond the ambit of the LHDA in the creation and execution of its historic preservation ordinances."
This case presents an issue of first impression. Although Michigan enacted an historic districts act in 1970,6 granting local government the authority to create historic districts, this Court has not yet addressed the parameters of the enabling legislation in a published decision. In so doing, we concur with the Draprop I panel and reiterate at the outset of our decision what apparently was unclear to the trial court in the previous opinion in this case: the LHDA does not permit the establishment of an historic district, the boundaries of which coincide with those of the entire city, in order to designate and subject to historical preservation regulation, individually selected, scattered properties throughout a city.
The general principles regarding statutory construction are found in Rose Hill Center, Inc. v. Holly Twp., 224 Mich.App. 28, 32, 568 N.W.2d 332 (1997):
The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature in enacting a provision. Statutory language should be construed reasonably, keeping in mind the purpose of the statute. The first criterion in determining intent is the specific language of the statute. If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, judicial construction is neither required nor permitted, and courts must apply the statute as written. However, if reasonable minds can differ regarding the meaning of a statute, judicial construction is appropriate. [Citations omitted.]
Statutes should be construed so as to prevent absurd results, injustice, or prejudice to the interests of the public. Camden v. Kaufman, 240 Mich.App. 389, 395, 613 N.W.2d 335 (2000).
This Court reviews de novo rulings on motions for summary disposition. Van v. Zahorik, 460 Mich. 320, 326, 597 N.W.2d 15 (1999). A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) may be granted if the affidavits or other documentary evidence show that there is no genuine issue in respect to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Smith v. Globe Life Ins. Co., 460 Mich. 446, 454, 597 N.W.2d 28 (1999). The affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other documentary evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Id.
As the enabling statute for local historic preservation in Michigan, the LHDA reflects the Legislature's reasoned scheme for balancing the community's cultural, aesthetic, and economic interests in historic preservation with landowners' rights in their property. MCL 399.201 et seq.; see House Legislative Analysis, HB 5504, August 24, 1992; O.A.G., 1995-1996, No. 6919, p. 215 (October 10, 1996); O.A.G., 1979-1980, No. 5514, p. 250 (July 16, 1979). Although the LHDA gives local government the authority to regulate private property for historic preservation purposes, such authority must be exercised in keeping with the mechanisms set forth in the act to maintain the careful balance between public and private interests.
MCL 399.202, § 2 of the LHDA, provides:
(c) Foster civic beauty.
(d) Strengthen the local economy.
(e) Promote the use of historic districts for the education, pleasure, and welfare of the citizens of the local unit and of the state.
The LHDA defines the term "historic district" as "an area, or group of areas not necessarily having contiguous boundaries, that contains 1 resource or a group of resources that are related by history, architecture, archaeology, engineering, or culture." MCL 399.201a(i). The LHDA defines the term "resource" as "1 or more publicly or privately owned historic or nonhistoric buildings, structures, sites, objects, features, or open spaces located within a historic district." MCL 399.201a(r). The LHDA sets forth detailed procedures and timeframes for establishing an historic district.
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