Dotson v. Haddock, 32957

• Decision Date: 06 January 1955
• Docket Number: No. 32957,32957
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: Verner L. DOTSON and Beatrice Dotson, his wife, Appellants, v. Philip G. HADDOCK and Sheila C. Haddock, his wife, Respondents.

Page 52

46 Wn.2d 52

278 P.2d 338

Verner L. DOTSON and Beatrice Dotson, his wife, Appellants, v. Philip G. HADDOCK and Sheila C. Haddock, his wife, Respondents.

No. 32957.

Supreme Court of Washington, Department 1.

Jan. 6, 1955.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 18, 1955.

Heideman, Flanagan & Duncan, Seattle, for appellants.

Eggerman, Rosling & Williams, Joseph J. Lanza, Paul C. Gibbs, Seattle, for respondents.

HAMLEY, Justice.

This action was brought to recover damages for personal injuries sustained when plaintiff wife, Mrs. Beatrice Dotson, fell on the front steps of defendants' home. Judgment was entered for defendants on a jury verdict, and plaintiffs appeal.

The first question here presented is whether the trial court erred in determining, as a matter of law, at the close of appellants' case, that, on the occasion in question, Mrs. Dotson was a licensee rather that an invitee. The significance of this ruling lies in the fact that, if the jury had been permitted to find that Mrs. Dotson was an invitee, and had so found, liability could have been established by showing failure on the part of respondents to use ordinary care. Kalinowski v. Y. W. C. A., 17 Wash.2d 380, 135 P.2d 852. In the case of a licensee, on the other hand, liability could be established only by showing a failure to exercise a less exacting degree of care, as discussed below.

The undisputed facts bearing upon Mrs. Dotson's status as an invitee or licensee are as follows: Both appellants and respondents were active members of the Christian citizenship committee of the University Baptist Church, in Seattle. The general purpose of the committee was to promote Christian principles of citizenship in the community. Membership on the committee was voluntary. Although some of the meetings were held in the church, usually one of the members would invite the committee to his home. At the last previous meeting of the committee, respondents had invited the committee to have its next meeting at their home. In doing so, they indicated that this would make it easier for respondents, as they would not then be required to hire a baby sitter that night. The members received no compensation, either for their work on the committee or for allowing the meeting to be held in their homes.

The meeting in question, which was held on the evening of September 19, 1952, was a regular monthly meeting of this committee. In addition to a discussion of means of raising funds for helping a missionary and making arrangements for a series of church programs for the following month, the members listened to a book review, and were served refreshments by respondents.

We have defined an invitee to be one who is either expressly or impliedly invited onto the premises of another for some purpose connected with the business in which the owner or occupant is then engaged, or which he permits to be conducted thereon. To establish such relationship, there must be some real or supposed mutuality of interest in the subject to which the visitor's business or purpose relates. Garner v. Pacific Coast Coal Co., 3 Wash.2d 143, 100 P.2d 32; Schock v. Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, 5 Wash.2d 599, 105 P.2d 838; Kalinowski v. Y. W. C. A., supra; Deffland v. Spokane Portland Cement Co., 26 Wash.2d 891, 176 P.2d 311.

In the cases cited above, a licensee has been defined as one who goes upon the premises of another, either without any invitation, express or implied, or else for some purpose not connected with the business conducted on the land, but goes, nevertheless, with the permission or at the toleration of the owner.

Mrs. Dotson was on the premises under an express invitation. However, the fact of invitation alone is not sufficient to make one an invitee. A social guest may be expressly invited onto the premises, but, nevertheless, is considered a licensee. McNamara v. Hall, 38 Wash.2d 864, 233 P.2d 852.

Viewing the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to appellants, there is no showing that respondents received, or had any expectation of receiving, any personal benefit, other than spiritual or humanitarian, from the church or the committee. They received compensation neither for their work on the committee nor for allowing the meeting to be held in their home. We are of the opinion that, before a person may attain the status of an invitee, it must be shown that the business or purpose for which the visitor comes upon the premises is of material or pecuniary benefit, actual or potential, to the owner or occupier of the premises. This requirement has been given implicit recognition by this court in prior cases. See Kinsman v. Barton & Co., 141 Wash. 311, 251 P. 563; Christensen v. Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 16 Wash.2d 424, 133 P.2d 797.

