Drysdale v. South County Hospital Health Care System, No. WC 01-0373 (RI 1/5/2005)
| Decision Date | 05 January 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. WC 01-0373,WC 01-0373 |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
| Parties | DOUGLAS DRYSDALE AND DONNA DRYSDALE v. SOUTH COUNTY HOSPITAL HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, ALIAS JOHN DOE I, DAVID COPPE, M.D., ERICA JOST, M.D., PAWTUXET VALLEY PRESCRIPTION & SURGICAL CENTER, INC. JOHN DOE II, AND JOHN DOE III. |
The matter before this Court is Plaintiffs' motion to strike Defendants' affirmative defense relating to the applicability of G.L. 1956 § 9-19-34.1, the so-called medical malpractice collateral source statute. Plaintiffs argue that §9-19-34.1 is unconstitutional,1 and thus the defense asserting its application is insufficient and should be stricken pursuant to Rule 12(f). Defendants object to Plaintiffs' motion.2
Plaintiffs brought this medical malpractice action against Defendants on July 13, 2001. According to Plaintiffs' answer to interrogatories, Plaintiff Douglas Drysdale's medical bills, net of co-payments made by the Plaintiff, were substantially paid by Blue Cross, a third party insurer. Plaintiff also states that he received temporary disability benefits and social security disability payments as a result of the injuries sustained allegedly due to the negligence of one or more of the Defendants.3
In light of these payments, Defendants Coppe and Pawtucket Valley Prescription and Surgical Center, Inc., in their respective answers, asserted an affirmative defense relating to the applicability of the provisions of § 9-19-34.1.4 That provision, applied as a rule of evidence at trial, has the effect of abolishing the common-law collateral source rule in medical malpractice actions with regard to specific types of collateral payment.5
Plaintiffs have notified the Attorney General pursuant to the provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 24(d), of the constitutional challenge. The Attorney General, by letter dated November 1, 2004, has advised the Plaintiffs and the Court that he will not intervene at this time relative to the constitutional issues.
The Rhode Island Rules of Civil Procedure allow a party to make a motion to strike a defense raised in any pleading. The rule provides:
"Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a party within 20 days after the service of the pleading upon the party or upon the court's own initiative at any time, the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense, or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. Rule 12(f).
Motions to strike a defense under Rule 12(f) are generally not favored. See Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, 677 F.2d 1045, 1057 (5th Cir. 1982). However, in the instance when only a legal determination must be made based upon uncontroverted facts, a motion to strike may be useful. See generally, Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 3d § 1381.
It appears from these pretrial pleadings that it is the intention of the Defendants, at trial, to make the statutory election permitted by §9-19-34.1. Accordingly, this motion to strike is essentially in the nature of a motion seeking a determination in limine as to the availability of this statutory defense. In that procedural context, the Court will rule on the constitutional issues raised by the Defendants.
In 1976, the General Assembly enacted the Rhode Island Medical Malpractice Reform Act. See P.L. 1976, ch. 244, sec. 7. At that time, the General Assembly enacted G.L. 1956 § 9-19-34, the precursor to the statute challenged herein. In addition, the General Assembly at that time enacted a variety of other measures designed to address a perceived crisis in connection with medical malpractice claims. In pertinent part, the statute effectively abrogated the common law collateral source rule in the context of medical malpractice actions. The common law collateral source rule "mandates that evidence of payments made to an insured party from sources independent of a tort feasor are inadmissible and shall not diminish the tort feasor's liability to plaintiff." Votolato v. Merandi, 747 A.2d 455, 463 (R.I. 2000) (quoting Gelsomino v. Mendoca, 723 A.2d 300, 301 (R.I. 1999)).
In 1986, the collateral source statute was amended to add the language which provides that whenever the plaintiff's award is reduced by the collateral source payment "the lien of any first party payor who had paid such benefit against the judgment shall be foreclosed and the plaintiff shall have no legal obligation to reimburse the payor." The effect of such amendment is that, to the extent a medical malpractice plaintiff is precluded by the statute from recovering sums paid by a collateral source, the collateral source is also prohibited from enforcing a lien against the plaintiff's recovery, or otherwise seeking to enforce as against the plaintiff a legal obligation to reimburse the collateral source.6
Legislative enactments of the General Assembly are presumed to be valid and constitutional. Kass v. Retirement Board of the Employees' Retirement System of the State of Rhode Island, 567 A.2d 358, 360 (R.I. 1989), citing Gorham v. Robinson, 57 R.I. 1, 7, 186 A.832, 837 (1936). The party challenging the constitutional validity of the statute carries the burden of persuading the court beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislation violates an identifiable aspect of the constitution. Id; Dowd v. Rayner, 655 A.2d 679, 681 (R.I. 1995). See also Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87, 92 (R.I. 1983). In an equal protection challenge, the burden is more than nominal: "A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1105, 6 L.Ed.2d. 393, 399 (1961). A court may not "overturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature's actions were irrational." Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97, 99 S.Ct. 939, 943, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979).
"When a statute involves neither a suspect classification, nor a fundamental right, nor a gender-based classification, the proper standard of review is minimal scrutiny." Dowd, 655 A.2d at 681. Minimal scrutiny is applied to "social or economic legislation, presuming it to be valid if the classification drawn is rationally related to a legitimate state interest." In re: Advisory from the Governor, 633 A.2d at 664, 669 (R.I. 1993).
Such a rational basis review "is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choice." Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 2642, 125 L.Ed.2d. 257 (1993), quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 2100-2101, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993). A statute must be upheld if the reviewing court determines that the disparate treatment serves some legitimate governmental purpose. Id. at 320.
There is no claim here that the classification of medical malpractice plaintiffs is subject to a heightened level of scrutiny. This statutory classification is not based on race, alienage, national origin, or gender. Nor is the classification subject to heightened scrutiny because of its effect upon a fundamental constitutional right. Rather, because it is a statutory classification applied solely to social or economic legislation, the statute passes constitutional scrutiny "if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification." FCC v. Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 313, 113 S.Ct. at 1201. See Rhode Island Insurer's Insolvency Fund v. Lewiston Mfg. Co., 716 A.2d 730, 734 (1998). ("A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.")
In 1976 and again in 1986, the General Assembly attempted to address what might generally be characterized as medical malpractice reform legislation. In each instance, the legislature attempted to modify certain legal doctrines, and treat claims for medical malpractice differently than other tort claims. The rationale for making such legislative distinctions was articulated to some extent in the preamble to 1986 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 350.7
Although the legislature in 1986 articulated some of the reasons for its enactment, the legislature need not actually articulate the reasons which it believes support a particular statutory classification. It is not for the courts to determine the wisdom of the legislative classification, as long as there is some conceivable rationale, in this instance, to distinguish between medical malpractice claims and other tort claims. "[A] legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data." FCC v. Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 315, 113 S.Ct. at 2098.
Although not specifically articulated in the statute, it appears to the Court that the legislature was attempting to put in place a measure that, in some fashion, would have the effect of reducing the cost of medical malpractice insurance and/or make medical malpractice more available to physicians and medical providers. In addition, although the statute renders the plaintiff unable to recover certain benefits he or she received from collateral sources, the collateral sources are likewise unable to collect the sums paid from any recovery the plaintiff may obtain. Accordingly, some part of the damages sustained by a victim of medical malpractice is shifted to the collateral source, who is statutorily precluded from recovering certain benefits paid to or on behalf of the plaintiff from the plaintiff's tort recovery. Thus, by shifting or spreading some of the financial risk for medical...
To continue reading
Request your trial