Downey v. Union Trust Co. of Springfield
| Decision Date | 30 November 1942 |
| Citation | 312 Mass. 405,45 N.E.2d 373 |
| Parties | BARBARA L. DOWNEY v. UNION TRUST COMPANY OF SPRINGFIELD, executor. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
May 28, 1942.
Present: FIELD, C.
J., QUA, DOLAN COX, & RONAN, JJ.
Executor and Administrator, Claim barred by short statute of limitations. Equity Jurisdiction, Claim barred by short statute of limitations. Contract, Implied, In behalf of child Performance and breach, Parties. Minor. Equity Pleading and Practice, Master: findings, reopening of hearing; Report Variance. Evidence, Admissions, Of value, Relevancy, Opinion. Damages, For breach of contract.
In a suit under G L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 197, Section 10, upon a claim against the estate of a deceased person which had not been prosecuted within the period of the short statute of limitations, a finding by a master, not based solely on his subsidiary findings, that the plaintiff was not guilty of culpable neglect in failing so to prosecute his claim, must stand since it was not inconsistent with a subsidiary finding that during that period the plaintiff had been represented by an experienced and respected member of the bar, upon whom he was justified in relying to protect his rights, and there was no finding as to the reason for such failure, or that it was due to negligence of the attorney.
The making of an oral contract between a man and the mother of a young girl, acting for her benefit, in substance that he would bequeath an annuity in a certain sum to the girl if he were permitted to have the privilege of association with her, and performance by the girl of all that was required of her under the contract in accordance with directions given her by the mother in reliance upon the contract, entitled the girl, although she did not know of the contract until after the man's death, to recover the value of such services from the man's estate upon quantum meruit.
Ratification of a contract made by a parent of an unemancipated minor for his benefit was warranted by continued prosecution, after majority, of a suit, begun during minority, for services performed in reliance upon the contract.
In a proceeding against the estate of a decedent for the value of services rendered to him in reliance upon an oral contract to bequeath an annuity of a specified amount to the plaintiff, evidence of the cost of such an annuity for one of the plaintiff's age at the time of the decedent's death was admissible to show an admission by the decedent of what he considered such services worth although the value of the annuity was not the measure of damages.
To prove the existence of an oral contract by a man to make a provision in his will in consideration of services rendered to him, it was proper to admit evidence that the agreed provision was included in an unproved will made after the making of the alleged oral contract and prior to a will which was admitted to probate, it not appearing that issues, thereby opened, improperly drew attention from the real issue presented.
No error was shown in a master's reopening a hearing, at the request of one party but against the objection of the other, after both parties had rested and before arguments, but following a discussion of some questions of law regarding which the master expressed some concern.
No question of variance between the allegations of a bill in equity and the proof was open in this court upon a reservation and report only of other questions.
A plaintiff should not have been permitted to give an opinion of the value of his services based on the opinion of another.
On quantum meruit for services performed by the plaintiff, the measure of damages was solely the fair value of the services; damages should not have been assessed in whole or in part on the basis of evidence that the defendant was wealthy and well able to pay.
BILL IN EQUITY, filed in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Hampden on March 13, 1939.
The suit was reserved and reported by Qua, J. There was no exception to the master's report specifying a contention of variance. The contention of the defendant in his brief appears to be that the plaintiff's allegation in her bill went no farther than to allege damages for the time during which the plaintiff lived with her grandmother; that on the master's report that time extended from the time the plaintiff was two years old until she first attended school, a period of approximately five years; but that the master in his assessment of damages calculated them on the whole period from the time when the plaintiff went to live with her grandmother up until the time of the testator's death, a period of approximately seventeen years: in other words, that the master in his findings found damages for a period in excess of three times as long as the period alleged in the plaintiff's bill of complaint. The defendant also contended, on the question of the form of the final decree, that no decree should be entered upon these findings since an equity decree is founded upon the pleadings and the relief granted cannot go beyond them. And the defendant cited Pickard v. Clancy, 225 Mass. 89, 95.
The case was submitted on briefs.
C. V. D.
Siegel & I. Salvage, for the plaintiff.
R. D. Mallary, M.
P. Gilbert, & S.
Williston, for the defendant.
This is a bill in equity filed under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 197, Section 10, in which the plaintiff seeks a judgment against the estate of a deceased person upon a claim not prosecuted within the time limited by G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 197, Section 9, as amended by St. 1933, c. 221, Section 4, for the commencement of actions by creditors of the deceased. The suit came on to be heard by the single justice upon the original and supplementary reports of the master and was reserved and reported by him to the full court upon all questions of law arising from the defendant's exceptions to the master's reports, the plaintiff's exception to the said reports, the plaintiff's motion to confirm the reports and upon the form of the final decree which ought to be entered.
At the outset of the case, the right of the plaintiff upon the findings of the master to invoke the aid of the statute, G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c 197, Section 10, is challenged by the defendant. This statute provides that a creditor of an estate who has not prosecuted his claim within the time limited by G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 197, Section 9, as amended by St. 1933, c. 221, Section 4, may file a bill in equity in this court and if the court "deems that justice and equity require it and that such creditor is not chargeable with culpable neglect in not prosecuting his claim within the time so limited, it may give him judgment for the amount of his claim against the estate of the deceased person." It appears from the reports that the plaintiff and her mother in January, 1937, consulted an experienced and respected member of the bar, apprised him of all the facts relative to her claim against the estate and requested him to handle the matter for her. He said that he would do whatever was necessary to protect her rights, and thereafter appeared as her guardian ad litem in the Probate Court in different matters pertaining to the testator's will. He advised her at various times during 1938 that "she had to await her turn; not to worry, that her interests would be taken care of." She consulted another attorney in February, 1939, who, on March 13, 1939, filed the bill of complaint. The bond of the defendant as executor was approved on December 20, 1937. The master found that the plaintiff was justified in relying upon the attorney to protect her rights; that she acted with due diligence; that she was not chargeable with culpable neglect; and that justice and equity required that she be permitted to prosecute her claim. The defendant contends that these findings are insufficient to bring the case within the statute and more especially that the plaintiff is barred from relief on account of the negligence of her attorney.
The obvious purpose of the statute, G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 197, Section 9, as amended by St. 1933, c. 221, Section 4, limiting the time within which creditors of an estate may bring actions to enforce their claims, was to expedite the settlement of estates, Stebbins v. Scott, 172 Mass. 356; Henshaw v. Brown, 299 Mass. 136; Spaulding v. McConnell, 307 Mass. 144; and a creditor whose claim is barred by this statute is not entitled to relief under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 197, Section 10, unless he shows a claim of such substantial merit that equity and justice require that its validity should be recognized, and unless he proves that his failure to commence action within the time prescribed was not due to his carelessness or to any lack of diligence for which he might properly be censured or blamed. Powow River National Bank v. Abbott, 179 Mass. 336 . Estabrook v. Moulton, 223 Mass. 359. Johnson v. Clabburn, 249 Mass. 216 . Haven v. Smith, 250 Mass. 546 . Dietrick v. Hayward, 304 Mass. 623 . Noyes v. Shea, ante, 32.
The difficulty with the defendant's contentions is that the master has found that the plaintiff was not guilty of culpable neglect and he has not found that the failure to bring action was due to the negligence of the attorney. He has refrained from finding the specific reason, or in fact any reason, for such failure. It would have been within his province to have made such a finding. Nothing more in this respect appears from the reports than the bald fact that there was such failure, and even this appears by implication and not by express finding. The master may have believed, upon unreported evidence, that the attorney's failure was due to inadvertence misunderstanding, illness or some cause other than neglect or breach of duty. The finding that ...
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