Doyle v. Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles
Decision Date | 09 May 1990 |
Docket Number | No. 89-497,89-497 |
Citation | 51 Ohio St.3d 46,554 N.E.2d 97 |
Parties | DOYLE, Appellee, v. OHIO BUREAU OF MOTOR VEHICLES, Appellant. |
Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Appellee, Clyde D. Doyle, was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol on three separate occasions: December 27, 1983, April 25, 1985, and November 11, 1986. The appellant, Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles, notified appellee that because his three DWI convictions were within the immediately preceding three years, his operator's license was being suspended pursuant to R.C. 4507.08(A) and Ohio Adm.Code 4501:1-1-16(B)(1). An administrative hearing on the matter was held at appellee's request. The hearing examiner recommended that the suspension remain in effect, and appellee filed his objections to the examiner's recommendation. The Registrar of the Bureau of Motor Vehicles ("Registrar") overruled the objections and affirmed the suspension of appellee's operator's license.
Appellee sought judicial review of this decision by the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles, and appealed to the common pleas court. On April 5, 1988, the trial court reversed the bureau's decision and held that Ohio Adm.Code 4501:1-1-16(B)(1) was unconstitutional. The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and also held that Ohio Adm.Code 4501:1-1-16(B)(1) was unconstitutional. Both courts relied on Gatts v. State (1984), 13 Ohio App.3d 380, 13 OBR 463, 469 N.E.2d 562, for the proposition that Ohio Adm.Code 4501:1-1-16(B)(1) violates the due course of law provision of Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution by establishing a conclusive presumption as to the status of the license holder.
This cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Myron A. Wolf and Fred Miller, Hamilton, for appellee.
Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Atty. Gen., Cordelia A. Glenn and Cheryl D. Minsterman, for appellant.
The issue before this court is whether Ohio Adm.Code 4501:1-1-16(B)(1) violates the due course of law provision of Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. Our determination of this issue also requires an examination of R.C. 4507.08(A). We are cognizant that "[a]n enactment of the General Assembly is presumed to be constitutional, and before a court may declare it unconstitutional it must appear beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislation and constitutional provisions are clearly incompatible." State, ex rel. Dickman, v. Defenbacher (1955), 164 Ohio St. 142, 57 O.O. 134, 128 N.E.2d 59, paragraph one of the syllabus. See, also, Rocky River v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1989), 43 Ohio St.3d 1, 10, 539 N.E.2d 103, 111 ( ); State v. Young (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 249, 251, 525 N.E.2d 1363, 1367 ( ); State v. Stambaugh (1987), 34 Ohio St.3d 34, 35, 517 N.E.2d 526, 527 ( ); State, ex rel. Swetland, v. Kinney (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 567, 23 O.O.3d 479, 433 N.E.2d 217.
It should be noted that neither the trial court nor the court of appeals held that R.C. 4507.08 is unconstitutional. Furthermore, appellee does not contend that this statutory provision is constitutionally inform. R.C. 4507.08 provides in pertinent part:
The General Assembly did not define the term "alcoholic" in R.C. 4507.08. However, Ohio Adm.Code 4501:1-1-16(B) defines the term "alcoholic" as follows: " 'Alcoholic' shall be defined as any person who: (1) Is convicted three or more times within the immediately preceding three-year period of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor * * *[.]"
We begin our analysis of Ohio Adm.Code 4501:1-1-16(B)(1) by examining the authority of the appellant Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles to adopt rules and regulations. Carroll v. Dept. of Admin. Services (1983), 10 Ohio App.3d 108, 110, 10 OBR 132, 133, 460 N.E.2d 704, 706. Moreover, " * * * [r]ules issued by administrative agencies pursuant to statutory authority have the force and effect of law." Parfitt v. Columbus Correctional Facility (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 434, 436, 16 O.O.3d 455, 456, 406 N.E.2d 528, 530. See, also, State, ex rel. Kildow, v. Indus. Comm. (1934), 128 Ohio St. 573, 580, 1 O.O. 235, 238, 192 N.E. 873, 876; Hiram House v. Indus. Comm. (1987), 42 Ohio App.3d 29, 32, 536 N.E.2d 36, 39.
