Schulze v. Schulze

• Decision Date: 04 November 1953
• Citation: 121 Cal.App.2d 75,262 P.2d 646
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: SCHULZE v. SCHULZE. Civ. 19408.

Page 646

262 P.2d 646

121 Cal.App.2d 75

SCHULZE v. SCHULZE.

Civ. 19408.

District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 3, California.

Nov. 4, 1953.

Alfred M. Klein, Los Angeles, for appellant.

Hahn, Ross & Saunders, Los Angeles, for respondent.

VALLEE, Justice.

Appeal by defendant from a summary judgment in an action for installments accrued under a foreign judgment for support and maintenance.

On March 30, 1950, the circuit court of Cook County, Illinois, having jurisdiction of the defendant, granted plaintiff a judgment for separate maintenance in which it decreed that: 1. Under an order made in the action on August 4, 1949, there was $2,660 due and owing from defendant to plaintiff for her support and maintenance and $200 for her attorney's fees; 2. Defendant pay the same to plaintiff; 3. Defendant pay plaintiff $60 a week for her separate support and maintenance until further order of the court; 4. Defendant pay plaintiff the rent of her apartment in Chicago in the sum of $105 a month until further order of the court; 5. Defendant pay plaintiff an additional attorney's fee of $500.

On October 2, 1950, plaintiff filed the complaint in the present action in the superior court of the County of Los Angeles in which she alleged: The terms of the Illinois judgment for separate maintenance; no part of the sums therein ordered to be paid to plaintiff had been paid except $100; there were due and owing from defendant to plaintiff $4,511 for support and maintenance and for rent of her apartment and $700 for attorney's fees; and the judgment had not been modified. Plaintiff prayed that the Illinois judgment be established as a judgment of the superior court of this state; judgment for $4,511 and $700 against defendant; defendant be ordered to pay plaintiff $60 a week for her support and maintenance and $105 a month for the rent of her apartment in Chicago.

On October 20, 1950, defendant filed an answer in which he denied for want of 'sufficient information and knowledge' the allegations of the complaint with the respect to the Illinois decree, admitted he had paid plaintiff only $100 and denied any sum was due or owing to plaintiff. As a separate defense and as a cross-complaint, defendant alleged facts for the purpose of showing a change of circumstances after the rendition of the Illinois judgment. He prayed that: 1. Plaintiff take nothing; 2. If the court recognize and establish the Illinois judgment, it supersede the provisions thereof for the support and maintenance of plaintiff and render judgment relieving him from further payments. Plaintiff answered the cross-complaint denying its allegations generally for want of information and belief.

On May 11, 1951, plaintiff made a motion for a summary judgment. In support thereof she made and filed an affidavit in which she set forth the same facts as alleged in her complaint. In opposition thereto, defendant made and filed an affidavit in which he stated facts for the purpose of showing a change of circumstances after the rendition of the Illinois judgment. He also stated that within the preceding two months plaintiff had filed a petition in the circuit court of Cook County, Illinois, in the action in which the judgment for separate maintenance had been rendered, praying that that judgment be changed to one of divorce. Defendant also filed in opposition to the motion an affidavit by his attorney in the present action, which incorporated therein exemplified copies of a supplemental complaint for divorce and a judgment of divorce in the Illinois action. The judgment recites that 'due notice for leave to file the Supplemental Complaint in Chancery for Divorce was given to Milton K. Joseph, Esq., one of the attorneys of record for the defendant in this cause, who personally appeared in court on April 18th, 1951; and thereupon the court order that the defendant answer or otherwise plead to said Supplemental Complaint in Chancery for Divorce within thirty (30) days thereafter, as will more fully appear from the order of this court entered on April 18th, 1951; and it also appearing to the court that on May 23rd, 1951, this cause came on to be heard upon the motion of the defendant to dismiss plaintiff's Supplemental Complaint in Chancery for Divorce; and that the court, thereupon, having considered the motion of the defendant to dismiss plaintiff's supplemental Complaint for Divorce and the pleadings on file, and having heard the arguments of the respective counsel for and in opposition of the motion to dismiss, it denied defendant's motion to dismiss.' In the judgment of divorce, the court found that $8,550 was due from defendant to plaintiff and decreed that defendant pay $50 a week for permanent alimony and support and $350 additional attorney's fees and the defendant pay plaintiff $7,850, 'the amount found to be due to the plaintiff from the defendant, for her support and rent to date under this decree.' The affidavit stated that the judgment of divorce 'superceded and replaced' the judgment for separate maintenance 'upon which the present action is based.' Plaintiff made and filed a counter affidavit stating facts for the purpose of showing no change of circumstances.

