Driscoll v. City of Bremerton, 33502
Decision Date | 15 December 1955 |
Docket Number | No. 33502,33502 |
Citation | 48 Wn.2d 95,291 P.2d 642 |
Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Parties | John S. DRISCOLL, Plaintiff and Relator, v. The CITY OF BREMERTON, a municipal corporation; H. O. Domstad, as Mayor & Commissioner of Public Health & Safety of the City of Bremerton; Ruth C. Cullin, as Commissioner of Finance and Accounting of the City of Bremerton; David B. Wheaton, as Commissioner of Public Works & Utilities of the City of Bremerton; and Edward H. T. McGowan, as City Clerk of the City of Bremerton, Defendants. The STATE of Washington, on the relation of John S. DRISCOLL, Plaintiff, v. Bertil JOHNSON, as Judge of the Superior Court for Kitsap County, Respondent. |
James O. Arthur, bremerton, Riddell, Riddell & Williams, Seattle, for plaintiff.
Preston, Thorgrimson & Horowitz, Seattle, Roy A. Holland, Bremerton, for defendants.
The City of Bremerton passed an ordinance authorizing the issuance of bonds in the amount of $200,000, the money to be advanced to the Washington Toll Bridge Authority to pay the costs of engineering, feasibility, and financial plans, reports, surveys, appraisals, estimates, studies and other items preliminary and necessary for the reconstruction and improvement of the existing approaches and the construction of new approaches to the Manette Bridge (which extends across the Port Washington Narrows in the City of Bremerton) and for the construction of a new bridge across the Narrows. It is provided in the ordinance that the city will be reimbursed out of the proceeds of the sale of revenue bonds issued by the Authority which will be payable out of tolls imposed for pedestrian and vehicular traffic over the new bridge and the existing bridge as improved. This ordinance was enacted pursuant to Chapter 208 of the 1955 session laws which specifically authorizes the project.
Plaintiff and relator herein, as a taxpayer, sought an injunction to prevent the city from issuing the bonds. A demurrer was sustained to the complaint and subsequently a judgment of dismissal entered. The matter is before us on a writ of certiorari, the city having agreed not to issue the bonds pending a decision by this court.
The complaint alleged that the ordinance was invalid in that it purported to authorize the reimposition of tolls by the State of Washington upon the existing Manette Bridge and that such proposed action was prohibited by the Act of Congress entitled, 'An Act Granting the consent of Congress to W. E. Buell of Seattle, Washington, to construct a bridge across Port Washington Narrows within the city of Bremerton in the State of Washington.' Approved, June 14, 1926. 44 Stat. 744.
The Act in its pertinent sections reads:
'Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the consent of Congress is hereby granted to W. E. Buell, his heirs, legal representatives, and assigns, to construct, maintain, and operate a bridge and approaches thereto across Port Washington Narrows, at a point suitable to the interests of navigation, within the city of Bremerton, in the State of Washington, in accordance with the provisions of the Act entitled 'An Act to regulate the construction of bridges over navigable waters,' approved March 23, 1906, and subject to the conditions and limitations contained in this Act.
* * *
Buell constructed the bridge and it was thereafter taken over by the State of Washington through condemnation proceedings and is now the property of the state. Tolls were imposed for a period of the state's ownership, but that practice has been discontinued for some years.
Our problem is this: Is the State of Washington prohibited by the Act from reimposing tolls on the existing Manette bridge.
It will be noted from a reading of the act that Section 2 provides for acquisition by purchase or condemnation by either the State of Washington, any political subdivision within or adjoining which any part of the bridge is located, or any two or more of them jointly. On the other hand, Section 3 relating to tolls, refers only to 'any municipality or other political subdivision or subdivisions of the State of Washington.' The Act does not, by its terms, prohibit the state from imposing tolls.
It is contended that the Act of 1906 entitled, 'An Act To regulate the construction of bridges over navigable waters', approved March 23, 1906, 34 Stat. 84, established a 'spirit' or 'policy' prohibiting the imposition of tolls. The 1906 Act merely regulated the construction of bridges over navigable waters. Congress has authorized the construction of hundreds of bridges in accordance with the provisions of that act. Some of the acts mention tolls, others do not. In fact, the vast majority of the acts make no mention of tolls whatsoever. The only reference in the 1906 Act to tolls is as follows:
'* * * If tolls shall be charged for the transit over any bridge constructed under the provisions of this Act, of engines cars, street cars, wagons, carriages, vehicles, animals, foot passengers, or other passengers, such tolls shall be reasonable and just, and the Secretary of War may, at any time, and from time to time, prescribe the reasonable rates of toll for such transit over such bridge, and the rates so prescribed shall be the legal rates and shall be the rates demanded and received for such transit.'
We are convinced that the Act of 1906 did not establish or inaugurate any 'spirit' or 'policy' that bridges authorized under it should eventually become toll free, nor has such a policy been evidenced by subsequent acts of Congress. The sole expression of policy in the 1906 Act with reference to tolls is that if they are to be charged, they must be reasonable.
It is also contended that, inasmuch as section 2 of the act under consideration provides for the acquisition of the bridge by the state, any political subdivision within or adjoining which any part of the bridge is located, or any two or more of them jointly, it was the intention of Congress, with respect to tolls, to limit any or all of those authorized to so acquire it, including the state.
One answer to that contention is that the act does not so state. In interpreting a statute, the legislative intent must be determined primarily from the language of the statute itself. 50 Am.Jur. 210, Statutes, § 227. It is also advisable at times to consider statutes in pari materia. 2 Sutherland Statutory Construction 535, In Pari Materia and Adopted Statutes, § 5202.
Chapter 358, Sixty-Eighth Congress, Sess. I, 43 Stat. 660, was an act approved June 7, 1924, authorizing the counties of Kittitas and Grant, in the State of Washington, to construct a bridge at Vantage Ferry. Section 2 provided:
'The State of Washington, or any political subdivision or subdivisions thereof, within or adjoining which said bridge is located, may at any time acquire all right, title, and interest in...
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