Fletcher v. Haas

Decision Date30 March 2012
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 11–10644–DPW.
Citation851 F.Supp.2d 287
PartiesChristopher M. FLETCHER, Eoin M. Pryal, Second Amendment Foundation, Inc., and Commonwealth Second Amendment, Inc., Plaintiffs, v. Robert C. HAAS, in his capacity as Cambridge Commissioner of Police, Mark K. Leahy, in his capacity as Northborough Chief of Police, and Jason A. Guida, Esq., in his capacity as Director of the Firearms Records Bureau, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Held Unconstitutional

Joseph M. Hickson, III, Hickson Law Group, P.C., Springfield, MA, for Plaintiffs.

Arthur J. Goldberg, Cambridge City Law Department City Hall, Cambridge, MA, Katharine Isabel Doyle, David J. Doneski, Kopelman & Paige, PC, Kenneth W. Salinger, Massachusetts Attorney General's Office, Boston, MA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DOUGLAS P. WOODLOCK, District Judge.

This case presents the question whether lawful permanent resident aliens 1 are among the people for whom the Second Amendment the United States Constitution provides a right to bear arms. I conclude they are.

Plaintiffs seek to enjoin enforcement of the citizenship requirement contained in Massachusetts General Laws chapter 140, sections 129B and 131, and all other Massachusetts provisions which prohibit firearm possession by all lawfully admitted aliens.

Defendants have moved to dismiss this action, contending that the Second Amendment grants the right to bear arms only to citizens. Plaintiffs have in turn moved for summary judgment to establish that lawfully admitted aliens have the same right to bear arms as do citizens. Because the only plaintiffs with standing in this case are lawful permanent resident aliens, I resolve the issue only as to lawful permanent resident aliens and do not reach the question whether the Second Amendment provides protection for other lawful aliens.

I. BACKGROUND
A. The Massachusetts Firearm Regulatory Regime

Massachusetts strictly regulates the possession of weapons through a licensing regime. See generallyMass. Gen. Laws. ch. 140, §§ 121–131P. Any person residing in Massachusetts who wishes to own, possess, or purchase a firearm, 2 rifle,3 shotgun 4 or ammunition, must obtain a permit. Id. at §§ 129C, 131E. This permit may take the form of a firearm identification card, which allows its licensee to own and possess non-large capacity 5 shotguns and rifles. Id. at § 129B(6). It may also take the form of a license to carry,6 which permits ownership and possession of a broader selection of weapons, including certain firearms. Id. at § 131(a) & (b).

Massachusetts denies to all aliens, illegal or legal, the right to obtain firearm identification cards or licenses to carry. Id. at §§ 129B(1)(vii), 131(d)(v). That general ban has two exceptions, however. Lawfully admitted aliens residing in Massachusetts may obtain a resident alien permit, which allows them “to own or have in his possession or under his control a rifle or shotgun,” but not a firearm. Id. at § 131H. In addition, lawfully admitted aliens residing in other states may obtain temporary licenses to carry firearms “for purposes of firearms competition.” Id. at § 131F.

B. The Parties

Plaintiffs Christopher Fletcher and Eoin Pryal are lawful permanent residents who emigrated from the United Kingdom and who now reside respectively in Cambridge and Northborough, Massachusetts. Except for a two year period between 1999 and 2001, Fletcher has resided in the United States continuously since 1995, and became a permanent resident alien on June 8, 2009. Prior to moving to Massachusetts, Fletcher resided in California, where he held a Basic Firearms Safety Certificate and a Handgun Safety Certificate, which allowed him to purchase and possess firearms in the state of California. Upon relocating to Massachusetts, Fletcher completed the Massachusetts Basic Firearms Safety Course as required by Massachusetts General Laws chapter 140, section 131P, and was awarded the Massachusetts Basic Firearms Safety Certificate on June 21, 2008.

Pryal, who is married to a United States citizen, was a Rifleman in the British Territorial Army before emigrating to the United States. In the United Kingdom, Pryal was granted a shotgun certificate and international dealer's license which permitted him to travel to other countries with his own firearms for hunting purposes. Currently, Pryal is an assistant instructor at the Massachusetts Firearm School in Framingham, Massachusetts, and a customer service representative at a Massachusetts-based firearm manufacturer. Pryal completed the Massachusetts Basic Firearms Safety Course, and was awarded the Massachusetts Basic Firearms Safety Certificate on October 25, 2010.

