Draughon v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 11 June 2021
• Docket Number: No. 20-0158,20-0158
• Citation: 631 S.W.3d 81
• Parties: Rodney DRAUGHON, Petitioner, v. Joycie JOHNSON, Respondent
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

631 S.W.3d 81

Rodney DRAUGHON, Petitioner,

v.Joycie JOHNSON, Respondent

No. 20-0158

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued March 24, 2021

Opinion delivered: June 11, 2021

Fields Alexander, Houston, Pro Se.

McCall Bauersfeld, Bruce N. Patton, Dallas, McCall Hoerz, LaToya Alexander, Daniel McGuire, Dallas, for Petitioner.

W. Bruce Monning, Dallas, Paul R. Leake, Mesquite, for Respondent.

Justice Busby delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Guzman, Justice Lehrmann, Justice Boyd, and Justice Devine joined.

In this quiet title action, a person who alleges a mental incapacity seeks to prevent his aunt from evicting him from property he inherited, contending that a deed to the aunt he had signed years earlier is void due to his lack of capacity. The aunt moved for traditional summary judgment based on the statute of limitations, and the nephew invoked the unsound-mind tolling statute. The question before us is whether the aunt had the burden to negate unsound-mind tolling in order to conclusively establish her affirmative defense and obtain summary judgment.

We have answered this question yes many times as to other doctrines affecting the running of limitations, explaining recently that a "defendant who moves for summary judgment based on limitations must conclusively establish the elements of that defense" and "must also conclusively negate application of the discovery rule and any tolling doctrines pleaded as an exception to limitations." Erikson v. Renda , 590 S.W.3d 557, 563 (Tex. 2019). We answer yes again in this case. If a defendant prefers to place the burden on the plaintiff to raise a fact issue regarding any aspects of limitations on which the plaintiff would have the burden at trial, it is free to file a no-evidence motion for summary judgment as to those matters. Because the defendant in this case filed a traditional motion for summary judgment and did not conclusively negate unsound-mind tolling, we reverse the summary judgment in her favor.

BACKGROUND

In 2018, respondent Joycie Johnson sued to evict petitioner Rodney Draughon from the house where he was living. The justice of the peace ordered Draughon to vacate, so he appealed the eviction and filed this separate declaratory judgment action seeking to quiet title to the property. The county court at law later consolidated the cases.

Draughon alleged that he owned the property by virtue of intestate succession but that Johnson, his aunt, purported to have an adverse claim to the property. Johnson's claim was based on a 2006 warranty deed that Draughon signed conveying the property to Johnson, which listed the consideration as ten dollars "and other good and valuable consideration, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged." Draughon alleged that he did not have the mental capacity to sign the warranty deed and Johnson was aware of his incapacity, so her claim to the property was invalid.

Johnson answered and pled "the affirmative defense of the four (4) year Statute of Limitations," alleging that the deed had been recorded more than eleven years before Draughon filed suit. She also filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that Draughon's suit was barred because it had not been brought within four years from the date the deed was signed. She attached the warranty deed to her motion as evidence.

In response, Draughon asserted that Johnson's motion for summary judgment was a no-evidence motion and she failed to allege that Draughon had no evidence to support his claim of lack of mental capacity. Draughon further contended that Johnson had the burden to produce evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to his mental capacity to sign a binding warranty deed, which she failed to do.

Draughon also offered his own evidence in support of his claim of lack of mental capacity, which he contended "by law tolls the statute of limitations." He attached to his response an affidavit from a licensed psychological associate, who stated that Draughon has diminished capacity and likely had it before 2006. Draughon also attached five affidavits from laypeople who knew him, observed his diminished capacity, and believed his "Intellectual Disability was obvious prior to 2006."

Johnson replied that her motion for summary judgment based on the four-year statute of limitations was not a no-evidence motion; instead, she had offered evidence establishing that Draughon failed to file suit to set aside the deed within four years of signing it. She also objected to each of Draughon's affidavits, contending that the licensed psychological associate failed to qualify as an expert and the other affidavits were conclusory. After a hearing, the trial court sustained Johnson's objections to the affidavits, struck them, and granted her motion for summary judgment.

