Doyle v. Hibernia Bank, 17051
| Decision Date | 11 December 1957 |
| Docket Number | No. 17051,17051 |
| Citation | 156 Cal.App.2d 16,319 P.2d 412 |
| Parties | Eileen DOYLE, as Administratrix with the Will Annexed of the Estate of Henry Doyle, deceased, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The HIBERNIA BANK, a corporation; The Hibernia Bank, a corporation, as Executor of the Last Will of Richard Montgomery Tobin, also known as Richard M. Tobin, deceased; Joseph O. Tobin; Cyril R. Tobin; Edward J. Tobin; Constance de Young Tobin; Ruth Haskins Tobin; Abby Parrott Tobin; Celia Tobin Clark; Beatrice Tobin Raoul-Duval; Richard Raoul-Duval; Florence Adele Tobin; Charles J. Barry; Ernest O. McCormick, Jr.; Leo O'Grady; Sheldon Cooper; Joseph O. Tobin, Trustee; Cyril R. Tobin, Trustee; Richard Raoul-Duval, Trustee; Charles J. Barry, Trustee; Ernest O. McCormick, Jr., Trustee; Leo O'Grady, Trustee; Sheldon G. Cooper, Trustee, et al., Defendants and Respondents. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Alexander S. Keenan, Jr., San Francisco, for appellant.
Tobin & Tobin, Sullivan, Roche, Johnson & Farraher, Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, San Francisco, for respondents.
Plaintiff appeals from a judgment in favor of defendants entered upon their motion for summary judgment in a suit for declaratory relief seeking an interest in the assets of Hibernia Bank by reason of Henry Doyle's membership in the bank's predecessor, the Hibernia Savings and Loan Society.
Questions Presented.
1. Was there a triable issue of fact?
2. Did Henry Doyle's membership rights terminate with his death? Record. 1
The Society, organized in 1859, was intended by its incorporators to be and was operated as a membership corporation. The members were required to sign the by-laws thereby agreeing that their mutual duties, rights and privileges as members should be governed by the by-laws. In 1864 the Society elected to become incorporated under laws then existing which provided that associations claiming in good faith to be incorporated under the laws of this state, could incorporate as savings banks without capital stock. The new certificate of incorporation provided that the Society should have no capital stock and that its affairs should be managed by a board of directors. September 29, 1864, new by-laws were adopted which provided that all persons who were members of the Society on August 29, 1864, should be deemed to be members of the new corporation and that as speedily as possible their signatures to an agreement confirming the new corporation would be procured. A clause as to other persons becoming members similar to the one hereinafter mentioned was included. October 19, 1888, article 4 of the by-laws was amended to read:
These by-laws were in effect on January 28, 1889, when Henry Doyle became a member by vote of the board of directors, opening an account by depositing $100 and signing the required agreement. His name was then entered on the books and records and has remained ever since as a member. In 1945 the Legislature added section 29a to the Bank Act (Stats.1945, p. 1017, Financial Code, § 671.1 et seq.). It provided that any California corporation without capital stock which continuously for 20 years had been doing business could bring an all persons suit to determine the persons entitled to membership therein, and who had any interests in its property and assets. On October 11, 1945, the Society brought such an action After judgment therein and in 1947 the Society reorganized as a stock corporation under the name of Hibernia Bank with stock in the amount of $7,000,000 divided among 15 persons.
Henry Doyle died August 16, 1898, never having resigned or otherwise disposed of his membership. At no time did his account have a balance of less than $100 nor does it now. He left surviving him several heirs. Ever since his death their names have appeared on Hibernia's books as claimants to Henry's membership rights. 2
The answer is no as to the fundamental issue in the case--the question of whether Henry's property rights as a member terminated upon his death, 3 for the reason that nowhere in the affidavits of either party on the motion for summary judgment is there any suggestion of evidence to be offered on the interpretation of the by-laws as to membership. Plaintiff contends that the interpretation of the by-laws on the subject is a question of fact, but she nowhere even intimates that she has any evidence to offer on the subject. Such matters as to which there appears from the affidavits of the parties to be a conflict of evidence are only such matters as arise if as claimed by plaintiff Henry's membership rights attached to his heirs upon his death. Whether they did or not is a question of law.
