Douglass v. State
| Decision Date | 30 September 1959 |
| Citation | 205 Tenn. 646,9 McCanless 646,330 S.W.2d 8 |
| Parties | Robert Ed DOUGLASS and Waddell Johnson v. STATE of Tennessee. 9 McCanless 646, 205 Tenn. 646, 330 S.W.2d 8 |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
J. Carl Redditt and Henry M. Crymes, Memphis, for petitioners.
James M. Glasgow, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent State.
These plaintiffs in error were convicted of petit larceny in the Circuit Court of Fayette County. The jury fixed their punishment at not less than one nor more than five years in the State penitentiary.
An appeal was prayed and granted to this Court. The bill of exceptions was not filed within the time allowed by the trial court with the result that the judgment of the court below was affirmed on July 27, 1959.
On August 3, 1959, separate petitions were filed in this Court, styled 'Motion of Defendant for Credit for Time Spent in Jail'. Attached to each motion is a certificate by the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Fayette County reciting that 'the defendant Waddell Johnson stayed in the County jail for a period of 185 days while waiting for trial.' In Robert Ed Douglass' case the certificate recited that 'he stayed in the County jail for a period of 51 days while waiting for trial.'
The prayer of the respective petitions is, as follows:
'Wherefore, Defendant prays that the Court allow him credit, in its sentence fixing his term of imprisonment of such time he has already been confined in connection with this cause.'
The petitions were seasonably filed in this Court and comply with the rules of the Court.
The Assistant Attorney General says in response to the foregoing petitions: 'As to the time spent in jail pending arraignment and trial, this Court appears to be without jurisdiction to modify the original sentence and allow credit for that time.'
The petitioners apparently rely upon Chapter 13 of the Public Acts of 1959, which amends 40-3102, T.C.A., and reads as follows:
'The trial court shall have authority at the time the sentence is imposed and the defendant committed to the state penitentiary for imprisonment to render the judgment of the court so as to allow the defendant credit on his sentence for any period of time for which he was committed and held in the county jail or workhouse pending his arraignment and trial.
The sole question at issue on this appeal is: What authority has this Court to revise a judgment or decree of the trial court? It is argued by the Assistant Attorney General that Chapter 13 of the Public Acts of 1959, quoted above, determines the matter of jurisdiction, the insistence being that the trial judge alone is authorized to allow credit for time spent in jail pending arraignment and trial.
It is true the foregoing statute authorizes the trial judge to allow credit for this time. But it does not impair the revisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in this regard. In other words the statute does not ported to exclude or prohibit this Court from correcting, or revising, lower courts' orders and decrees in case of mistakes, or possibly an inadvertence in pronouncing judgment on the verdict of the jury. Nor is it a restraint upon the Court from rendering such judgment on the record as the law demands as required by the statute.
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is fixed by the Constitution of this State as appellate only. 'The legislature may restrict and regulate this appellate jurisdiction in any manner deemed wise and proper, so that it does not alter, impair, or destroy the constitutional status and integrity of the Supreme Court, * * * and does not unreasonably interfere with its ultimate revisory power.' See Note 2 under Article 6, Section 2, Vol. 1, T.C.A. and authorities cited therein.
The broad supervisory authority of the Supreme Court over judgments and decrees of trial courts is well stated in Hundhausen v. United States Marine Fire Ins. Co., 52 Tenn. 702. The Court was there dealing with the matter of the Court's jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 2, of the Constitution, and specifically its jurisdiction to revise the action of the Chancery Court in cases of contempt. It was said:
'We think the fair and legitimate meaning of these last provisions is, that this Court is the supreme tribunal of the State, and other Courts inferior in the sense of being subject in their action to the jurisdictional control of this Court, as the appellate tribunal, over all such judgments and decrees as they may render affecting the life, liberty property, or rights of the citizens of the State.' (Emphasis ours.)