Draughon appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because Johnson failed to conclusively negate the tolling doctrine after he had raised it.¹ ––– S.W.3d ––––, 2020 WL 364144 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2020). The court of appeals affirmed. Id. at ––––. The court held that a claimant seeking to toll limitations based on unsound mind has the burden to produce evidence raising a fact issue regarding mental capacity. Id. at ––––. Therefore, once Johnson conclusively established that Draughon did not file the case within the statute of limitations, the burden was on Draughon to produce evidence of his unsound mind. Id. at ––––. Because the trial court properly struck all of Draughon's evidence, he did not meet his burden. Id.

Draughon petitioned this Court for review, asserting that when a traditional motion for summary judgment is based on the statute of limitations and the non-movant asserts that a tolling provision applies, it is the movant's burden to conclusively negate the application of the tolling provision. He argues that the courts of appeals are divided regarding which party has the burden on summary judgment when unsound-mind tolling is claimed and urges this Court to settle the matter. See, e.g., Rollins v. Pressler , 623 S.W.3d 918, 926–31 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 25, 2021, pet. filed) (collecting cases). We granted Draughon's petition for review.

ANALYSIS

In this Court, Draughon argues that when a defendant moves for traditional summary judgment based on the statute of limitations and the plaintiff asserts that a tolling provision applies, the defendant has the burden to negate conclusively the application of that provision. He contends that tolling provisions should be treated like the discovery rule, which we have held the defendant must negate on summary judgment if raised even though the plaintiff would have the burden of proof on that issue at trial. See Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Pasko , 544 S.W.3d 830, 834 (Tex. 2018) (per curiam) ("In cases in which the plaintiff pleads the discovery rule, the defendant moving for summary judgment on limitations bears the additional burden of negating the rule.").

Johnson counters that a defendant may conclusively establish its limitations defense by proving when the claim accrued and when suit was filed or served, at which point the burden shifts to the plaintiff to offer evidence of any grounds for extending the time by which suit should have been filed. She urges us to treat tolling provisions like a plaintiff's allegations of fraudulent concealment or equitable estoppel, on which we have held the plaintiff must raise a fact issue to avoid summary judgment. See Nichols v. Smith , 507 S.W.2d 518, 521 (Tex. 1974) (holding it was plaintiff's "burden ... to come forward with proof raising an issue of fact with respect to fraudulent concealment" to "avoid the [limitations] defense").

To evaluate the parties’ arguments, we begin by addressing the burden of a defendant moving for traditional summary judgment as compared to no-evidence summary judgment. We then examine our precedent addressing what this burden includes in the context of a defendant's traditional motion for summary judgment on the affirmative defense of limitations. Finally, we apply our precedent to the issue of unsound-mind tolling.

I. A defendant moving for traditional summary judgment has the burden to conclusively establish its affirmative defense.

A court must grant a "traditional" motion for summary judgment "forthwith if [the summary judgment evidence] show[s] that ... there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issues expressly set out." TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c). This rule is similar to the federal rule, which courts have interpreted to permit "summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to ... establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

We have interpreted the Texas rule differently, explaining that "[t]he presumptions and burden of proof for an ordinary or conventional trial are immaterial to the burden that a movant for summary judgment must bear." Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. v. City of Dallas , 623 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Tex. 1981) ; see Chavez v. Kan. City So. Ry. Co. , 520 S.W.3d 898, 900 (Tex. 2017) (per curiam). Under our traditional rule, courts "never shift the burden of proof to the non-movant unless and until the movant has ‘establish[ed] his entitlement to a summary judgment ... by conclusively proving all essential elements of his cause of action or defense as a matter of law.’ " Casso v. Brand , 776 S.W.2d 551, 556 (Tex. 1989) (quoting City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth. , 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979) ); see KCM Fin. LLC v. Bradshaw , 457 S.W.3d 70, 79 (Tex. 2015). "[T]he non-movant's failure to answer or respond cannot supply by default the summary judgment proof necessary to establish the movant's right." Clear Creek Basin Auth. , 589 S.W.2d at...