Dowlen v. Fitch
| Citation | 196 Tenn. 206,266 S.W.2d 357,32 Beeler 206 |
| Parties | , 196 Tenn. 206, 41 A.L.R.2d 791 DOWLEN v. FITCH et al. |
| Decision Date | 20 April 1954 |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
B. J. Boyd, Ashland City, for plaintiff in error.
H. Francis Stewart and Watkins & McGugin, Nashville, for defendants in error.
A petition to rehear has been filed by the defendants in error, complaining that the Court erred in holding that Chapter 34 of the Public Acts of 1953 was applicable to causes of action 'which were in esse at the time of the effective date of this act'. It is stated there is nothing in the act 'either plainly expressed or necessarily implied' which gives to the Court the power to hold that said act applies to substantive causes of action in existence at the time of the passage of the act.
In the case of Collins v. East Tennessee, V. & G. Railroad Co., 56 Tenn. 841, a parallel situation occurred. This case was fully discussed in the original opinion.
The effective date of the act referred to in that case was December 11, 1871, from and after its passage. The Court construed said act as conferring upon a widow the right to bring a suit for the wrongful death of her husband. Said husband had lost his life two months and twelve days prior to the passage of said act. Upon his death the law provided that the action for his death could be prosecuted by the personal representative of the deceased only. Out of deference to the earnest petition to rehear, the language of the Court in holding that the widow had the right to maintain an action is quoted again:
We set out in the original opinion that a person has no vested right in any particular remedy. We held then, and we reaffirm, that the defendants had no vested right...
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Davis v. Jones
...held a venue statute should be construed to apply retroactively. See also Dowlen v. Fitch, 1954, 196 Tenn. 206, 264 S.W.2d 824, 266 S.W.2d 357, 41 A.L.R.2d 791, and annotations following. We hold a venue statute should not be considered on the same basis as one pertaining to a jurisdictiona......
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Sadler v. Draper
...National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Atwood, 29 Tenn. App. 141, 194 S.W.2d 350; Dowlen v. Fitch, 196 Tenn. 206, 264 S.W.2d 824, 266 S.W.2d 357, 41 A.L.R.2d 791. It is objected for Mrs. Sadler that the evidence introduced negatived, or displaced, the statutory presumption and showed, as a ma......
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Keeble v. Loudon Utilities
...as well as to transitory actions. This statute was first before the Court in Dowlen v. Fitch, 196 Tenn. 206, 264 S.W.2d 824, 266 S.W.2d 357, 41 A.L.R.2d 791, and in Parker v. Raddick, 196 Tenn. 472, 268 S.W.2d 357, 45 A.L.R.2d 1096. Both of these cases were transitory In Keefe, Admr. v. Atk......
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State ex rel. LeNeve v. Moore, s. 51921
...80 F.Supp. 734, 'venue' was characterized as a procedural matter. In the case of Dowlen v. Fitch, 196 Tenn. 206, 264 S.W.2d 824, 266 S.W.2d 357, 41 A.L.R.2d 791, an action for injuries sustained in an automobile accident was brought in the county where the accident occurred. The defendants ......