State ex rel. LeNeve v. Moore, s. 51921
Decision Date | 14 November 1966 |
Docket Number | 51993,Nos. 51921,s. 51921 |
Citation | 408 S.W.2d 47 |
Parties | STATE ex rel. Don LeNEVE, d/b/a LeNeve's TV and Appliance Company, Relator, v. Honorable James A. MOORE, Judge of the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Respondent. STATE ex rel. Harold F. GOEBEL, Relator, v. Honorable William M. TURPIN, Judge of the Circuit Court of St. Charles County, Respondent. |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Harold L. Caskey, Butler, for relator LeNeve.
Adolph K. Schwartz, St. Louis, for relator Goebel.
Richard P. Shanahan, Jones & McDaniel, Kansas City, for respondent Moore.
Robert V. Niedner, Paul F. Niedner, Niedner, Niedner & Moerschel, St. Charles, for respondent Turpin.
These are original proceedings in prohibition, consolidated for the purpose of this opinion.
In No. 51921, Relator, a resident of Bates County, Missouri, seeks to prohibit Respondent, Judge Moore, from proceeding with the trial of a tort action brought against Relator in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri. The cause of action accrued in Jackson County, Missouri, on April 7, 1965. The action in question was instituted on October 26, 1965.
In No. 51993, Relator, a resident of St. Louis County, Missouri, seeks to prohibit Respondent, Judge Turpin, from proceeding with the trial of a tort action brought against Relator in the Circuit Court of St. Charles County, Missouri. The cause of action accrued in St. Charles County, Missouri, on May 9, 1965. The action in question was instituted on October 20, 1965.
Our venue statute, § 508.010, RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S., was amended, effective October 13, 1965, by adding the following: '(6) In all tort actions the suit may be brought in the county where the cause of action accrued regardless of the residence of the parties, and process therein shall be issued by the court of such county and may be served in any county within the state; provided, however, that in any action for defamation or for invasion of privacy the cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued in the county in which the defamation or invasion was first published.'
The question for determination in both cases is whether this statute shall operate retrospectively or prospectively. If the statute may operate retrospectively, the Respondent Judges should be allowed to proceed in the counties where the causes of action accrued. If the statute must operate prospectively, the Respondent Judges should be prohibited from proceeding in the counties where the causes of action accrued.
Article I, Section 13 of the Constitution of Missouri, 1945, V.A.M.S., provides: 'That no ex post facto law, nor law impairing the obligation of contracts, or retrospective in its operation, or making any irrevocable grant of special privileges or immunities, can be enacted.'
Applicable rules of law are stated in State ex rel. Clay Equipment Corporation v. Jensen, Mo.Sup., 363 S.W.2d 666, at 669, as follows: * * *.'
We come then to the questions: (1) whether the statute deals only with procedure; and (2) whether its language evidences a clear intention on the part of the Legislature that it shall operate prospectively only.
In an annotation contained in 41 A.L.R.2d 798, we find this statement: 'No cases prohibiting the retroactive application of venue statutes on constitutional grounds have been found; this is so whether the statute was applied to a cause of action accrued prior to, but sued upon after, the effective date of the statute, or to an action pending in the trial court on the effective date of the statute.'
In the cases of In re Robertson (D.C.Mo.), 127 F.Supp. 39, and United States v. National City Lines, Inc., (D.C.Cal.), 80 F.Supp. 734, 'venue' was characterized as a procedural matter. In the case of Dowlen v. Fitch, 196 Tenn. 206, 264 S.W.2d 824, 266 S.W.2d 357, 41 A.L.R.2d 791, an action for injuries sustained in an automobile accident was brought in the county where the accident occurred. The defendants were residents of another county of the State. The accident occurred before the effective date of a statute providing for such venue. The Supreme Court of Tennessee held that the defendants had no vested right in the venue provisions existing at the time the cause of action accrued, and construed the amendment of the venue statute as applicable to actions brought after the effective date of the amendment.
We are of the opinion that a...
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