Douglass v. Iowa City, 2--56106

Decision Date22 May 1974
Docket NumberNo. 2--56106,2--56106
Citation218 N.W.2d 908
PartiesR. Thomas DOUGLASS et al., Appellees, v. The IOWA CITY, a municipal corporation, et al., Appellants.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Jay H. Honohan and James M. Hess, Iowa City, and Kenneth H. Haynie, Des Moines, for appellants.

Johnston, Penney & Bray, Iowa City, for appellees.

Heard before MOORE, C.J., and MASON, LeGRAND, REYNOLDSON and HARRIS, JJ.

REYNOLDSON, Justice.

Defendants, The City of Iowa City, Iowa, and named members of the city council, appeal from a district court decree enjoining them from issuing $2,000,000 in parking revenue bonds for the purpose of constructing a multi-level parking facility in downtown Iowa City. We modify in part, reverse in part, and remand with directions.

Ordinance 2632, adopted July 3, 1972, authorized and provided for the issuance, and secured the payment of, parking facility revenue bonds under the provisions of chapter 390, The Code. There is no dispute concerning the legality of preliminary steps or the enactment of the ordinance. The bonds were sold and construction bids solicited.

Following the filing of this suit the purchaser of the bonds withdrew its bid. The City cancelled the bond sale and plans for constructing the parking facility pending the outcome of the litigation.

Ordinance 2632 is in evidence. It specifically provides the bonds are to be paid solely and only from the future net revenues of the consolidated parking system and shall not be a general obligation of the City nor payable in any manner by taxation. Revenue from both on-street and off-street parking facilities was pledged to secure payment of these bonds. By the terms of the ordinance, revenue from parking does not include fines received by the City as the result of parking and traffic violations.

Both parties assume fines for parking violations have been and will be paid into the general fund, no the parking fund. Fine revenues in 1971 exceeded $212,000 and collection costs were only $78,800.

In 1970, the City transferred $107,000 to the general fund from the parking fund to pay for the cost of enforcement and administration of the parking system. In 1971, $117,000 was so transferred. But in 1972 the City transferred only $15,000 for that purpose and proposed to make no transfer in 1973.

Salaries for the clerical help, parking enforcement and attendants and supervisory personnel whose duties are solely to facilitate the enforcement and collection of parking meter fines and the incidental expenses are to be paid out of the general fund although in 1970 and 1971 this expense was paid from the parking fund.

The City has 1349 on-street metered parking spaces. Expense of maintenance, repair, cleaning and clearing of snow from the streets, including these spaces, is paid from tax revenues through the road use tax fund. Similar work relating to off-street parking is financed from the parking fund, as a painting of on-street spaces.

The City's director of finance testified the proposed ramp would not generage sufficient revenue to pay its operational and maintenance costs and the retirement of its bonds. The change in the method of paying enforcement costs was impelled by the ramp and taken 'because of the need for available funds within the parking system and to reduce the amount that we would need to borrow and to generate the service debt.'

Division I of plaintiffs' petition alleged the above described expenditure of road use tax revenue and payment of enforcement costs out of the general fund, asserted all of this would result in an illegal, indirect use of tax monies for the retirement of revenue bonds, and prayed that sale and delivery of the revenue bonds be permanently enjoined. In division II plaintiffs alleged defendants proposed to pay costs of maintenance and meter enforcement costs from the general fund rather than from funds derived from the operation of parking meters as required by § 390.8, The Code. Plaintiffs prayed the City be permanently enjoined from making such expenditures from general funds.

Trial court's decree enjoined sale and delivery of bonds under Ordinance 2632 until all meter enforcement costs are deducted from all future parking meter revenues, until costs of maintenance of on-street parking spaces are deducted from the parking meter revenue funds, and until payment of certain revenue bonds issued under a prior ordinance.

I. Scope of review and procedural matters.

Our review in the equity action is de novo. Farrell v. State Board of Regents, 179 N.W.2d 533, 537 (Iowa 1970); rule 334, Rules of Civil Procedure.

