Drake v. State ex rel. Okla. Dep't of Pub. Safety
| Citation | 349 P.3d 559,2015 OK CIV APP 42 |
| Decision Date | 10 December 2014 |
| Docket Number | Released for Publication by Order of the Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, Division No. 3. ,112,917. |
| Parties | Arthur Eric DRAKE, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. STATE of Oklahoma, ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Defendant/Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma |
Charles A. Ramsey, Charles A. Ramsey, PLLC, Pryor, OK, for Plaintiff/Appellant.
Mark E. Bright, Assistant General Counsel, Department of Public Safety, Oklahoma City, OK, for Defendant/Appellee.
¶ 1 Plaintiff/Appellant Arthur Eric Drake (Licensee) appeals from an Order of the district court denying his petition to reinstate his driver's license filed more than one year after an order revoking his driver's license was issued by Defendant/Appellee State of Oklahoma, ex rel. Department of Public Safety (DPS). We affirm.
¶ 2 Licensee was arrested on May 20, 2012, for operating a vehicle while under the influence. Licensee did not consent to the state's implied consent test and timely requested an administrative hearing as to the suspension of his driver's license. A hearing was held on October 17, 2012.1 On October 19, 2012, DPS issued an order suspending Licensee's driver's license for a period of one year, from December 17, 2012, to December 17, 2013.2 On March 11, 2014, Licensee filed a petition to reinstate his driver's license in the district court.3
¶ 3 A hearing was held on April 23, 2014, concerning the Licensee's assertion that DPS lacked jurisdiction to revoke or suspend his driver's license and DPS's assertion that because Licensee did not timely appeal the revocation order, the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Licensee argued DPS was without jurisdiction to revoke or suspend his license because the arresting officer's affidavit that was submitted to DPS was “insufficient as a matter of law and did not grant DPS jurisdiction under” 47 O.S.2011 §§ 753 & 754.4 Licensee relied on Roulston v. State ex rel. Department of Public Safety, 2014 OK CIV APP 46, 324 P.3d 1261. Licensee argued the issue before the Roulston Court was whether the arresting officer's affidavit was sufficient and did not invoke DPS's jurisdiction.
¶ 4 DPS argued that neither Roulston nor another case, Tucker v. State ex rel. Department of Public Safety, 2014 OK CIV APP 45, 326 P.3d 542, supported Licensee's jurisdiction argument because, in those cases, the appellate Court found the officer's affidavit was “fatally flawed” and Licensee only argues the affidavit in the present case is “facially defective.” DPS argued the difference has to do with whether an order is “void or voidable.” It also argued that in neither case did the appellate court decide jurisdiction.5
¶ 5 On May 7, 2014, the district court entered its Order in which it found Licensee failed to timely file an appeal from the October 19, 2012 order of suspension pursuant to 47 O.S.2011 § 6–211(E), and therefore it was without jurisdiction to hear the appeal.6 The district court found that even if the affidavit was fatally defective because it did not contain the required statutory language, a timely appeal to invalidate the revocation was required by Roulston and Chase v. State ex rel. Department of Public Safety, 1990 OK 78, 795 P.2d 1048, the Oklahoma Supreme Court decision upon which Roulston relied. The district court found the precedent fails to indicate that a fatally flawed affidavit raises a jurisdictional issue, though it raises an appealable issue upon a timely filing. Because Licensee failed to timely appeal, the district court found it was without jurisdiction to set aside the revocation order.
¶ 6 Licensee appeals.
¶ 7 The issue before us is whether the trial court correctly determined that it was without jurisdiction to hear Licensee's appeal of the DPS order revoking his driver's license because Licensee's appeal was untimely. The answer to that issue turns on whether DPS had jurisdiction to issue the order of revocation because of the alleged defect in the arresting officer's affidavit. Questions concerning jurisdiction present a question of law requiring a de novo standard of review. See, e.g., Guffey v. Ostonakulov, 2014 OK 6, ¶ 10, 321 P.3d 971. “In a de novo review,” this Court has “plenary, independent and non-deferential authority to determine whether the trial court erred in its application of the law.”Justus v. State ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 2002 OK 46, ¶ 3, 61 P.3d 888 (citation omitted).
