Draper v. Healey
| Decision Date | 05 March 2015 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 14–12471–NMG. |
| Citation | 98 F.Supp.3d 77 |
| Parties | Robert DRAPER, Ariel Weisberg, Donna Major, Eric Notkin, Robert Boudrie, Brent Carlton, Concord Armory, LLC, Precision Point Firearms, LLC, Commonwealth Second Amendment, Inc. and Second Amendment Foundation, Inc., Plaintiffs, v. Maura T. HEALEY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Alexander A. Flig, Law Office of Alexander A. Flig, Canton, MA, for Plaintiffs.
Glenn S. Kaplan, Massachusetts Office of the Attorney General, Eric M. Gold, Lydia E. French, Office of the Attorney General Martha Coakley, Boston, MA, for Defendant.
Plaintiffs bring this action challenging the enforceability of 940 C.M.R. § 16.05(3) (“the regulation”), a state regulation promulgated by defendant Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (“the AG”) that requires load indicators or magazine disconnects on handguns sold by handgun dealers.1
There are three categories of plaintiffs: 1) individuals: Robert Draper, Ariel Weisberg, Donna Major, Eric Notkin, Robert Boudrie and Brent Carlton (collectively “consumer plaintiffs”), 2) business entities: Concord Armory, LLC and Precision Point Firearms, LLC (collectively “dealer plaintiffs”) and 3) nonprofit organizations: Commonwealth Second Amendment, Inc. and Second Amendment Foundation, Inc. (collectively “organization plaintiffs”).
Between December, 2013 and May, 2014, various dealer and consumer plaintiffs sent letters to the AG inquiring whether the Generations 3 and 4 Glock pistols (“Gen3/4 Glock pistols”) violate the regulation. In April and May, 2014, the Deputy Chief of the Attorney General's Consumer Protection Division responded to those letters explaining that the handguns presently manufactured by Glock are noncompliant “because they lack an effective load indicator or magazine safety disconnect.”
In June, 2014, plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking declaratory judgments that the regulation 940 C.M.R. § 16.05(3) 1) violates the rights to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the dealer and organization plaintiffs because it is void for vagueness and void as applied and 2) violates the Second Amendment rights of the consumer plaintiffs. Defendant, in response, moved to dismiss the case and extensive briefing ensued. The Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence also submitted an amicus brief in support of the defendant.
Oral argument on defendant's motion to dismiss was held in February, 2015. For the reasons that follow, defendant's motion will be allowed.
Defendant contends that the case should be dismissed because all plaintiffs lack standing.
Standing is a prerequisite for Article III jurisdiction and must be determined before addressing the merits of the case. See Sutliffe v. Epping Sch. Dist., 584 F.3d 314, 325 (1st Cir.2009). In order to establish standing, a plaintiff must show 1) an injury in fact, 2) a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of and 3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). An injury in fact is one that is “concrete and particularized [and] actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”. Id. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Defendant contends that the two organization plaintiffs lack standing because they do not allege harm to themselves or to their members. The AG further notes that none of the claims in the complaint is brought by the organizations.
Organization plaintiffs respond that they have standing to sue in their own right despite never having attempted to purchase a Gen3/4 Glock pistol in Massachusetts because they have spent time and resources analyzing the regulation and that they have incurred financial loss in sponsoring the lawsuit. These investments do not, however, serve as a concrete injury to the organizations. Plaintiff Second Amendment Foundation also alleges injury based on the fact that it raffles firearms to its members every year, including at least one Glock pistol, and if the winner of that pistol were in Massachusetts, then it could not transfer the prize to the winner due to the regulation. The Court concludes that this injury is too speculative to qualify as an “injury in fact”. The organization plaintiffs therefore lack standing to sue on their own behalf.
With respect to its standing to sue on behalf of its members, Second Amendment Foundation claims to have 8,066 “members and supporters” in Massachusetts, of which 1,847 are current paid members. It has not identified, however, any specific members who have attempted to purchase Glocks in the Commonwealth or who were dissuaded from selling Glocks because of the regulation. See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 498–99, 129 S.Ct. 1142, 173 L.Ed.2d 1 (2009) (); Fletcher v. Haas, 851 F.Supp.2d 287, 291 (D.Mass.2012) ( ) (emphasis in the original).
Commonwealth Second Amendment likewise has failed to identity affected members. In fact, it not does appear to have members. The organization only claims to have 835 donors, many of whom reside in Massachusetts. The organization cannot, therefore, sue on behalf of members who do not exist.
Accordingly, the organization plaintiffs will be dismissed for lack of standing.
Defendant asserts that the dealer plaintiffs do not have standing because they fail to make a sufficient allegation of injury related to their challenge of the regulation. The AG contends that her office made clear that the handguns at issue violated the regulation and therefore the plaintiffs' injury could not be their uncertainty as to the pistols' compliance.
Plaintiffs respond that although they were informed that the Gen3/4 Glock pistols were noncompliant with the regulation, they have standing because there is ongoing uncertainty as to which firearms contain an acceptable load indicator.
The Court agrees that the dealer plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged an injury caused by the regulation and redressable by injunctive relief.
Finally, defendant contends that consumer plaintiffs lack standing because the regulation does not implicate the Second Amendment and therefore they have failed to allege a cognizable injury.
Plaintiffs respond that defendant conflates standing to sue with stating a cognizable injury under the Second Amendment. Instead, they argue that the injury results from the regulation's vague definition of load indicator which makes it more difficult or impossible for consumers to purchase Gen3/4 Glock pistols.
The Court concludes that the consumer plaintiffs have standing because they have submitted evidence indicating that various consumer plaintiffs attempted to purchase a Gen3/4 Glock pistol but were unable or dissuaded to do so because of the regulation.
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The Court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Langadinos v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 68, 69 (1st Cir.2000). The Court, however, need not accept legal conclusions as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Threadbare recitals of the legal elements, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice to state a cause of action. Id. Accordingly, a complaint does not state a claim for relief where the well-pled facts fail to warrant an inference of any more than the mere possibility of misconduct. Id. at 1950.
For a regulation to be facially void, plaintiffs must prove that “no set of circumstances exists under which the [regulation] would be valid.” United...
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