Doubleday v. Town of Stockbridge
| Decision Date | 05 October 1937 |
| Docket Number | No. 9225.,9225. |
| Citation | 194 A. 462 |
| Parties | DOUBLEDAY v. TOWN OF STOCKBRIDGE. |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
Exceptions from Windsor County Court; Walter H. Cleary, Judge.
Action by Charles E. Doubleday against the Town of Stockbridge. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings exceptions.
Affirmed.
Argued before POWERS, C. J., and SLACK, MOULTON, SHERBURNE, and BUTTLES, JJ.
Roland E. Stevens, of White River Junction, for plaintiff. Raymond Trainor, of White River Junction, for defendant.
This is an action of contract to recover sums paid over a period of years for taxes alleged to have been illegally assessed. Trial was by court and judgment was for the defendant.
The defendant pleaded nil debet, non assumpsit, and the statute of limitations. At the trial the plaintiff seasonably moved that the defendant be required to elect upon which of its defenses it proposed to rely. To the overruling of this motion the plaintiff excepted. The plaintiff's brief calls attention to P.L. 1574, subd. 2, and the construction placed upon it in Coates v. Eastern States Farmers' Exchange, 99 Vt. 170, 175, 130 A. 709, to the effect that inconsistent defenses are permissible and only subject the defendant, on motion before or during the trial, to an election of the defense on which he intends to rely, and then makes the naked assertion that the defenses here set up are inconsistent, without any supporting argument or citation of authority, and that therefore the court erred. This is inadequate briefing and merits no consideration.
Defenses are inconsistent only when they cannot both be true, and the proof of one necessarily proves the falsity of the other. Bradley v. Blandin and Somerset Land Co., 92 Vt. 313, 315, 104 A. 11; McKinstry v. Collins, 74 Vt. 147, 156, 52 A. 438. The substance of the pleas is, that the defendant did not owe the plaintiff anything; that it did not assume and promise as alleged by the plaintiff; and that plaintiff's supposed causes of action did not accrue within 6 years prior to the date suit was commenced. The proof of any one of these defenses does not prove the falsity of any other, although by implication of law the last defense admits that a cause of action once existed. It has long been the practice in this state to plead the general issue and the statute of limitations together, and it is generally held in other jurisdictions that such defenses are not inconsistent. 49 C.J. 220; Annotations in L.R.A.1917C, 71. The defendant was properly allowed to go to trial upon all its pleas.
The only other exception necessary to consider is to the finding that the taxes were lawfully assessed. It appeared that on January 22, 1853, the selectmen of defendant town leased to the plaintiff's predecessor in title 683/4 acres of land in said town for the term of 999 years at the annual rental of $4.121/2, and that the original lessee deposited with said selectmen $68.75 to remain in the hands and under the control of them and their successors in office, upon trust that they apply the annual interest at 6 per cent., viz., $4.121/2, in payment of the rent as it should fall due. The lease also contained a provision that the lessee should annually pay all taxes that may be assessed on or on account of the land leased during the term of the lease. The lease was duly recorded in the land records of said town, and several assignments and transfers were made, the last being in 1878, when it was transferred to the plaintiff. In these assignments and transfers no mention was made of the money deposited to take care of the rent.
The findings show that this land was listed to the plaintiff in the grand list book for taxes from 1893 to 1932; and that he received tax notices for taxes on this land each year, at least from 1922 to 1933, and for several of these years, at least, he received a receipt when he paid his taxes, showing that the bill was for taxes raised on the list of those years. In 1932 the plaintiff refused to pay anything more, and he has not since been required to pay anything, and his name was stricken from the grand list.
The court found that the taxes were lawfully assessed under the terms of the original lease, and that all payments sought to be recovered, except for the years 1929, 1930, and 1931, were made more than 6 years prior to the bringing of this suit.
The sum of money deposited with the selectmen amounted to a commuted rent for the entire term of the lease at the rate of $1 per acre of land. It is clear that the land leased did not belong to that class of public lands which are exempted from taxation, and that it was understood and agreed that the lessee should pay taxes thereon. So under this exception the only question is whether the taxes upon this land could lawfully be assessed to this plaintiff.
During the term of years covered by the taxes here involved we have had a statute, now P.L. 603, which reads: "Taxable real estate shall be set in the list to the last owner or possessor thereof, on April 1 in each year, in the town, village, school and fire district where it is situated." Since the enactment of No. 46 of the Acts of 1910, it has been required, as now in P. L. 636, that the quadrennial appraisal of real estate shall contain "the name of each person owning real estate, provided it can be ascertained;" and as now in P.L. 685, that the completed grand list shall contain "a brief description and the appraised valuation of each separate piece or parcel of taxable real estate in the town owned by each taxpayer." It thus appears that these sections of the statute are somewhat inconsistent. P.L. 603 directs that real estate shall be set to the owner or possessor, whereas P.L. 636 and 685 would seem to require that it be set to the owner only.
These sections of the statute are sufficiently cognate to be in pari materia, since they all relate to the taxation of real estate, and they are to be construed with reference to each other as parts of one system, and the legislative intent, thus ascertained, must be given effect Belfore v. State Highway Department, 108 Vt. —, 187 A. 797; Grand Lodge of Vermont F. & A. M. v. City of Burlington, 104 Vt. 515, 519, 162 A. 368. The fundamental rule for the construction of statutes is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature. This intent must be ascertained from the act itself, if the language is plain. But when the language used is doubtful in meaning, the true meaning may be ascertained by considering it in the light of all of its provisions, the object to be accomplished by its passage, its title, pre-existing legislation on the same subject, and other...
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