Dubois v. Town of Arundel
| Decision Date | 01 February 2018 |
| Docket Number | SUPERIOR COURT Civil Action DOCKET NO. AP-17-0024 |
| Parties | MARCEL DUBOIS, and SOL FEDDER, Plaintiffs, v. TOWN OF ARUNDEL, et al, Defendants. |
| Court | Maine Superior Court |
YORK, ss.
The instant case arises out of proceedings before defendant Town of Arundel's Planning Board (the "Board") in relation to Dubois Livestock, Inc.'s ("Dubois Livestock") permit renewal application (the "Application") in June and July of 2017. (Compl. ¶¶ 6-9.) Dubois Livestock submitted the Application to the Board on June 28, 2017, seeking to renew a conditional use permit for property located at 2 Irving Road in Arundel, Maine. (Def.'s Mot. Ex. A 1.) The property had been granted conditional use as an agricultural composting facility under a consent decree entered into between Dubois Livestock, the Randrick Trust, and the Town of Arundel on June 27, 2016 (the "Consent Decree"). (Def.'s Ex. Mot. A 3-4.) The Consent Decree required Dubois Livestock to apply to the Town no later than July 1, 2017 for a renewal permit to continue the conditional use and outlined the requirements to obtain such renewal. (Def.'s Mot. Ex. A 3.)
The Application lists Randrick Trust as the property owner, Dubois Livestock as the applicant, and Ricky Dubois and Randy Dubois as authorized agents of Dubois Livestock. (Def.'s Mot. Ex. A 1.) Attached to the Application were a copy of the Consent Decree, an operations log, a survey of the property, and a solid waste compost annual utilization report for 2016 from the Maine Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP"). (Def.'s Mot. Ex. A 3-6.)
On June 27, 2017,1 defendants Leah Rachin, the Town Attorney, and James Nagle, the Town Code Enforcement Officer ("CEO") drafted and submitted a letter (the "Letter") to the Board, presumably in anticipation of the Application. Attached to the letter was a copy of a notice of violation ("NOV") issued by the Maine Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP") on June 23, 2017. Noting the NOV, the Letter states that Nagle was unable to produce a letter confirming that the composting facility run by Dubois Livestock was in compliance with all applicable state licenses. Such a letter was required for renewal of Dubois Livestock's conditional use permit pursuant the Consent Decree.
On July 27, 2017, the Board held a hearing on the Application. (Def.'s Mot. Ex. B 1-3.) No representative of Dubois Livestock attended the meeting. (Def.'s Mot. Ex. B 2.) Because Dubois Livestock had not submitted a letter from the CEO indicating that their compost operation was in compliance with existing state licenses and regulations pursuant to the Consent Decree or a sufficient plan of the site, the Board found that the Application was incomplete and did not comply with the Consent Decree. (Def.'s Mot. Ex. B 3.) Thus, the Board denied the Application. (Def.'s Mot. Ex. B 3.)
Plaintiffs Marcel Dubois and Sol Fedder filed the instant Complaint on September 12, 2017 against the Town, individual members of the Planning Board, including Richard Ganong, Chip Bassett, Jamie Lowrey, Tom McGinn, and Roger Morin, CEO James Nagle (collectively, the "Town Defendants"), the law firm Bergen and Parkinson, LLC (the "Firm"), which represents the Town, and Town Attorney Leah Rachin of the Firm (collectively, the "Attorney Defendants").
The Complaint alleges that the Letter to the Board constituted a "secret, clandestine and prohibited 'executive sessions' that were intended to discriminate against Dubois Livestock, Randy Dubois, Rick Dubois Sol Fedder and Marcel Dubois, and violate their rights protected under the Constitution of the United States and the Maine Constitution." (Compl. ¶ 6.) A copy of the Letter was attached to the Complaint.
Plaintiffs allege that the distribution of the Letter to the Board violated the Maine Freedom of Access Act ("FOAA") and created bias, unfairness, and partiality against the plaintiffs. (Compl. ¶ 7.) Thus, plaintiffs assert that the Board was predisposed against them in their meeting addressing their application on July 27, 2017.2 (Compl. ¶ 7.) In addition to their FOAA claim, plaintiffs assert that Rachin and Nagle's correspondence denied them procedural due process. (Compl. ¶¶ 8-9.) Finally, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs allege that they were denied equal protection due to the dissemination of the Letter to the Board. (Compl. ¶ 13.)