Appellants argue that, since the meeting was held at respondent's home, for their convenience and benefit to save them the expense of hiring a baby sitter, appellant wife met all the qualifications of an invitee on this occasion. We must agree with respondents that such an incidental benefit will not be sufficient to characterize the visitor as an invitee. See, Mitchell v. Legarsky, 95 N.H. 214, 60 A.2d 136; Cosgrave v. Malstrom, 127 N.J.L. 505, 23 A.2d 288; 25 A.L.R.2d 605.

The cases of Collins v. Hazel Lumber Co., 54 Wash. 524, 103 P. 798, and Hanson v. Spokane Valley Land & Water Co. 58 Wash. 6, 107 P. 863, are distinguishable. Although the plaintiff in each of those cases was termed as 'invitee,' with no apparent showing of even potential benefit of the nature discussed above, the imposition of liability, under the circumstances there presented, rests upon a basis wholly independent of that which governs the present case.

Those decisions are based upon the principle that, if the possessor of land maintains a private way over his land, under such circumstances as to induce a reasonable belief by those who use it that it is public in character, he is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to maintain it in a reasonably safe condition for travel. See Gasch v. Rounds, 93 Wash. 317, 160 P. 962; 20 A.L.R. 202; 2 Restatement of Torts, § 367 (1934).

Neither Heckman v. Sisters of Charity, 5 Wash.2d 699, 106 P.2d 593, nor Kalinowski v. Y. W. C. A., 17 Wash.2d 380, 135 P.2d 852, is inconsistent with the conclusion which we have reached. The court, in the Heckman case, supra, held that where a charitable hospital held a 'capping ceremony' to honor student nurses who had attained a certain grade in their course, and such nurses were permitted to invite friends and relatives to witness the ceremony, the relationship of invitor and invitee existed between the hospital and the persons so invited. An analysis of the reasoning by which the court reached that conclusion indicates to us that the court impliedly recognized the necessity for finding that the presence of friends and relatives of the student nurses at the capping ceremony was of at least potential benefit, of a material or pecuniary nature, to the hospital.

In the Kalinowski case, supra, the court's determination that the plaintiff was an invitee was dictum, since the court held that evidence was insufficient to establish that the defendant was negligent toward the plaintiff, or failed in its duty to her in any way. However, even if this determination were not dictum, we do not believe that the decision may be interpreted as authority for a rule obviating the necessity of finding at least potential benefit, of the nature discussed above.

We therefore conclude that the trial court correctly ruled that appellant wife was a licensee.

The next question presented relates to the instructions given and refused regarding the applicable duty of care, under the facts of this case. Those facts, in so far as here relevant, are as follows:

On the evening in question, Mrs. Dotson arrived at the home of respondents sometime between 8:00 and 8:30 p. m. There was evidence that it was getting quite dark, and Mrs. Dotson testified that it was sufficiently dark so that the steps were not clearly discernible as she went into respondents' home. There were four or five other people with her when she arrived. Neither she nor the others encountered any difficulty in walking up the steps, nor is there any evidence that anyone, other than Mrs. Dotson, experienced any trouble in descending the steps at the conclusion of the meeting.

When the meeting adjourned at approximately 10:30 p. m., Mrs. Dotson left respondents' home in the company of another member of the committee. When they reached the second or third step from the bottom of the cement steps, which lead from the level of the yard to the cement sidewalk abutting on the street in front of the house, Mrs. Dotson started to fall. Her companion, being unable to prevent the fall, released her grasp on Mrs. Dotson's arm. She fell to the cement sidewalk, landing on her right foot in such a manner that she fractured her right ankle in three places. Mrs. Dotson testified that she stepped on something which was other than the regular face of the step, and that it felt like a hole. At the time of the fall, the porch light was on, but the illumination afforded by it did not extend to the steps in question. There were no street lights which illuminated the steps.

As to the condition of the steps, the jury could have reasonably concluded, from the evidence introduced, that the steps were in general disrepair, and that one of the steps fairly close to the bottom of the flight had a broken edge and the surface was broken out about halfway back from the front edge, leaving an uneven, crumbly surface. It also sloped a little to the front. It was admitted that ...