Doyle v. Goldberg

• Decision Date: 01 April 1936
• Citation: 294 Mass. 105,1 N.E.2d 1
• Parties: DOYLE v. GOLDBERG.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

294 Mass. 105

1 N.E.2d 1

DOYLE v. GOLDBERG.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

April 1, 1936

Action of tort by Anna V. Doyle against Jack Goldberg. From an order by the appellate division dismissing a report for the plaintiff in the sum of $606.60, the defendant appeals.

Order affirmed.

Appeal from Appellate Division of District Court Northern district.

D. H Fulton, of Boston, for appellant.

Brooks Potter, of Boston, for appellee.

RUGG Chief Justice.

The plaintiff seeks to recover in this action of tort compensation for personal injuries and damage to property sustained by her in February, 1934, while operating an automobile, through the negligence of the defendant in operating an automobile. The trial judge found for the plaintiff. It has not been argued that there was not sufficient evidence to support the finding that the harm to the plaintiff was caused by the negligence of the defendant. The only question for decision is whether the automobile of the plaintiff was legally registered. The plaintiff stated in her application for registration that her ‘ Massachusetts residential address' and her ‘ Mail Address' were 41 Ocean Avenue, Weymouth, Massachusetts and that the motor vehicle was garaged in Weymouth, Massachusetts. The evidence touching this subject was undisputed and was in substance as follows: Testimony of the plaintiff was that she was part owner of the house in North Weymouth described in her application for registration and lived there. In 1933 she went there about April first and lived there until about November twentieth. Then the water was shut off, although the electricity remained on, the house was closed for the winter and she came to Boston. She was a school teacher in Boston and votes in Boston. In the directory issued by the Boston school department her address is given as Roxbury, which is a part of Boston. She has a room and living quarters in the home of her father at Roxbury. Between January and April she went to Weymouth only occasionally and never stayed over night there, and had no intention of remaining there indefinitely. She remained in Weymouth in the autumn until the weather was bad, when she came to Boston. The home in Roxbury is open in the summer but no one lives there; the family lives at North Weymouth in the summer. The father keeps both homes. In 1934, on January 1 and on April 1, she was in Roxbury. Subject to report at request of the defendant, the plaintiff was permitted to testify that in 1933 she garaged her automobile in Weymouth from April to November and in Roxbury the rest of the year, that she made application ‘ for plates for the calendar year 1934’ in October, 1933, and received them in November, 1933, and that in October, 1933, she was living in Weymouth. The father of the plaintiff testified that the house at North Weymouth was his summer home and that his daughters lived there with him.

The trial judge found that the plaintiff lives and garages her automobile ‘ more than seven months in each year at 41 Ocean Avenue, North Weymouth’ and that that is her ‘ principal residence.’ It has not been argued that there is any distinction between Weymouth and North Weymouth so far as concerns the merits of the case. The court takes judicial notice that North Weymouth is not a town but is a part of the town of Weymouth. These findings are supported by the evidence and must be accepted as true. Jones v. Clark, 272 Mass. 146, 149, 172 N.E. 250; Bresnick v. Heath (Mass.) 198 N.E. 175; Kennedy Bros., Inc., v. Bird, 287 Mass. 477, 484, 192 N.E. 73. The trial judge ruled upon these facts that the ‘ automobile of the plaintiff having been registered from 41 Ocean Avenue, North Weymouth, which was the place where the plaintiff lived more than seven months in each year, was not an outlaw on the highway in February 12, 1934.’

It is required that an application for registration of an automobile shall contain ‘ a statement of the name, place of residence and address of the applicant.’ G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 90, § 2. The statutes contain no definition of the words ‘ place of residence’ as thus used; do not in terms require a statement of the domicil of the applicant and make no reference to the word ‘ domicil.’ One object of this legislative scheme for registration of automobiles is that there may be upon the public records an easy means of identification of the automobile and its owner. Nash v. Lang, 268 Mass. 407, 409, 167 N.E. 762; Topf v. Holland, 288 Mass. 552, 193 N.E. 364; Ricker v. Boston Elevated Railway Co. (Mass.) 194 N.E. 815; Brodmerkle v. Gorolsky (Mass.) 200 N.E. 274.

The words of the statute imply that there may be a distinction between ‘ residence’ and ‘ address' of the applicant for registration, and that both are required in the application. Crean v. Boston Elevated Railway Co. (Mass.) 198 N.E. 172. ‘ Residence’ is not a word of inflexible meaning but may be used in different senses. It is not synonymous with domicil.‘ Generally, in the laws relating to taxation, voting, and settlement, it means the same as ‘ domicile.’ Usually it means the same in the law of divorce. * * * For the purpose of giving notice to an indorser, his place of residence implies less permanency of abode.' Stoughton v. Cambridge, 165 Mass. 251, 252, 253, 43 N.E. 106; Marlborough v. Lynn, 275 Mass. 394, 397, 176 N.E. 214. Although a person can have but one domicil, he may have more than one residence. Opinion of Justice, 5 Metc. 587, 588, 589; Holmes v. Greene, 7 Gray, 299, 301; Wachusett National Bank v. Fairbrother, 148 Mass. 181, 185, 19 N.E. 345,12 Am.St.Rep. 530; Lowell Trust Co. v. Pratt, 183 Mass. 379, 381, 67 N.E. 363; Emery v. Emery, 218 Mass. 227, 229, 105 N.E. 879; Martin v. Gardner, 240 Mass. 350, 353, 134 N.E. 380; Tax Collector of Lowell v. Hanchett, 240 Mass. 557, 561, 134 N.E. 355; Avila v. DuPont, 278 Mass. 83, 87, 180 N.E. 124; Commonwealth v. Ballou, 283 Mass. 304, 313, 186 N.E. 494. It is matter of common knowledge that a person may have two places of residence within the commonwealth. A statement of the residence and address of the applicant affords information sufficient in the ordinary case to satisfy one main purpose of the statute as to the easy identification of the registrant. Crompton v. Williams, 216 Mass. 184, 187, 103 N.E. 298; Rolli v. Converse, 227 Mass. 162, 165, 116 N.E. 507; Koley v. Williams, 265 Mass. 601, 603, 164 N.E. 444; Di Cecca v. Bucci, 278 Mass. 15, 16, 178 N.E. 447. Trifling inaccuracies in the statements in the application not affecting this statutory design do not invalidate the registration. Crompton v. Williams, 216 Mass. 184, 187, 103 N.E. 298; Nash v. Lang, 268 Mass. 407, 414, 167 N.E. 762; Topf v. Holland, 288 Mass. 552, 193 N.E. 364. The determination of the place of residence or domicil...