R.C. 4501.02 is the statute which establishes the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles, and provides in pertinent part: "There is hereby created in the department of highway safety a bureau of motor vehicles, which shall be administered by a registrar of motor vehicles. The registrar shall be appointed by the director of highway safety and shall serve at his pleasure.
* * * "(Emphasis added.)
R.C. Chapter 4507 sets forth the driver's license law in Ohio. R.C. 4507.01(B) states in part: "In the administration of this chapter and Chapter 4506. of the Revised Code, the registrar of motor vehicles has the same authority as is conferred on the registrar by section 4501.02 of the Revised Code. * * * " (Emphasis added.)
From the foregoing, it is clear that appellant is authorized to promulgate the rule in question (Ohio Adm.Code 4501:1-1-16[B] ) in order to enforce R.C. 4507.08. Furthermore, according to the Ohio case law set forth above, this rule is to be given the force and effect of law. See 2 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise (2 Ed.1979) 36-37, Section 7:8. See, also, Jemo Associates, Inc. v. Lindley (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 365, 367, 18 O.O.3d 518, 519, 415 N.E.2d 292, 293, fn. 1, wherein it is stated that
(Citing Davis, supra.)
In determining that Ohio Adm.Code 4501:1-1-16(B)(1) is constitutionally infirm, the court of appeals relied exclusively on Gatts v. State (1984), 13 Ohio App.3d 380, 13 OBR 463, 469 N.E.2d 562. The court in Gatts, supra, found that "[t]he administrative agency has defined 'alcoholic' in terms of the frequency of convictions for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor and thereby established a conclusive presumption of the status of the license holder." Id. at 381-382, 13 OBR at 465, 469 N.E.2d at 563. The court went on to conclude that because Ohio Adm.Code 4501:1-1-16 establishes a conclusive presumption as to the status of a person as an alcoholic, due process had been violated. We disagree, and expressly disapprove the holding of Gatts.
According to R.C. 4507.08, no person who is an alcoholic shall be issued or retain an operator's license. 1 In order to administer and enforce this statute, it was necessary for appellant to adopt a rule defining the word "alcoholic." Ohio Adm.Code 4501:1-1-16(B)(1). Recently, the General Assembly has enacted R.C. 3793.01(A), wherein the following definitions are found: "(1) 'Alcoholism' means the chronic and habitual use of alcoholic beverages by an individual to the extent that he no longer can control his use of alcohol or endangers the health, safety, or welfare of himself or others.
"(2) 'Alcoholic' means a person suffering from alcoholism." (Emphasis added.)
There is, however, no precise, singular, all encompassing definition of "alcoholism" which is appropriate in all situations or describes all persons who are alcoholic. An alcoholic is not susceptible to one definitive description. A large body of literature has been written pertaining to alcoholics and alcoholism, and there cannot be found one all encompassing definition which will apply to all individuals. E.M. Jellinek, in his landmark treatise on The Disease Concept of Alcoholism, discussed the almost impossible task of defining "alcoholism" and "alcoholic." He commenced his discussion by stating, "[w] have termed as alcoholism any use of alcoholic beverages that causes any damage to the individual or society or both." (Emphasis deleted in part.) Jellinek, The Disease Concept of Alcoholism (College & Univ. Press 1960), at 35. Even Jellinek was quick to point out Benjamin N. Cardozo's famous quotation: "Peril lurks in definitions, so runs an ancient maxim of law." Id. at 33. In order to enforce R.C. 4507.08 it was necessary, however, for the Registrar to attempt to define "alcoholic." The Registrar adopted one definition which, as will subsequently be demonstrated, is appropriate to accomplish the legislative purpose of R.C. 4507.08.
"Professionals who work extensively with alcoholics widely subscribe to the 'disease concept' of alcoholism." The modern 'disease concept' of alcoholism was given its basic foundation in E.M. Jellinek's book The Disease Concept of Alcoholism. Since the publication of that book, researchers have worked to define alcoholism within rigorous...
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