Driver v. SENTENCE REVIEW DIV. IN SUP. CT.

• Decision Date: 09 March 2010
• Docket Number: No. OP 09-0609.,OP 09-0609.
• Citation: 227 P.3d 1018,2010 MT 43
• Parties: Jerel DRIVER, Charles Smith, Alan Combs, Abel Gonzales, Michael Hammond, Martin Swan, Clifford Delger, Daniel Miles, Timothy Deherrera, William Piper, Ronald Hummel, Steven Whiteclous, Cleve Spang, Zane Wymore, Darin Guckeen, Tommy Seth Dellar, Petitioners, v. The SENTENCE REVIEW DIVISION IN the SUPREME COURT OF the STATE OF MONTANA, Respondent.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

227 P.3d 1018

2010 MT 43

Jerel DRIVER, Charles Smith, Alan Combs, Abel Gonzales, Michael Hammond, Martin Swan, Clifford Delger, Daniel Miles, Timothy Deherrera, William Piper, Ronald Hummel, Steven Whiteclous, Cleve Spang, Zane Wymore, Darin Guckeen, Tommy Seth Dellar, Petitioners, v. The SENTENCE REVIEW DIVISION IN the SUPREME COURT OF the STATE OF MONTANA, Respondent.

No. OP 09-0609.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Argued and Submitted January 27, 2010.

Decided March 9, 2010.

For Petitioners: Joslyn Hunt, Chief Appellate Defender (argued); Eric Olson (argued), Assistant Public Defender, Helena, Montana.

For Respondent: Hon. Steve Bullock, Montana Attorney General; Sheri K. Sprigg, Assistant Attorney General (argued), Helena, Montana, Dennis Paxinos, Yellowstone County Attorney; Mark Murphy, Chief Criminal Deputy County Attorney (argued), Billings, Montana.

Justice JIM RICE delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 Petitioners filed a motion with the Sentence Review Division (Division) seeking clarification of the standard of review to be applied to criminal sentences submitted to the Division for review. The Division denied the Petitioners' motion, holding that the "clearly inadequate or excessive" standard under Rule 17, Mont. Sent. Rev. Div., correctly stated the appropriate standard of review. Petitioners then filed a Petition for Writ of Supervisory Control with this Court, asserting the Division was proceeding under a mistake of law.

¶ 2 We state the issues as follows:

¶ 3 1. Is the exercise of supervisory control appropriate in this matter?

¶ 4 2. Did the Division err by denying Petitioners' motion to clarify the standard of review applicable to sentences reviewed by the Division?

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

¶ 5 Petitioners are criminal defendants who have petitioned or intend to petition the Division for review of their sentences. On January 9, 2009, Petitioners filed a motion before the Division requesting that the Division clarify the standard it applies to sentences submitted for review. Petitioners argued that the Division should declare that the "clearly inadequate or excessive" standard in Rule 17 of the Division's Rules "is not the applicable standard." Instead, the motion asked that the Division "review its cases for equity." On May 12, 2009, the Attorney General filed a response objecting to Petitioner's motion and arguing in support of the standard stated in Rule 17.

¶ 6 The Division denied the motion, reaffirming Rule 17 as the appropriate standard of review and rejecting Petitioners' argument that their sentences should be reviewed for equity. In its order, the Division also stated that its "rules and practices ... have considered sentences to be unjust or inequitable if they are so greatly disproportionate to the crime as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment."

¶ 7 Petitioners filed a Petition for Writ of Supervisory Control with this Court, arguing that the Division erred in denying its motion and was thus proceeding under a mistake of law. The State filed its response, agreeing that this was an appropriate case for the exercise of supervisory control by this Court.

JURISDICTION & STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 8 We may assume supervisory control, as authorized by Article VII, Section 2(2) of the Montana Constitution and M.R.App. P. 14(3) (2007) (former M.R.App. P. 17), to control the course of litigation where the district court "is proceeding under a mistake of law and is causing a gross injustice." M.R.App. P. 14(3)(a); State v. Thirteenth Jud. Dist. Ct., 2009 MT 163, ¶ 13, 350 Mont. 465, 208 P.3d 408; see Sportsmen for I-143 v. Mont. Fifteenth Jud. Dist. Ct., 2002 MT 18, ¶ 4, 308 Mont. 189, 40 P.3d 400 (citing Park v. Mont. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct., 1998 MT 164, ¶ 13, 289 Mont. 367, 961 P.2d 1267). Our determination of whether supervisory control is appropriate is a case-by-case decision, based on the presence of extraordinary circumstances and a particular need to prevent an injustice from occurring. Sportsmen for I-143, ¶ 4 (citing Park, ¶ 13).

