Droste v. Board of County Com'Rs of Pitkin

• Decision Date: 06 October 2005
• Docket Number: No. 04CA0637.,04CA0637.
• Citation: 141 P.3d 852
• Parties: Peter C. DROSTE, individually and as Trustee of a Trust for the benefit of Peter C. Droste, Jr. and Elise Droste; and Bruce F. Droste, individually and as Trustee of a Trust for the benefit of Edward Droste and William Droste, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF the COUNTY OF PITKIN, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

141 P.3d 852

Peter C. DROSTE, individually and as Trustee of a Trust for the benefit of Peter C. Droste, Jr. and Elise Droste; and Bruce F. Droste, individually and as Trustee of a Trust for the benefit of Edward Droste and William Droste, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF the COUNTY OF PITKIN, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 04CA0637.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. V.

October 6, 2005.

Certiorari Granted August 28, 2006.

Grimshaw & Harring, P.C., Wayne B. Schroeder, Jody Harper Alderman, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

John M. Ely, County Attorney, Pitkin, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee.

ROY, J.

Plaintiffs, Peter C. Droste, individually and as trustee of a trust for the benefit of Peter C. Droste, Jr. and Elise Droste; and Bruce F. Droste, individually and as trustee of a trust for the benefit of Edward Droste and William Droste (the Owners), appeal the trial court's summary judgment in favor of defendant, the Board of County Commissioners of Pitkin County (the County), on the issue of whether the County had authority to impose a temporary development moratorium on their property. We affirm.

In 1963, the Owners purchased approximately 925 acres of land in unincorporated Pitkin County, now known as the Droste Ranch and lying between the City of Aspen and the Town of Snowmass Village. On March 25, 1974, the County passed a zoning ordinance applicable to lands encompassing the Owners' property that allowed for development of single family residences on lots of at least ten acres as a use by right. The ordinance remained in effect on May 17, 1974, when both the Areas and Activities of State Interest Act (AASIA), § 24-65.1-101, et seq., C.R.S.2005, and the Local Government Land Use Control Enabling Act (the Enabling Act), § 29-20-101, et seq., C.R.S. 2005, became effective.

In 1996, the Owners sold a conservation easement covering approximately 100 acres to the County for $480,000. In 1999, they sold a second easement for $7.5 million to the County and the Town of Snowmass Village covering an additional 500 acres. Following these transactions, the Owners owned approximately 345 developable acres.

Subsequently, the Owners filed several development applications. Two of these applications, filed in 2000, were for a 15,000-square foot residential dwelling and an access road to the proposed site of the residence. A third, filed in 2002, was for a proposed fourteen-home planned unit development. The County denied all three of these development applications, but granted a fourth application requesting permission to develop an agricultural structure on the property.

In February 2003, a representative of the Owners met with a representative of the County concerning three new potential applications for development of the Owners' property. Following these discussions, however, no applications were filed.

In March 2003, the County passed an emergency ordinance creating a temporary moratorium on accepting, processing, and approving development applications concerning certain lands in Pitkin County including the Owners' property. In the recitals of the ordinance, the County stated, referring to AASIA and the Enabling Act, that "[t]he State of Colorado has mandated that all areas of unincorporated Pitkin County be subject to a master plan by no later than January of 2004," and that the moratorium was necessary "to allow time to conduct a comprehensive study of what appropriate zoning and development regulations should be imposed as a result of the Master Plan process." Although the County noted that "an appropriate analysis of the area and adoption of necessary zoning regulations can be accomplished within sixty (60) days," it nonetheless also expressly stated that the moratorium would "remain in effect until formally terminated by the Board of County Commissioners."

On June 11, 2003, the County adopted an ordinance that amended the projected end date of the moratorium. Because the Pitkin County planning staff had notified the County that more than sixty days would be needed to finish its analysis, the County stated in the amended ordinance that "[t]he projected timeline necessitates that the temporary moratorium remain in effect until January 1, 2004, at which time the [County] may again determine whether the stated goals have been effectively achieved." In addition, the County noted that "[a]ll terms of the [original adopted ordinance] remain in full effect with the exception of the projected timeline for completion of the goals of the moratorium."

On May 14, 2003, the Owners filed an action in district court seeking a declaratory judgment that the temporary moratorium was void under the applicable statutes, and requesting injunctive relief enjoining the County from enforcing the terms of the moratorium and from changing any zoning regulations governing their property. The court denied the request for injunctive relief and, after cross-motions were filed, granted summary judgment in favor of the County. In its order, the court found that the County had authority under AASIA to enact a temporary moratorium.

The Owners thereafter filed a motion for amendment of the trial court's findings and judgment pursuant to C.R.C.P. 59, which the court denied in a written order dated February 18, 2004. In this second order, the court determined that, in addition to its authority under AASIA, the County had authority under its general police powers and the Enabling Act to impose the moratorium. This appeal followed.

Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and supporting documents clearly demonstrate that no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A court must afford all favorable inferences that may be drawn from the undisputed facts to the nonmoving party and must resolve all doubts as to the existence of a triable issue of fact against the moving party. Cotter Corp. v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 90 P.3d 814 (Colo.2004). Our review of an order granting summary judgment is de novo. Bedard v. Martin, 100 P.3d 584 (Colo.App.2004).

Because it is dispositive, we first address the Owners' contention that the trial court erred in concluding that the moratorium is authorized or permissible under the Enabling Act. We disagree.

As a threshold matter, we note that the Owners do not claim on appeal that the imposition of the moratorium is unconstitutional, but instead argue that the County was without authority to so act. Thus, we are not presented here with a question of whether a temporary regulatory measure has violated a constitutional provision, and we need not address such issues.

Statutory interpretation is a question of law that appellate courts review de novo. Boone v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 107 P.3d 1114 (Colo.App.2004).

When construing statutory provisions, a court's primary task is to effectuate the intent of the General Assembly. To discern that intent, a court first looks to the statutory language, giving words and phrases their commonly accepted meaning. Archibold v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 58 P.3d 1031 (Colo.2002).

The legislative declaration of the Enabling Act provides in pertinent part:

The general assembly hereby finds and declares that in order to provide for planned and orderly development within Colorado and a balancing of basic human needs of a changing population with legitimate environmental concerns, the policy of this state is to clarify and provide broad authority to local governments to plan for and regulate the use of land within their respective jurisdictions.

Section 29-20-102(1), C.R.S.2005.

The specific enumerated powers granted to local governments, including counties, see § 29-20-103(1.5), C.R.S.2005, are found in § 29-20-104, C.R.S.2005. That provision states, in pertinent part:

(1) [With an exception not relevant here], the power and authority granted by this section shall not limit any power or authority presently exercised or previously granted. Each local government within its respective jurisdiction has the authority to plan for and regulate the use of land by:

. . .

(b) Protecting lands from activities which would cause immediate or foreseeable material danger to significant wildlife habitat and would endanger a wildlife species;

. . .

(e) Regulating the location of activities and developments which may result in...