Although the issues in this case are well-briefed, we note both briefs fail to comply with rule 344, R.C.P. by failing to incorporate a table of cases alphabetically arranged, and by referring to parts of the record almost exclusively by use of pages of the transcript, rather than the appendix, without providing the court with a cross-reference between the two. The appendix does not include the relevant docket entries in the proceeding below. Rule 344.1, R.C.P. This part of the appendix should minimally include date of filing of petition, date of final judgment or decree, and date of filing notice of appeal. The appendix summarizes the evidence rather than setting out relevant portions of the transcript with transcript page numbers indicated in brackets as required by rule 344.1(d). Compliance with appellate rules will expedite the efforts of counsel and court to achieve prompt disposition of appeals.

We turn to the basic issues raised in this litigation.

II. May maintenance, surfacing, repair, cleaning and snow removal of on-street metered parking space be paid from road use tax funds?

At the threshold it should be noted all parties apparently agree tax monies cannot be employed to retire revenue bonds for off-street parking. Section 390.9 provides:

'* * * such bonds * * * shall be a lien on the property purchased from the proceeds thereof but shall not be a general obligation of such city or town and shall not be payable in any manner by taxation nor shall the municipality be in any manner liable by reason of said funds being insufficient to pay said bonds.'

Plaintiffs invoke the general principle that the City should not be permitted to do indirectly what it cannot do directly. The City asserts it is merely doing what the law allows it do.

Section 312.6, The Code, prescribes those purposes for which road use tax funds may be spent. Subsection 1 provides:

'For the purposes for which street fund money may be used, with the exception of parking facilities as provided in subsection 5 of section 404.7.'

The three applicable provisions of § 404.7 premit street funds to be used for:

'2. * * * maintaining, repairing, surfacing * * * any street, highway, avenue, alley, pulic ground, or market place.

4. For the removal of snow and ice from the streets.

5. In lieu of the tax provided by section 390.2 to acquire and improve real estate and to erect or improve buildings thereon for the parking of vehicles to the extent that income from parking meters or parking lots is insufficient for said purposes.'

These statutes make it apparent road use funds may be used for street maintenance, surfacing, repair, and snow and ice removal, but not to acquire or improve real estate for parking purposes.

The basic issue is thus whether portions of streets designated as metered parking spaces lose their character as streets within the meaning of § 404.7.

In § 321.1(48) the legislature defined 'street' to mean 'the entire width between property lines of every way or place of whatever nature when any part thereof is open to the use of the public, as a matter of right, for purposes of vehicular traffic.' Section 390.8(3) relates to the expenditure of parking meter revenue for the purchase and installation of parking or traffic control devices 'on such portion of streets as are equipped with parking meters.' Throughout chapter 390, The Code, references are made to 'off-street parking areas,' distinguishing such locations from those areas on the streets designated for parking.

Nothing in the relevant statutes indicates the legislature intended that metered on-street parking areas should lose their character as part of the municipal street system for the purpose of road use tax fund expenditures. To the contrary the legislature in § 312.6(1), with all of the various permissible uses of street fund money before it in § 404.7 (maintenance, repair, snow and ice removal, and others), selected only one off-street situation--acquisition and improvement of real estate and erection and improvement of buildings for parking purposes--in which to prohibit expenditures of road use tax funds.

On-street parking areas are not necessarily used exclusively for parking, other than for certain hours or days. We hold their character as part of the street system remains intact for the permissible expenditure of road use tax funds for the purposes of repair, surfacing, maintenance, cleaning and snow removal.

III. May the cost of meter ordinance enforcement be charged to the city general fund?

Although we find no express statutory direction, the City concedes fines from parking meter violations are properly paid into the general fund. See § 367.9, The Code, 1971; 1973 Regular Session of the 65th General Assembly, Chapter 282, Section 42; Thomson v. City of Dearborn, 347 Mich. 365, 79 N.W.2d 841 (1956). The City contends costs of production of such revenue are properly allocated against the general fund if it decides to do so.

Plaintiffs assert § 390.8, The Code, mandates such enforcement expense be paid from parking revenues:

'390.8 Use of funds. Funds derived from the operation of parking meters shall be used for the following purposes and none other, ot wit:

1. Payment of the cost of acquisition and installation of meters purchased.

2. Payment of the cost of maintenance and repair of meters, the collection of meter taxes, and the...

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