On September 29, 2017, the Town Defendants moved to dismiss the case, arguing that it was not timely filed, that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the suit, and that the Complaint failed to state a claim for relief. The Town Defendants also included copies of the Application, which also contains a copy of the Consent Decree (Ex. A), and meeting minutes for the Board's July 27 meeting (Ex. B). On December 21, 2017, the Attorney Defendants also moved to dismiss, joining the other defendants' arguments and also arguing that they had not been served and also asserting another argument as to why the Complaint failed to properly state a claim for relief. The Firm and Rachin also simultaneously requested sanctions and an injunction preventing future litigation. With their motion to dismiss, they further provided a copy of Nagle's Letter and a letter sent by Town Planner Tad Redway to inform Dubois Livestock of the Board's Decision.
In reviewing a motion to dismiss, courts "consider the facts in the complaint as if they were admitted." Bonney v. Stephens Mem. Hosp., 2011 ME 46, ¶ 16, 17 A.3d 123, 127. The complaint is viewed "in the light most favorable to the plaintiff to determine whether it sets forth elements of a cause of action or alleges facts that would entitle the plaintiff to relief pursuant to some legal theory." Id. (quoting Saunders v. Tisher, 2006 ME 94, ¶ 8, 902 A.2d 830). "Dismissal is warranted when it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any set of facts that he might prove in support of his claim." Id. However, when the court's jurisdiction is challenged, it is the plaintiff's burden of establishing that jurisdiction is proper. Commerce Bank & Tr. Co. v. Dworman, 2004 ME 142, ¶ 8, 861 A.2d 662 (citing Interstate Food Processing Corp. v. Pellerito Foods, Inc., 622 A.2d 1189, 1191 (Me. 1993)).
The first ground for dismissal asserted in defendants' motion is that plaintiffs lack standing to bring the present suit. Standing relates to, but is theoretically distinct from, the court's subject matter jurisdiction. Bank of Am., N.A. v. Greenleaf, 2015 ME 127, ¶ 7, 124 A.3d 1122 (citations omitted). "Standing is a condition of justiciability that a plaintiff must satisfy in order to invoke the court's subject matter jurisdiction in the first place." Id. (citing Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Girouard, 2015 ME 116, ¶ 8 n.3, 123 A.3d 216.). Thus, it is plaintiffs burden to establish that they have standing to bring the present action.
Only plaintiffs "whose definite and personal legal rights are at stake may act as a plaintiff in a proper legal action." Nichols v. Rockland, 324 A.2d 295, 297 (Me. 1974) (citations omitted). Consequently, the court must analyze the plaintiffs' legal interest in the suit in order to properlydetermine standing. Id. Further, in a Rule 80B action, plaintiffs must prove: (1) that they were a party to the administrative proceeding, and (2) that they suffered a particularized injury as a result of the agency's decision. Norris Family Assocs., LLC v. Town of Phippsburg, 2005 ME 102, ¶ 11, 879 A.2d 1007 (citing Lewis v. Town of Rockport, 2005 ME 44, ¶ 8, 870 A.2d 107). One suffers a particularized injury when "a judgment or order adversely and directly affects a party's property, pecuniary, or personal rights" and the injury is "in fact distinct from the harm experienced by the public at large." Nergaard v. Town of Westport Island, 2009 ME 56, ¶ 18, 973 A.2d 735 (quoting Ricci v. Superintendent, Bureau of Banking, 485 A.2d 645, 647 (Me. 1984). The Law Court has construed the term "party" to the underlying proceeding broadly as, "[A]ny participant in the proceedings who is aggrieved by the action or inaction of the zoning board of appeals." Singal v. Bangor, 440 A.2d 1048, 1050 (Me. 1982) (citing Pride's Corner Concerned Citizens Assn. v. Westbrook Board of Zoning Appeals, Me., 398 A.2d 415, 417-18 (1979)).
Defendants argue that plaintiffs have not alleged any connection to Dubois Livestock or otherwise participated in the process so that they have standing to challenge the Board's decision. They draw the court's attention to a previous decision of the Superior Court (Cumberland County, Crowley, J.): Duchaine v. Town of Gorham, No. CV-99-573, 2001 Me. Super. LEXIS 89 (June 15, 2001). In Duchaine, Justice Crowley found that corporate shareholders who had made personal payments to corporations, which were then used to pay allegedly excessive attorney's and engineer's fees, lacked standing to assert constitutional, negligence, and slander of title claims. Id. at *3-4. Specifically, the court held, "While the Individual Plaintiffs did make personal payments to the corporations, the Town's conduct did not directly affect their personal pecuniary interest as required to demonstrate a particularized injury." Id. at *4; see also 19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 1925 ().
The Law Court held similarly in Stull v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 2000 ME 21, 745 A.2d 975. In Stull, the Court addressed a plaintiff's standing to bring a breach of contract claim based on a contract between an insurance company and the corporation of which he was the sole...
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