State Dept. of Transp. v. State Employees' Ins. Bd.
| Decision Date | 03 June 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 6,No. 99,No. 117,No. 104,No. 174,No. 32,No. 262,No. 48266-7,R,No. 46,No. 1184,No. 79,No. 8,6,262,8,46,79,1184,99,117,174,32,104,48266-7 |
| Citation | 645 P.2d 1076,97 Wn.2d 454 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | , 114 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2071 STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; Inlandboatmen's Union of the Pacific; International Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots, Pacific Maritime Region, & the Marine Engineers Beneficial Association, Appellants, v. STATE EMPLOYEES' INSURANCE BOARD; Service Employees International Union Local; Service Employees International Union, Local; Office& Professional Employees International Union, Local; InternationalBrotherhood of ElectricalWorkers, Local; International Association of Machinists & AerospaceWorkers, Local; United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America,Local; Sheet Metal Workers International Association, Local;InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, & Helpers of America, Local; International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen& Helpers of America, Local; United Association of Journeymen& Apprentices of thePlumbing & Pipefitting Industry of the United States & Canada, Local;& the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders,Blacksmiths, Forgers, & Helpers, Localespondents. |
Kenneth O. Eikenberry, Atty. Gen., Spencer Daniels, Asst. Atty. Gen., Olympia, for appellants.
Preston, Thorgrimson, Ellis & Holman, Kirk Dublin, David A. Peters, Reaugh & Prescott, J. E. Fischnaller, Hafer, Cassidy & Price, John Burns, Seattle, Kenneth O. Eikenberry, Atty. Gen., Richard A. Heath, Asst. Atty. Gen., Olympia, for respondents.
Appellants State Department of Transportation (Department), Inlandboatmen's Union of the Pacific, International Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots and the Marine Engineers Beneficial Association seek declaratory relief in this action brought against respondent State Employees' Insurance Board (SEIB). 1 The sole issue is whether the Department may negotiate separate employer-supported insurance coverage with union employees of the Washington State ferry system or whether the Department is restricted to making contributions to insurance plans offered state employees by the SEIB.
The trial court denied appellants' motion for summary judgment and granted respondent's motion. In granting respondent's motion, the trial court declared that the ferry system employees of the Marine Transportation Division of the Department are state employees subject to the jurisdiction of the SEIB with respect to the design and procurement of insurance they receive from the state. We disagree with the holding, reverse the trial court and remand the cause for entry of a summary judgment in favor of appellants.
The SEIB contends it is the purpose of RCW 41.05 (the SEIB Act) to centralize the design and procurement of insurance for the employees of all branches of state government. The ferry system employees, it is asserted, fall within the broad definition of "state employee" as that term is used in RCW 41.05. While RCW 47.64.030 does authorize the Department to negotiate for and include insurance coverage in its labor agreements, the SEIB argues it does not specifically give the Department authority to design and procure insurance contracts. It is urged that the latter authority is given to the SEIB by RCW 41.05. 2 Thus, the SEIB concludes, in labor negotiations pertaining to health insurance coverage the Department and the ferry system employees may only choose from the various plans and optional coverages offered and designed by the SEIB.
We do not agree with the conclusion of the SEIB. It looks primarily at RCW 41.05 and the overall function of the SEIB, almost in isolation, while virtually overlooking the impact of RCW 47.64 on the subject of negotiated health and welfare contracts. 3 The SEIB also denigrates the specific proviso, in RCW 41.05.050(2), that nothing therein is to be a limitation on persons employed under RCW 47.64. 4
Clearly, RCW 41.05 and RCW 47.64, both relating to health care benefits for state employees, create an ambiguity. As pointed out by appellants, there are at least four possible applications:
(1) Ferry system employees may not participate in SEIB insurance plans even if they so desire. They are restricted to negotiating for health and welfare benefits pursuant to RCW 47.64.
(2) Ferry system employees may participate in SEIB insurance plans if they so desire. However, they may negotiate for different coverage pursuant to RCW 47.64.
(3) Ferry system employees must participate in SEIB insurance plans. However, they may also negotiate for additional, non-SEIB coverage pursuant to RCW 47.64.
(4) Ferry system employees must participate in SEIB insurance plans and only those plans. However, they may negotiate for additional coverage under those plans (if available) to be paid by the employer, pursuant to RCW 47.64.
(Italics ours.) Appellants contend the second interpretation is the proper one because the actions of the ferry system, its employees, and the SEIB (since its inception in 1970) have been consistent therewith. Interpretation number 4 is, of course, the SEIB's current position.