On July 19, 1951, the motion for a summary judgment was denied on the ground the judgment for separate maintenance had been superseded by and merged in the judgment of divorce.

On October 30, 1951, plaintiff was granted leave to, and she filed a supplemental complaint denominated by stipulation as an amended and supplemental complaint, referred to hereinafter as the supplemental complaint. The supplemental complaint alleged the filing of the complaint for separate maintenance; the rendition of the judgment for separate maintenance; the judgment of divorce and that by its terms plaintiffs was awarded judgment against defendant for $8,900, no part of which had been paid. The prayer was for judgment against defendant in that amount and interest.

Defendant answered the supplemental complaint admitting he had been served with summons in Illinois in the action for separate maintenance; denying that the circuit court of Cook County, Illinois, had jurisdiction of him 'in any Supplemental Complaint for Divorce or of the subject matter' referred to in the supplemental complaint, and denying that any sum was owing to plaintiff. As a separate defense defendant alleged that no summons was ever issued 'in connection with said Supplemental Complaint for Divorce'; a copy of said supplemental complaint was never served on him, nor 'was he ever duly served personally with process of said Supplemental Complaint for Divorce,' nor did he personally appear or plead thereto, or authorize any appearance or plea to be made or entered thereto on his behalf; the Illinois court did not obtain jurisdiction either of the cause of action or of the defendant sufficient to enable it legally render 'any such Decree of Divorce.' As a further defense the answer alleged that the judgment for separate maintenance was on a single cause of action and disposed of all the issues made in the complaint therefor; that the court did not reserve jurisdiction for any purpose except to carry the judgment into effect; that by that judgment the Illinois court lost jurisdiction of the action and of the defendant for any purpose other than 'to carry out' the judgment for separate maintenance, and did not have or retain jurisdiction to entertain a new and separate cause of action for divorce; consequently, all proceedings subsequent to the judgment for separate maintenance including the judgment for divorce are null and void.

On November 30, 1951, plaintiff moved for a summary judgment. In support thereof, she made and filed an affidavit in which she stated all of the facts alleged in the supplemental complaint. She also filed an affidavit by her attorney in this action, which stated that the record of the Illinois action revealed that a motion to dismiss the supplemental complaint for divorce was filed therein by one of the attorneys who had appeared for defendant in the action prior to the judgment for separate maintenance, which motion was based on the following grounds: 1. The original complaint was for separate maintenance; the judgment for separate maintenance finally and completely adjudicated the single cause of action stated in the complaint; the judge did not reserve jurisdiction for any purpose except to carry the judgment into effect. 2. By virtue of the judgment for separate maintenance, the Illinois court lost jurisdiction of the cause for any purpose other than 'to carry out' the judgment; the Illinois court lack jurisdiction to entertain a new and separate cause of action as prayed for in the supplemental complaint therefor. 3. Defendant, therefore, asks that the supplemental complaint be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The affidavit further stated the record of the Illinois action reveals an order was made by the Illinois court denying defendant's motion to dismiss and entering his default for failing to answer or otherwise plead to the supplemental complaint for divorce; that thereafter a motion was filed in...