Drisdel v. Lewis
| Decision Date | 31 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:18 CV 50 MTS |
| Parties | LEONARDO DRISDEL, Plaintiff, v. JASON LEWIS, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Leonardo Drisdel's Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for writ of habeas corpus.1 For the following reasons, Petitioner's § 2254 petition is denied.
Petitioner is currently incarcerated at the Southeast Correctional Center in Charleston, Missouri. In June of 2005, he was charged in the Circuit Court of St. Louis City with murder in the first degree and armed criminal action. On May 18, 2012, a jury found Petitioner guilty on both counts. Petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for the murder count and a concurrent term of 150 years' imprisonment on the armed criminal action count. Petitioner's convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal.2 See State v. Drisdel, 417 S.W.3d 773(Mo. App. 2014). Petitioner thereafter filed a timely pro se motion for post-conviction relief under Missouri Supreme Court Rule 29.15 in the circuit court. An amended motion was subsequently filed by appointed counsel.3 The circuit court denied the amended motion after an evidentiary hearing. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's judgment. See Drisdel v. State, 509 S.W.3d 860 (Mo. App. 2017). The appellate court issued its mandate on March 3, 2017.4 Petitioner filed a timely5 petition for writ of habeas corpus on March 5, 2018, pursuant to 28 USC § 2254. Petitioner sought and was granted extensions of time until July 23, 2018, when the amended petition, Doc. [11], was filed.
Petitioner asserts five grounds for relief. Grounds one through four were addressed by the Missouri Court of Appeals. Because the state appellate court's decisions were not unreasonable applications of clearly established law and not based on unreasonable determinations of fact,Petitoner's petition for writ of habeas corpus will be denied as to those grounds. Ground five is denied as well because it was not raised during Petitioner's state proceedings and is procedurally defaulted.
On the evening of June 4, 2005, Petitioner abruptly left his home between 8:30 p.m. and 9:00 p.m., telling his wife he would return in ten minutes. Doc. [12-2] at 371. At 12:15 a.m., Petitioner returned home. Id. His wife met him in the unlit hallway leading to their bedroom. Id. at 373. At that time, she noticed he was "nervous and jittery." Id. at 374. In the light of the bathroom, she saw that "his face, his arms, his hands...his shirt and his pants" were covered in blood. Id. As he cleaned himself, she noticed a cut on his finger and small bump on his forehead Id. at 376, 383. He then finished rinsing, wiped the bathroom down with a washcloth, toilet paper, and ammonia, washed his soiled clothes in the washing machine, shaved off his facial hair, changed clothes, and departed. Id. at 377-79. Petitioner's wife called the police. Id. at 384. Police officers located Petitioner a few hours later near a bus stop close to his house. Id. at 385, 422. They noticed a cut on his finger, but did not observe any other injuries when they took Petitioner into custody. Id. at 424, 426. Subsequently, police officers located the body of the victim, a young woman, in her apartment. Id. at 446-47. Signs of a struggle were evident at the scene. Id. at 537. The victim's body had suffered multiple injuries consistent with repeated beating, biting, smothering, and cutting. Id. at 515-26. The coroner determined her cause of death to be from head trauma and asphyxia. Id. at 536.
At trial, Petitioner did not testify and his statements made to police were not entered into evidence. The State, however, offered blood and DNA evidence found at the crime scene, bite wounds matching Petitioner's teeth, and the victim's blood found in Petitioner's bathroom and on the clothes he wore the night of the murder. Id. at 638, 650. Petitioner was found guilty of murderin the first degree and armed criminal action, and was sentenced to life without parole or probation as to the murder count and 150 years of imprisonment as to the armed criminal action count.
When a claim has been adjudicated on the merits in state-court proceedings, habeas relief is permissible under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), though such relief is "limited and deferential." Lonholt v. Iowa, 327 F.3d 748, 751 (8th Cir. 2003). Under AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), habeas relief is only permissible if the state court's determination:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2)
A state court's decision is "contrary to" clearly established Federal law if "it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of the [Supreme Court] but reaches a different result." Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). "The state court need not cite or even be aware of the governing Supreme Court cases, 'so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.'" Brown v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 458, 4647 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting Early v. Packer, 547 U.S. 3, 8 (2002)). "In the 'contrary to' analysis of the state court's decision, [the federal court's] focus is on the result and any reasoning that the court may have given; the absence of reasoning is not a barrier to a denial of relief." Id.
A decision involves an "unreasonable application" of clearly established law if "the state court applies [the Supreme Court's] precedents to the facts in an objectively unreasonable manner," see Payton, 544 U.S. at 141 and Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000), or "if the state court unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply." Id. at 406. "Clearly established" Supreme Court law "refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. "Federal habeas relief is warranted only when the refusal was 'objectively unreasonable,' not when it was merely erroneous or incorrect." Carter v. Kemna, 255 F.3d 589, 592 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 410-11 (2000)). "[I]t is not enough for us to conclude that, in our independent judgment, we would have applied federal law differently from the state court; the state court's application must have been objectively unreasonable." Rousan v. Roper, 436 F.3d 951, 956 (8th Cir. 2006). "An 'unreasonable application' is different from an incorrect or erroneous application; a prisoner must establish that a state court's adjudication was not only wrong, but also objectively unreasonable, such that 'fair-minded jurists' could not disagree about the proper resolution." Smith v. Titus, 958 F.3d 687, 691 (8th Cir. 2020).
When reviewing whether a state court decision involves an "unreasonable determination of the facts," state court findings of "basic, primary, or historical facts" are presumed correct unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption with clear and convincing evidence. Collier v. Norris, 485 F.3d 415, 423 (8th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); § 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Erroneous findings of fact by the state courts do not ensure the grant of habeas relief. Rather, the determination of these facts must be unreasonable in light of the evidence of record. Id.
Petitioner asserts three claims of trial error and two claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
Ground One: Petitioner claims he was denied his rights to due process of law, to remain silent, to be free from self-incrimination, and a fair trial under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution when the trial court did not allow him to present a defense of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect because he did not discuss the facts of the crime with the State's mental health expert.
Petitioner gave notice to the trial court that he planned to rely on the defense of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. He procured an expert, Dr. Steven Stromsdorfer, to examine him and prepare a report. Doc. [12-5] at 24. In Dr. Stromsdorfer's initial report he did not find that Petitioner suffered from a mental disease or defect. Id. A copy of that report was provided to the State on September 8, 2008. Id. The State was later provided with a "supplemental report" in which Dr. Stromsdorfer found that Petitioner did suffer from a mental disease or defect which may provide him with a defense. Id. (emphasis added). The State objected to the findings of the initial and "supplemental" reports and requested an evaluation be done by another psychiatrist or psychologist, as allowed under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 552.020.6 and § 552.030 RSMo. Id. at 25, 26. The trial court ordered another psychological examination of Petitioner. During an examination by Dr. Richard Scott, Petitioner refused to answer questions regarding the day of and immediately after the alleged offenses. The State then sought and obtained an order from the trial court to compel Petitioner to answer offense-specific questions during a subsequent evaluation by Dr. Scott. Doc. [11] at 9. Dr. Scott testified at the hearing on the motion to compel that he needed Petitioner's explanation of the events surrounding the crime to assess Petit...
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