At the outset it must be recognized that the primary objective of statutory construction is to carry out the intent of the legislature. Anderson v. O'Brien, 84 Wash.2d 64, 67, 524 P.2d 390 (1974); Amburn v. Daly, 81 Wash.2d 241, 501 P.2d 178 (1972). The intent must be determined primarily from the language of the statute itself. Driscoll v. Bremerton, 48 Wash.2d 95, 99, 291 P.2d 642 (1955). If, however, the intent is not clear from the language of the statute, the court may resort to statutory construction. See, Meyer Drilling Co. v. Alton V. Phillips Co., 2 Wash.App. 600, 605, 468 P.2d 1008 (1970), aff'd 79 Wash.2d 431, 486 P.2d 1071 (1971). Such statutory construction may involve a consideration of the legislative history, Shelton Hotel Co. v. Bates, 4 Wash.2d 498, 508, 104 P.2d 478 (1940); Kucher v. County of Pierce, 24 Wash.App. 281, 285, 600 P.2d 683 (1979); other statutes dealing with the same subject, State v. Felix, 78 Wash.2d 771, 776, 479 P.2d 87 (1971); Springer v. Department of Licensing, 24 Wash.App. 847, 849, 604 P.2d 994 (1979); and administrative interpretation of the statute, Hama Hama Co. v. Shorelines Hearings Board, 85 Wash.2d 441, 448, 536 P.2d 157 (1975); Pedersen v. Department of Transportation, 25 Wash.App. 781, 789, 611 P.2d 1293 (1980). In any event the interpretation adopted should be the one that best advances the legislative purpose. Anderson v. Morris, 87 Wash.2d 706, 716, 558 P.2d 155 (1976).
In light of the obvious ambiguity we may resort to a consideration of extrinsic evidence in interpreting RCW 41.05 and 47.64. In so doing the history of events surrounding the enactment of RCW 41.05 and 47.64 is helpful.
The Washington Toll Bridge Authority (Authority), predecessor to the Department, acquired the ferry system from the Puget Sound Navigation Company in 1951. See Laws of 1949, ch. 179. The Authority was empowered to "negotiate and to enter into labor agreements with its employees". Laws of 1949, ch. 148, sec. 3.
In 1953 the statute was amended to authorize the Authority to negotiate and to enter into labor agreements which specifically included:
provisions for health and welfare benefits for its employees to be financed either wholly or in part by contributions from the operating fund.
Laws of 1953, ch. 211, sec. 2 (later codified as RCW 47.64.030). In 1961 these statutes relating to labor relations with the ferry system employees were reenacted as RCW 47.64.
In 1963 House Bill 6 was introduced authorizing any department, division, agency or political subdivision to provide for hospitalization and medical aid for employees when funds were available. During debate over the measure an issue arose concerning a limitation on the amount of governmental contribution because such a limitation would have an impact upon the amount then being paid, by contract, for the ferry system employees' insurance. In response, Laws of 1963, ch. 75, sec. 1 (codified as RCW 41.04.180) was enacted providing specifically that:
such limitation shall not apply to employees employed under chapter 47.64 RCW. (i.e., the ferry system employees of the Authority.)
From 1963 to 1970 the ferry system employees and the Authority continued to negotiate collective bargaining agreements containing provisions for health and welfare benefits, including insurance, pursuant to the authorization of RCW 47.64.030. In 1970 the legislature enacted Laws of 1970, 1st ex. sess., ch. 39 (RCW 41.05) which established the State Employee's Insurance Board and made the SEIB Act and insurance plans derived thereunder mandatory for state agencies. All other public employees remained under the purview of RCW 41.04. As with all previous legislation pertaining to insurance for state employees, however, section 5 of the new act contained a proviso that:
nothing herein shall be a limitation on employees employed under RCW 47.64.
Insofar as the issue here is concerned subsequent amendments to the SEIB act did not alter its basic thrust. 5
Subsequent to the establishment of the SEIB in 1970, the ferry system employees continued to enter into collective bargaining agreements with the Authority. 6 Most agreements included provisions for state-financed health and welfare benefits which were neither designed nor procured by the SEIB. Thus most of the ferry system employees did not participate in any SEIB plan. There were, however, one or two unions that did negotiate agreements under which their employees received SEIB coverage.
The collective bargaining procedure under RCW 47.64 continued without apparent question or conflict with the SEIB until approximately January 1980 when, pursuant to a request of the Director of the Department of Personnel the Attorney General issued a letter opinion defining the jurisdiction of...
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