Both Fletcher and Pryal applied for, and were denied, a license to possess a firearm in their home for immediate self-defense purposes. Neither applied for a license to carry a firearm on his person outside of the home.

Plaintiffs Second Amendment Foundation, Inc. (SAF) and Commonwealth Second Amendment, Inc. (“CSA”) are organizations whose purpose is the defense of the constitutional right to own and possess firearms. Both organizations claim to have as members lawfully admitted aliens residing in Massachusetts.

Defendants Robert Haas, as Cambridge Commissioner of Police, and Mark Leahy, as Northborough Chief of Police, are responsible for determining whether to issue firearm identification cards and licenses to carry to residents of their municipalities. For his part, defendant Jason Guida, as Director of the State Firearms Records Bureau, is in charge of issuing resident alien permits.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Motion to Dismiss

A district “court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984). In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must “accept as true all well-pleaded facts set out in the complaint and indulge all reasonable inferences in favor of the pleader.” S.E.C. v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 436, 441 (1st Cir.2010) (en banc). The rules of pleading require “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). This statement need only “give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Gargano v. Liberty Int'l Underwriters, Inc., 572 F.3d 45, 48–49 (1st Cir.2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).

B. Motion for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “A dispute is genuine if the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in the favor of the non-moving party,” whereas [a] fact is material if it has the potential of determining the outcome of the litigation.” Farmers Ins. Exchange v. RNK, Inc., 632 F.3d 777, 782 (1st Cir.2011) (quoting Rodríguez–Rivera v. Federico Trilla Reg'l Hosp., 532 F.3d 28, 30 (1st Cir.2008)). Traditionally, a district court must “draw every reasonable inference in favor of the nonmoving party on summary judgment. Lopera v. Town Of Coventry, 640 F.3d 388, 407 (1st Cir.2011). But, where, as here, a party has cross-moved for summary judgment, a district court “must determine based on the undisputed facts whether either the plaintiffs or the defendants deserve judgment as a matter of law.” Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. CNA Ins. Co. (Europe) Ltd., 633 F.3d 50, 53 (1st Cir.2011) (quotation and citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION
A. Do The Plaintiff Organizations Have Standing?

Standing is a prerequisite for Article III jurisdiction, and thus must be determined before addressing the merits of a case. See Sutliffe v. Epping Sch. Dist., 584 F.3d 314, 325 (1st Cir.2009). To establish standing, a plaintiff must “present an injurythat is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the defendant's challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.” Ramírez–Lebrón v. Int'l Shipping Agency, Inc., 593 F.3d 124, 130 (1st Cir.2010) (quoting Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 129 S.Ct. 2579, 2592, 174 L.Ed.2d 406 (2009)). In the context of an organization suing on behalf of its members, the organization must demonstrate (1) at least one of its members would have standing to sue as an individual, (2) ‘the interests at stake are germane to the organization's purpose,’ and (3) individual members' participation is not necessary to either the claim asserted or the relief requested.” Animal Welfare Inst. v. Martin, 623 F.3d 19, 25 (1st Cir.2010) (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000)). Only the first prong of the test is in dispute in this case.

As to the first prong, the Plaintiff organizations fall short of demonstrating Article III standing. Neither SAF nor CSA has identified a single member who sought to obtain a license to carry a firearm in Massachusetts, let alone was denied. See Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1179 (9th Cir.2004) (concluding that organization lacked standing where it failed to identify any member who had standing in his or her own right). Instead, both organizations allege in a conclusory fashion that their members include “lawfully admitted aliens residing in the Commonwealth.” That lawfully admitted aliens residing in Massachusetts have joined SAF or CSA is, without more, insufficient to show that these members themselves suffer harm from the Massachusetts firearms regulatory regime. Not every lawfully admitted alien residing in Massachusetts who decides to join this type of organization can necessarily be said to intend to own or possess a firearm...

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    ...regulation predicating firearm possession upon citizenship was unconstitutional as applied to such persons. Fletcher v. Haas, 851 F.Supp.2d 287, 288 (D.Mass.2012) (Woodlock, J.). 15. The Fifth Circuit was the first of the courts of appeals to wrestle with the constitutionality of an eightee......
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