In Dodds v. Duncan, 80 Tenn. 731, it is said:
Again in Hopper v. Fisher, 39 Tenn. 253, it is held: 'The rule for jurisdiction is, that nothing shall be intended to be out of the jurisdiction of a Superior Court but that which specially appears to be so; and, on the contrary, nothing shall be intended to be within the jurisdiction of an Inferior Court but that which is so expressly alleged.' (Emphasis ours.)
The question of the authority of this Court to revise judgments of convictions in criminal cases was expressly decided in Corlew v. State, 181 Tenn. 220, 180 S.W.2d 900, 904, wherein Mr. Justice Chambliss, speaking for the majority of the Court (there was a dissenting opinion) said: '* * * and the power of the appellate courts to modify and reduce imprisonment in criminal cases, and 'render such judgment on the record as the law demands,' Code, Sec. 11810 (40-3409, T.C.A.) is quite generally recognized and exercised', citing authorities. To the same effect is Forsha v. State, 183 Tenn. 604, 194 S.W.2d 463.
The petitions are sustained, and an order will be entered in this Court granting credit for time spent in jail pending arraignment and trial in the Circuit Court. The warden of the State penitentiary will be accordingly advised.
The time spent in jail pending arraignment and trial by these defendants was not in execution of the judgment, but to assure their presence at the trial since they seemed to have been unable to make an appearance bond. Nevertheless, their incarceration during this period is appealing to our sympathies as individuals. However, I am firmly convinced that we are entirely without authority to credit the sentence imposed with the time that was thus spent in jail.
In this connection, based on my experience in trials of this nature, I venture to say that if, in the presentation of this case to the jury, the lawyers representing the defendants did not ask the jury, in fixing the punishment, to consider the time spent in jail awaiting trial, then, such failure was an exception to the general practice, in so far as I have experienced and observed it.
No doubt, it is for situations like the present case that Legislatures enact statutes vesting in the Trial Judge, who knows all that occurred during the trial, discretion as to whether credit on the sentence for time spent in jail shall be given. To me, it is inconceivable that this Court would be permitted to disturb the Trial Court's exercise of that discretion in the absence of its having been exercised arbitrarily.
In so far as it applies to the present case, this Court is entirely without information upon which to base a conclusion that these defendants are entitled to credit for the time thus spent in jail. There was no bill of exceptions to which the Court could look. Thus, I do not see how its action could be defined otherwise than as purely arbitrary, and contrary to the spirit at least of that which our Legislature has said by statute as to allowing credit for time so spent in jail.
At the time of the trial and conviction of these defendants in the Trial Court, the statute applicable was Chapter 303 of the Public Acts of 1955. That Act is carried in the Code Supplement as the second paragraph of Section 40-3102, T.C.A. Supplement. It reads as follows:
'The trial court shall have authority within six (6) months after imposition of sentence and commitment to the state penitentiary for imprisonment to amend the judgment of the court so as to allow the defendant credit on his said sentence for any period of time for which he was committed and held in the county jail or workhouse pending his arraignment, trial and subsequent conviction of the offense' * * * etc.
Neither of these defendants made any request of the Trial Judge for such credit.
At...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State ex rel. Ivey v. Meadows
...may also allow time served in jail after trial and credit for such time spent in jail pending arraignment and trial. Douglass v. State, 205 Tenn. 646, 330 S.W.2d 8. These amendments allowing a criminal time spent in jail before he gets to the penitentiary clearly brought out the fact that t......
-
Marsh v. Henderson
...for time served in jail after trial and also allow credit for such time spent in jail pending arraignment and trial. Douglass v. State, 205 Tenn. 646, 330 S.W.2d 8. The argument on behalf of the petitioner is that he was constrained of his liberty and held in a mental institution, and that ......
-
State ex rel. Crist v. Bomar
...may also allow time served in jail after trial and credit for such time spent in jail pending arraignment and trial. Douglass v. State, 205 Tenn. 646, 330 S.W.2d 8. These amendments allowing a criminal time spent in jail before he gets to the penitentiary clearly brought out the fact that t......