In considering a motion for summary judgment the province of the court is issue finding rather than issue determination. If the court finds a triable issue, then it is powerless to continue but must allow the issue to be tried by a jury, unless a jury trial is waived. Walsh v. Walsh, 1941, 18 Cal.2d 439, 441, 116 P.2d 62; Schulze v. Schulze, 1953, 121 Cal.App.2d 75, 81, 262 P.2d 646; Eagle Oil & Refining Co. v. Prentice, 1942, 19 Cal.2d 553, 555, 122 P.2d 264. And the question of issue finding is to be determined by the sufficiency of the affidavits of the parties. Code Civ.Proc., § 437c; Dorsey v. City of Los Angeles, 1955, 132 Cal.App.2d 716, 719, 282 P.2d 997. Where on a motion for summary judgment the issues are of law only it is the duty of the trial court to determine those issues. (Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Casady, 1936, 15 Cal.App.2d 163, 168, 59 P.2d 444; see also Bromberg v. Bank of America, 1943, 58 Cal.App.2d 1, 135 P.2d 689 affirming summary judgment where only issues of law were presented.)
Bennett v. Hibernia Bank, supra, 47 Cal.2d 540, 305 P.2d 20, held that under the 1862 act the by-laws could provide the conditions under which membership rights might be acquired or lost. Thus we are required then to determine what the by-laws provided concerning membership rights upon the death of a member.
The only provision on the subject is in section 4. There is no express statement as to what happens to the property rights attached to membership on the member's death. Whether the by-law is ambiguous or not, we must interpret it without the aid of extrinsic evidence as there is none. We may, however, consider the history of the Society and the other provisions of the by-laws in making the interpretation.
In England and on the Atlantic Coast in the early days a common form of savings bank was one in which the depositors were the members and only those who were depositors at the time of liquidation of the bank could have any interest in its reserves. Membership and interest in the bank's assets terminated upon withdrawal of the member's deposits. (See Society for Savings in City of Cleveland, Ohio v. Bowers, 1955, 349 U.S. 143, 75 S.Ct. 607, 99 L.Ed. 950.) The act of 1862 contemplated that there could be two kinds of bank corporations, one, a stock corporation, the other a membership corporation. It is significant that section 299, Civil Code, enacted in 1872 on the adoption of the codes, provided 'If a member of a corporation dies, resigns or is removed, a majority of the remaining members may elect another in his place.' This was one of the Civil Code sections which in Murphy v. Pacific Bank, 119 Cal. 334, 51 P. 317, was held to supersede the act of 1862, except as to banks then existing. This shows that even as late as 1872 the nondescendibility of membership was recognized. The Bennett case, supra, held that the Society, when in 1864 it filed a certificate of incorporation under the 1862 act, became a valid membership corporation regardless of what its prior legal status may have been. It is reasonable to conclude that the incorporators had in mind the type of savings bank prevalent in those days rather than any other. Otherwise they would have incorporated a stock company. They then provided in their by-laws that the only members should be of two classes: (1) persons who were members of the Society on August 29, 1864 and who signed the specified agreement; (2) other persons elected to membership by vote of the board of directors. The by-laws then provided that membership would not pass with the ownership of moneys deposited with or under control of the corporation. Then came the amendment of 1888 which again classified membership into two classes: (1) those who were then members and (2) other persons who might become members by vote of the board of directors and who signed the agreement and kept an open account with the Society. This by-law not only had the sentence contained in the by-laws of 1864 as to...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Green v. Green
...issue of fact. McHugh v. Howard, 165 Cal.App.2d 169, 331 P.2d 674; Dawson v. Rash, 160 Cal.App.2d 154, 324 P.2d 959; Doyle v. Hibernia Bank, 156 Cal.App.2d 16, 319 P.2d 412; Enos v. Foster, 155 Cal.App.2d 152, 317 P.2d 670. Whether a triable issue of fact exists is determined by the suffici......
-
Spencer v. Hibernia Bank
...Casady, 1936, 15 Cal.App.2d 163, 168, 59 P.2d 444; Enos v. Foster, 1957, 155 Cal.App.2d 152, 157, 317 P.2d 670; Doyle v. Hibernia Bank, 1957, 156 Cal.App.2d 16, 20, 319 P.2d 412. The judgments in the instant cases comport with the requirement of Essick v. City of Los Angeles, 1950, 34 Cal.2......
-
Exchequer Acceptance Corp. v. Alexander
...for summary judgment the issues are of law only it is the duty of the trial court to determine those issues.' (Doyle v. Hibernia Bank, 156 Cal.App.2d 16, 20, 319 P.2d 412, 415; Bank of America etc. Assn. v. Casady, 15 Cal.App.2d 163, 168, 59 P.2d 444.) Appellants contend as a matter of law ......
-
Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd.
...Reed, 228 Cal.App.2d 230, 234, 39 Cal.Rptr. 284; Goldstein v. Hoffman, 213 Cal.App.2d 803, 811, 29 Cal.Rptr. 334; Doyle v. Hibernia Bank, 156 Cal.App.2d 16, 20, 319 P.2d 412; Enos v. Foster, 155 Cal.App.2d 152, 157, 317 P.2d 670; Tibbs v. Smart & Final Iris Co., 152 Cal.App.2d 618, 623, 313......