Chase v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety, 68517
| Decision Date | 24 July 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 68517,68517 |
| Parties | George E. CHASE, Appellant, v. STATE of Oklahoma ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Appellee. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Stephen G. Fabian, Jr., Cathy M. Christensen, Fabian & Associates, Edmond, for appellant.
Earl L. Reeves, Jr., Robert T. Goolsby, Oklahoma City, for appellee.
The dispositive issue on certiorari is whether the district court erred by failing to vacate a driver's license revocation order because it was not founded on administrative documentation that meets the standards mandated by the governing statute. We answer in the affirmative.
The appellant, George E. Chase [driver or licensee], was arrested following a one-car accident. He then consented to take a breath test for alcohol concentration. The Commissioner of the Department of Public Safety [Department or DPS] revoked his driver's license because, inter alia, the test result exceeded the minimum value (0.10) for intoxication prescribed by the terms of 47 O.S.Supp.1986 § 754(3). 1 Following a hearing the Commissioner sustained the revocation which was to be effective January 6, 1987. 2
On appeal, the district court modified the Department's order, 3 permitting the licensee to drive to work and to other work-related locations. The Court of Appeals reversed the nisi prius order, holding that the Department's revocation order must be vacated because of perceived fatal flaws 4 which facially taint the proceedings before the Commissioner and render them "void." Upon the Department's petition, we now grant certiorari to provide guidance on an important, first-impression question of public law.
Two statutory prerequisites for DPS revocation of the license here in dispute are: 1) a written report that the driver's breath test showed an alcohol concentration of at least 0.10 and 2) the enforcement officer's sworn report "that he had reasonable grounds to believe the arrested person had been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon the public roads ... while under the influence of alcohol...." 5 In addition to these legislative standards for essential DPS paperwork, the Court of Appeals required, as a precondition to an effective revocation, that the first of these documents--the written alcohol analysis--include, inter alia, a certification by the tester that he (or she) is qualified to and did properly administer the test to the affected licensee. Because § 754(3) 6 does not provide for the inclusion of such statement by the sobriety tester, its absence cannot constitute a flaw in the Department's paperwork.
DPS concedes that the sworn report of an enforcement officer, which § 754(3) expressly mandates, is absent from the DPS paperwork and from the record in this case. Although there is an exhibit before us entitled "Officer's Affidavit and Notice of Revocation," 7 the name of the person designated in this document as the affiant differs from that of the individual whose signature appears on it. 8 This patent deficiency in the statutorily required DPS material does indeed make the Department's revocation order vulnerable to invalidation, on timely appeal, for failure to meet the minimum legislatively prescribed standards for the DPS paperwork on which its administrative action must be rested. 9
We therefore hold that when, on appeal to the district court, the trial judge finds a DPS revocation order was issued on administrative documentation that fails to meet the minimum standards mandated by the applicable statute, the order should be set aside as fatally flawed. 10
CERTIORARI IS GRANTED; THE COURT OF APPEALS' OPINION IS VACATED; THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER MODIFYING THE DRIVER'S LICENSE REVOCATION IS REVERSED;
CAUSE REMANDED TO THE DISTRICT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO DISMISS.
1 This statute requires the Commissioner to revoke the driver's license of an arrested person based on 1) a written report showing the driver had an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more and 2) the arresting officer's "sworn report." The pertinent terms of 47 O.S.Supp.1986 § 754(3) are:
* * * " (Emphasis added.)
2 Adjudicative hearings in a driver's license revocation proceeding before the Public Safety Department are not governed by the Administrative Procedures Act. See 75 O.S.1981 § 325, which provides:
"The provisions of [the Administrative Procedures Act] Section 9 to Section 16, inclusive, shall not apply to hearings conducted by the Personnel Board under 74 O.S.1961, § 833, or the Commissioner of Public Safety under 47 O.S.1961, § 2-115." (Emphasis added.)
The quoted statute in effect when the revocation proceeding took place was repealed and replaced by 75 O.S.Supp.1987 § 250.4(B)(11), effective July 20, 1987, whose terms are:
3 The licensee's right to appeal from the revocation order is governed by the terms of 47 O.S.1981 § 6-211, which provide in pertinent part:
The quoted provision has been amended. The pertinent provisions of 47 O.S.Supp.1988 § 6-211, in effect since November 1, 1988, are:
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Hedrick v. Comm'r of the Dep't of Pub. Safety
...§ 2–116, see page 9, supra. 23.Title 47 O.S. Supp.2006 § 6–211(E), see note 4, supra. 1. Appellant's Brief-in-chief at pp. 1, 2, & 7–8. 2.Chase v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety, 1990 OK 78, 795 P.2d 1048. 3.Chase v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety, 795 P.2d at 1049. 4.Hollis v. ......
-
State ex rel. State Ins. Fund v. JOA, INC.
...must be express, and it cannot be implied from a general statute relating to costs. However, in Chase v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety, 1990 OK 78, n. 10, 795 P.2d 1048, 1050, we approved a post-decisional order by the Court of Civil Appeals that imposed appeal-related costs upon the......
-
Chandler v. State ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Safety
...the court's interpretation of 754(D) as ambiguous is contrary to the section's "explicit" language and Chase v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety , 1990 OK 78, 795 P.2d 1048, which holds a sworn report with the officer's reasonable grounds statement is a statutory prerequisite for DPS au......
-
State Ins. Fund v. GREAT PLAINS CARE CENTER, 96,024.
...must be express, and it cannot be implied from a general statute relating to costs. But see, Chase v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety, 1990 OK 78, n. 10, 795 P.2d 1048, 1050, (approval of post-decisional order by Court of Civil Appeals imposing appeal related costs upon Department of P......