Druker v. Druker

• Decision Date: 30 January 1941
• Citation: 31 N.E.2d 524,308 Mass. 229
• Parties: DRUKER v. DRUKER.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

308 Mass. 229

31 N.E.2d 524

DRUKER

v.DRUKER.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Jan. 30, 1941.

Equity suit by Norma H. Druker against Harold E. Druker, to establish title to realty, and for accounting. From a decree dismissing the bill, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.Appeal from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Kirk, Judge.

Argued before FIELD, C. J., and DONAHUE, QUA, DOLAN, and RONAN, JJ.

E. O. Proctor and R. Rambach, both of Boston, for plaintiff.

M. E. Schneider, of Boston, for defendant.

DOLAN, Justice.

This is a suit in equity in which the plaintiff seeks to establish title to certain real estate standing in the name of her husband, the defendant, for an accounting of all sums of money received by him from said property, and for payment to her of such sums as may be found to be due her under the accounting. The property was purchased by the defendant following his betrothal to the plaintiff, but before he married her. The judge, after hearing, filed ‘Findings of Fact and Order for Decree,’ in accordance with which a final decree was entered dismissing the bill. The case comes before us upon the plaintiff's appeal from that decree.

There is no report of the evidence. So far as appears the findings of fact were made by the judge voluntarily and not as a report of ‘the material facts found by him’ under G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 214, § 23. The parties, however, have dealt with the case as if the findings were of all the material facts found by him, and, considering the scope and extent of the findings, and since the result will be the same, we treat the findings on that basis. See, however, Birnbaum v. Pamoukis, 301 Mass. 559, 561, 562, 17 N.E.2d 885, and cases cited. Thus considered, ‘the decree * * * must be affirmed if the conclusions of fact of the trial judge are consistent with the specific facts found by him.’ Goldston v. Randolph, 293 Mass. 253, 255, 199 N.E. 896, 898.

It would add nothing to our jurisprudence to narrate the specific findings of the judge. The ultimate findings of the judge that the defendant contributed $5,000 of his own money toward the purchase price ($14,500) of the property involved, that the balance of the purchase price was contributed by or in behalf of the plaintiff, that it was intended that the property should be held for the benefit of the parties in undefined proportions, that there was no fraud or overreaching on the part of the defendant, are consistent with the findings of specific facts and so must stand.

It is settled that when one person pays the purchase price of property and title is taken in the name of another, without more, the beneficial interest in the property inures to the person who paid or became liable to pay the purchase price, by way of a resulting trust. Blodgett v. Hildreth, 103 Mass. 484, 487;Howe v. Howe, 199 Mass. 598, 604, 85 N.E. 945,127 Am.St.Rep. 516;Quinn v. Quinn, 260 Mass. 494, 501, 157 N.E. 641;Cook v. Howe, 280 Mass. 325, 328, 182 N.E. 581;Bosworth v. Bosworth, 285 Mass. 82, 83, 188 N.E. 612;Gerace v. Gerace, 301 Mass. 14, 18, 16 N.E.2d 6;Cohen v. Simon, 304 Mass. 375, 377, 23 N.E.2d 863; Am.Law Inst. Restatement: Trusts, § 440; 3 Scott, Trusts, § 440. It is also settled in this Commonwealth that where one pays but a part of the purchase price and seeks to enforce a resulting trust in his favor, it must be shown that the payment made by him was for some specific part or distinct interest in the estate; ‘for ‘some aliquot part,’ as it is sometimes expressed; that is, for a specific share * * * and that a general contribution of a sum of money toward the entire purchase is not sufficient.' McGowan v. McGowan, 14 Gray 119, 121,74 Am.Dec. 668;Pollock v. Pollock, 223 Mass. 382, 384, 111 N.E. 963;Karas v. Karas, 288 Mass. 460, 463, 193 N.E. 18;Moat v. Moat, 301 Mass. 469, 472,...