Dove v. Pns Stores, Inc.

• Decision Date: 09 September 1997
• Docket Number: No. 95-8640 RAP(Shx).,95-8640 RAP(Shx).
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California
• Parties: Daniel DOVE, Plaintiff, v. PNS STORES, INC., dba Pic `N' Save, a California Corporation, et al., Defendant.

982 F.Supp. 1420

Daniel DOVE, Plaintiff, v. PNS STORES, INC., dba Pic `N' Save, a California Corporation, et al., Defendant.

No. 95-8640 RAP(Shx).

United States District Court, C.D. California.

September 9, 1997.

F. James Feffer, F. James Feffer Law Offices, Sherman Oaks, CA, for Plaintiff.

Gary Raymond Basham, Jackson Lewis Schnitzler & Krupman, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT COLLINS'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

PAEZ, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Pending before the Court is defendant David Collins' Motion for Summary Judgment regarding plaintiff's tenth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Upon consideration of the parties' moving, opposition, reply papers, and the oral arguments of counsel, the Court finds that there are no material triable issues of fact, and that defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This action involves claims by plaintiff Daniel M. Dove against PNS Stores, Inc., dba Pic `N' Save, and several of its employees, including David Collins ("Collins"), for employment discrimination and related tort claims. In his original complaint, plaintiff alleged that in December of 1994, Pic `N' Save employees harassed and discriminated against him because of his mental disability. Plaintiff contends that he complained about these incidents to Collins, the store manager, but Collins failed to investigate the alleged incidents. According to plaintiff, Collins' only response was to tell plaintiff that these incidents were "all in his head." Plaintiff also alleges that he overheard Collins say to another employee, "I wish Danny would quit."

On September 25, 1996, plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint asserting five causes of action against Collins: defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and two negligence claims. Subsequently, all claims except the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress were dismissed either by the Court or by stipulation of the parties.¹ Defendant Collins now seeks summary judgment on plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

III. Factual Background²

Plaintiff began working at a Pic `N' Save store located in Van Nuys, California, in December 1988. Throughout his employment at Pic `N' Save, plaintiff worked as a cashier and recovery clerk. Plaintiff's last day at work was June 18, 1995. Defendant Collins was the store manager of the Van Nuys store from November 1993 to June 1995, and supervised plaintiff.

While plaintiff worked at Pic `N' Save, he and Collins had a cordial, if not friendly, relationship. On occasion, plaintiff would arrive at work early to visit with Collins. Also, on occasion, Collins told plaintiff that he was a good worker. During the time that Collins supervised plaintiff, he gave plaintiff fair performance reviews, and did not discipline plaintiff in any way.

In December of 1994, plaintiff complained to Collins about disparaging comments made about him by a fellow co-worker. Collins, after asking the employee about the incident, was told that this employee thought "it was all in his [plaintiff's] head," and Collins subsequently relayed that comment to plaintiff. Collins apparently accepted this employee's explanation and did not conduct any further investigation. In January of 1995, plaintiff also overheard Collins say to another employee, "I wish Danny would quit." This comment, was not directed at Collins but to another employee. Plaintiff was upset by these two statements, because he interpreted Collins' comments as an intention to force him to quit. Plaintiff did not present any evidence which indicated that prior to the incidents at issue, Collins said or did anything to plaintiff that upset him at work. On June 18, 1995, plaintiff quit his job.

Defendant assumes, for the purposes of this motion, that he made the statements alleged by plaintiff.³ Based on the above facts, as presented by plaintiff, Collins contends that his conduct was not outrageous, and that he did not have the intent to cause plaintiff to suffer emotional distress. At the hearing on the motion, defendant's counsel emphasized that at the time of the events in question, Collins did not know the full extent of plaintiff's mental impairment. Collins does acknowledge, however, that he was aware of plaintiff's dyslexia. Collins' testimony at his deposition is consistent with these representations. At his deposition, Collins testified that throughout plaintiff's employment, he was only aware that plaintiff was a slow learner, which Collins attributed to plaintiff's learning disability (i.e. dyslexia). See Collins Depo. at 75.

Defendant contends that these undisputed facts, taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff, are insufficient to establish a prima facie case of intentional infliction of emotional distress, because they fail to show that defendant's conduct was outrageous or that he acted with the intent to cause emotional distress. Thus, defendant argues that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Plaintiff argues that whether defendant intended to harm him and whether Collins' conduct was outrageous turn on Collins' knowledge of plaintiff's diminished mental capabilities. In other words, plaintiff contends that defendant's knowledge of plaintiff's susceptibility to emotional distress is an issue for the jury, and therefore, defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Summary Judgment Standard.

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for summary judgment if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Summary judgment terminates the action without trial and is a "judgment `on the merits.'" Judge William W. Schwarzer et al., Cal. Prac. Guide: Fed. Civ. Proc. Before Trial § 14:28 (The Rutter Group 1996) (hereinafter SCHWARZER). Not only is summary judgment not "disfavored," but it is "an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed `to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2555, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

In a trilogy of 1986 cases, the Supreme Court clarified the standard for summary judgment. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 317, 106 S.Ct. at 2549; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Matsushita Electric Industry Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. at 2514. Whether a fact is material is determined by looking to the governing substantive law; if the fact may affect the outcome, it is material. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. If the moving party seeks summary adjudication with respect to a claim or defense upon which it bears the burden of proving the claim or defense, the moving party can meet its burden by pointing out the absence of evidence from the non-moving party. The moving party need not disprove the other party's case. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2553-54; see also Schwarzer, Cal. Prac. Guide: Fed. Civ. Proc. Before Trial § 14: 123-141.

When the moving party meets its burden, the "adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleadings, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).

In assessing whether the non-moving party has raised a genuine issue, its evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513-14 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress and Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970)). Nonetheless, "the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" is insufficient. Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512. As the Court explained in Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87, 106 S.Ct. at 1356:

When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.... Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no "genuine issue for trial."

The rules of evidence generally govern the admissibility of facts. See Schwarzer, Cal. Prac. Guide: Fed. Civ. Proc. Before Trial § 14:160 (citing Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 (9th Cir.1990)). Rule 56(e) requires that declarations or affidavits submitted in support of or in opposition to a summary judgment motion "be based on personal knowledge; state `facts as would be admissible in evidence' ...; and `show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein[.]" Id., § 14:162. Declarations on information and belief are insufficient. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989).

B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

1. Standard

Under California law, a prima facie case of intentional infliction of emotional distress requires the following: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by defendant's outrageous conduct. See Christensen v. Superior Court, ...