¶ 8 In essence, Licensee argues the sworn affidavit of an arresting officer setting forth the statutory requirements set forth in 47 O.S.2011 § 753 is a jurisdictional fact and a prerequisite to the authority of DPS to revoke a driver's license. Further, he argues, because the order is void for lack of jurisdiction, his failure to timely appeal is immaterial because a void judgment can be attacked at any time.
¶ 9 In Abraham v. Homer, 1924 OK 393, 102 Okla. 12, 226 P. 45, the Oklahoma Supreme Court set forth three separate elements of the jurisdiction of a court.
Jurisdiction over the person, jurisdiction over the subject-matter, and jurisdiction to render the particular judgment are three separate elements of the jurisdiction of a court. Each element of jurisdiction is dependent upon both law and fact. Facts showing the service of process in time, form and manner sufficient to satisfy the requirements of mandatory statutes in that regard are essential to jurisdiction over the person. Facts showing that the matter involved in a suit constitutes a subject-matter consigned by law to the jurisdiction of that court are essential to jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit. Facts showing that a particular judgment is rendered in compliance with all existing mandatory law in that regard are essential to jurisdiction to render particular judgment. All such facts are known as jurisdictional facts.
Id. ¶ 2 (subparagraph 5) (citations omitted).7 See also Parker v. Lynch, 1898 OK 76, ¶ 0, 56 P. 1082 () (Syllabus by the Court); Robinson v. Okla. Emp't Sec. Comm'n, 1997 OK 5, ¶ 8, 932 P.2d 1120 ) (citation omitted).
¶ 10 By way of illustration, the Abraham Court discussed examples of jurisdictional facts within the context of probate proceedings.
Applicable to the probate court we often find mandatory statutes which provide that[,] though facts may be presented to the court with jurisdiction over the person and the subject-matter, justifying the court to order real estate of the deceased or of a minor to be sold, and although such an order may have been lawfully made, it may be provided that such sale cannot be confirmed unless the purchase price be equal to a given percentage of the appraised value. In that event facts showing such appraisement in accordance with the mandatory law relate rather to the power of the court to render a judgment of confirmation than to a mere course of procedure, as the result of the appraisement inheres in the judgment itself. Whenever by a statute which the court has determined to be not merely directory, but absolutely mandatory, the Legislature has required acts to be done and provides that the court shall not render a particular judgment without facts showing compliance with such statute, then such facts are jurisdictional to the power of the court to render that particular judgment.
Id. ¶ 2 (subparagraph 8) (emphasis added).
¶ 11 The Supreme Court further stated that it is upon “making of proper distinction between quasi-jurisdictional facts and jurisdictional facts [that] often rests the determination of the validity of a judgment.”Id. ¶ 2 (subparagraph 10). The Court stated statutes that are merely directory—for example, those that “had in mind only an advisable manner of orderly advancement” in a lawsuit “and had not in mind the nature of the judgment to be rendered when the course was run”—are not to be considered “in determining the judicial power of the court to render a judgment.” Id. ¶ 2 (subparagraph 11). The Court further reasoned, as follows:
On the other hand, if it appears that in the enactment of such statute the lawmakers, while providing a step in the procedure, had uppermost in mind the effect of such a step upon the judgment thereafter to be rendered, and intended the taking of such step in the procedure as a condition precedent to the existence of the judicial power of a court to thereafter render the particular judgment, then such facts, while in a sense being quasi jurisdictional, are clearly jurisdictional facts, necessary to the existence of the third element of jurisdiction. Such statute is a mandatory one.
Id. ¶ 2 (subparagraph 11) (emphasis added). The Court continued:
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