¶ 9 The proper basis by which this Court may review a challenge to a decision of the Sentence Review Division is through a petition for extraordinary relief. Ranta v. State, 1998 MT 95, ¶ 12, 288 Mont. 391, 958 P.2d 670. "Because the Sentence Review Division functions as an arm of this Court, this Court has the supervisory authority to ensure that it complies with statutes and rules governing its operations as well as the Montana Constitution and the United States Constitution." Ranta, ¶ 12 (citing § 46-18-901(1), MCA; Mont. Const. art. VII, § 2). Pursuant to M.R.App. P. 14(1), this Court has the power to "hear and determine such original and remedial writs as may be necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its jurisdiction." See Ranta, ¶ 12.

DISCUSSION

¶ 10 1. Is the exercise of supervisory control appropriate in this matter?

¶ 11 Petitioners contend that supervisory control is appropriate to correct the Division's mistake of law of applying the "clearly inadequate or excessive" standard to the review of sentences before it. The State agrees that supervisory control is appropriate, but requests that we do so to affirm that the "clearly inadequate or excessive" standard of review is appropriate.

¶ 12 We can exercise supervisory authority to ensure that the Division, as an arm of this Court, complies with the statutes and rules governing its operations, as well as the Montana Constitution and the United States Constitution. Jordan v. State, 2008 MT 334, ¶ 22, 346 Mont. 193, 194 P.3d 657 (quoting Ranta, ¶ 12). Because we have exclusive jurisdiction to review the Division's compliance with governing statutes and rules, as well as state and federal constitutional mandates, Jordan, ¶ 22 (citing Ranta, ¶ 12), we deem this case appropriate for the exercise of supervisory control to resolve the issue raised by the petition.

¶ 13 2. Did the Division err by denying Petitioners' motion to clarify the standard of review applicable to sentences reviewed by the Division?

¶ 14 In its order, the Division agreed with Petitioners' observation that the Legislature did not articulate a standard of review within the statutes creating and governing the Sentence Review Division. See §§ 46-18-901 through 905, MCA (2007). However, noting that the statutes granted it authority to "adopt any rules that will expedite its review of sentences," § 46-18-901(4), MCA, the Division cited its purpose and standards for review of criminal sentences as set forth in Rules 16 and 17. The Division rejected Petitioners' assertion that sentences should be reviewed for abuse of discretion or equity, and affirmed the standard set forth in Rule 17, that sentences "will not be reduced or increased unless it is deemed clearly inadequate or excessive." Acknowledging that sentences may be challenged as "unjust or inequitable," the Division appeared to define this review narrowly by holding that "the rules and practices of this division have considered sentences to be unjust or inequitable if they are so greatly disproportionate to the crime as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment." The Division stated that this Court "approved such analysis in In re Jones," 176 Mont. 412, 578 P.2d 1150 (1978).

¶ 15 Petitioners contend that the "clearly inadequate or excessive" standard of Rule 17 "unnecessarily limits the Division's reviewing power" and contradicts statements made by this Court that the Division "will review sentences for equity." See State v. Herd, 2004 MT 85, ¶ 22, 320 Mont. 490, 87 P.3d 1017. They note that this standard is not stated within the Division's statutory authorization. During oral argument, Petitioners focused their argument on the language within the Division's order which appeared to define inequitable sentences as only those which constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Petitioners argue that the Division should review for equity "in the broadest sense of the word, so the Division may review everything encompassing a defendant's sentence."

¶ 16 The State, during argument, agreed that the language within the Division's order purporting to limit review to sentences constituting cruel and unusual punishment was unduly narrow. However, the State argues that the Division's adoption of the "clearly inadequate or excessive" standard under Rule 17, pursuant to its statutory authority to promulgate rules, was an appropriate application of the statutory directive that "the sentence imposed by the district court is presumed correct." Section 46-18-904(3), MCA. The State acknowledges that the Division may take into account "equity issues" and "considerations of justice," but that its primary role is the reduction of disparities in prisoner sentencing, noting Rule 16's statement that the primary objective of the Division "is to provide uniformity in sentencing."

¶ 17 Montana law provides for generalized, indiscriminate sentencing of criminal defendants, with term ranges and broad authority for sentencing courts to impose conditions. "One of the purposes of the 1973 Montana Criminal Code was to vest wide sentencing discretion in the trial judge who is familiar with the character and past record of the defendant, and with the circumstances of the particular case." State v. Maldonado, 176 Mont. 322, 334, 578 P.2d 296, 303 (1978). "In imposing sentence, the sentencing court may consider any relevant evidence relating to the nature and circumstances of the crime, the character of the defendant, the defendant's background history, mental and physical condition, and any evidence the court considers to have probative force." State v. Collier, 277 Mont. 46, 63, 919 P.2d 376, 387 (1996) (citing State v. Klippenstein, 239 Mont. 42, 45, 778 P.2d 892, 894 (1989)). "The District Court is given a wide scope of inquiry in sentencing." Klippenstein, 239 Mont. at 45, 778 P.2d at 894 (citing State v. D.B.S., 216 Mont. 234, 247-48, 700 P.2d 630, 639-40 (1985)).

¶ 18 The...