Stebbins v. Scott

Decision Date07 January 1899
Citation172 Mass. 356,52 N.E. 535
PartiesSTEBBINS et al. v. SCOTT.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
COUNSEL

Elliot D. Stetson, for plaintiffs.

H.B Worth, for defendant.

OPINION

FIELD C.J.

Under the agreed statement of facts on which this case was determined in the superior court, the only question submitted is "whether or not the special statute of limitations of actions against executors and administrators is a bar to the plaintiffs' claim," etc. The plaintiffs sue here upon a judgment against the United States Savings Bank, a corporation established under the laws of the state of Kansas, recovered in the district court of Shawnee county, in Kansas, on October 26, 1895, on which execution issued, and was returned "wholly unsatisfied," in November 1895. The writ in that action was dated August 23, 1895. The plaintiffs are the assignees of certain certificates of deposit issued by the bank to eight different persons, who at different times, from December 20, 1890, to July 6, 1891, deposited with the bank the sums of money represented by the certificates. Each depositor had a separate cause of action against the bank, represented by his certificate. The bank carried on its business in Topeka, Kan., and, as appears in the agreed statement, it suspended payment of its debts and deposits in March, 1891; and afterwards resumed payment, in July, 1891; and "on September 17, 1891, it again suspended payment; and on September 19, 1891, a receiver of said corporation was duly appointed by the court of Kansas; and thereafter the assets of said bank were duly turned into cash, and distributed by said receiver among the bank's creditors." "The assets of said bank were insufficient to pay in full the claims of the depositors, the last dividend being paid June 4, 1894." "Said receiver applied all the assets of said bank to the payment of its liabilities, and was finally discharged on September 4, 1894." Frederick C. Sanford, of Nantucket, of whose will the defendant is executor, died on August 13, 1890, leaving a will, which was duly proved and allowed in the probate court of the county of Nantucket, and of which the defendant was appointed executor on November 10, 1891, and on that date he gave bond according to law, and afterwards he duly published notice of his appointment, and returned affidavit thereof to said probate court. The two years of limitation provided in Pub.St. c. 136, § 9, therefore, expired on November 10, 1893. The writ in the present action is dated October 17, 1896. Sanford, at the time of his death, owned 20 shares of the capital stock of the bank, of the par value of $2,000. It is to be noticed that the indebtedness of the bank on which the judgment was rendered in the court of Kansas arose after the death of Sanford, but it has been assumed by the counsel of both parties that the liability of his estate is the same as if the indebtedness of the bank had arisen in his lifetime. We express no opinion about this, but we proceed to deal with the single question which, under the agreed statement of facts, has been submitted to us.

The plaintiffs, on November 19, 1892, as attorneys for an association of creditors of the bank, wrote a letter to the defendant, as executor of the will of Sanford, calling his attention to the liability of the estate of Sanford to the creditors of the bank, and requested that he, as such executor, should pay "50 per cent." of the amount of the stock held by the estate towards a fund for the payment of the creditors, but nothing was paid by the defendant on this request. With knowledge of the death of Sanford and the appointment of the defendant as executor, "after the two-years period of limitation had expired, the plaintiffs took assignments of the certificates" of deposits on which they brought the suit and obtained the judgment in the court in Kansas. "On September 20, 1896, the estate of said Frederick C. Sanford not being finally settled, and said 20 shares of the capital stock of said United States Savings Bank being still in the name of said Sanford on the books of said corporation, a decree was made by the probate court of [the county of] Nantucket, ordering, under the provisions of Pub.St. c. 136, § 13, the defendant, as executor of said Sanford, to retain funds to satisfy" the judgment against the bank, and "such funds are now being held in obedience to said decree."

We assume, without considering it, that under the laws of Kansas an assignee of the several choses in action against the bank could sue the bank in the courts of Kansas in his own name and could join in one action claims assigned by different persons. If, however, the claims of the assignors against the estate of Sanford were barred in this commonwealth when they were assigned to the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs' claim, as assignees, we think is also barred. The plaintiffs, as assignees, have no greater rights against the estate of Sanford than their assignors would have had if no assignment had been made. The contention of the defendant is that by paragraphs 1200 and 1204 of the General Statutes of Kansas of 1889, which are cited in the margin, the causes of action of the assignors against the estate of Sanford accrued within two years after the giving of the administration bond. Pub.St. c. 136, §§ 1, 9. If their causes of action accrued within said two years, then the probate court could not lawfully order the defendant to retain assets, under Pub.St. c. 136,§ 13. Whether the causes of action so accrued depends upon the construction to be given to said paragraphs 1200 and 1204 and to the agreed statement of facts. We are of opinion that the meaning of the agreed statement of facts is that the bank finally suspended business on September 17, 1891, and that it never resumed business. The agreed facts say that it suspended payment of its debts and deposits; that a receiver of the bank was duly appointed by the court of Kansas; that the assets of the bank were duly turned into cash, and distributed by said receiver among the bank's creditors; that the assets were insufficient to pay in...

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13 cases
  • New England Trust Co. v. Spaulding
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • 30 Diciembre 1941
    ...of his giving bond for the performance of his trust. The purpose of the statute is to expedite the settlement of estates. Stebbins v. Scott, 172 Mass. 356, 52 N.E. 535;Parker v. Rich, 297 Mass. 111, 8 N.E.2d 345;Spaulding v. McConnell, 307 Mass. 144, 29 N.E.2d 713. And, in view of its aim, ......
  • Baldwin, State Treasurer v. Scullion
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • 24 Noviembre 1936
    ...the statute of limitations and bind the heirs. Abbott v. Johnston, (Ark.) 195 S.W. 676; McCoy v. Morrow, (Ill.) 68 Am. Dec. 578; Stebbins v. Scott, 52 N.E. 535; McHugh v. O'Dowds Est., (Mich.) 49 N.W. Fitzgerald v. First National Bank, (Nebr.) 89 N.W. 813; Miller v. Ewing, (Ohio) 67 N.E. 29......
  • Downey v. Union Trust Co. of Springfield
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • 30 Noviembre 1942
    ...time within which creditors of an estate may bring actions to enforce their claims, was to expedite the settlement of estates, Stebbins v. Scott, 172 Mass. 356; Henshaw v. Brown, 299 Mass. 136; Spaulding McConnell, 307 Mass. 144; and a creditor whose claim is barred by this statute is not e......
  • New England Trust Co. v. Spaulding
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • 30 Diciembre 1941
    ...a year of his giving bond for the performance of his trust. The purpose of the statute is to expedite the settlement of estates. Stebbins v. Scott, 172 Mass. 356 . Parker Rich, 297 Mass. 111 . Spaulding v. McConnell, 307 Mass. 144 . And, in view of its aim, the term "creditor" as used there......
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