Singal v. City of Bangor

• Decision Date: 09 February 1982
• Parties: Ruthanne SINGAL v. CITY OF BANGOR and Nite Owl, Inc.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 1048

440 A.2d 1048

Ruthanne SINGAL v. CITY OF BANGOR and Nite Owl, Inc.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued Jan. 4, 1982.

Decided Feb. 9, 1982.

Gross, Minsky, Mogul & Singal, George C. Schelling (orally), Bangor, for plaintiff.

Twitchell, Linscott & Badger, Frederick J. Badger, Jr., Orman G. Twitchell (orally), Bangor, for defendants.

Before McKUSICK, C. J., GODFREY, ROBERTS, CARTER, VIOLETTE and WATHEN, JJ., and DUFRESNE, A. R. J.

DUFRESNE, Active Retired Justice.

The defendant Nite Owl, Inc. ¹ appeals from a decision of the Superior Court, Penobscot County, in an 80B proceeding that reversed a decision of the Bangor Zoning Board of Appeals. The Board had granted Nite Owl's application for a permit to install two self-service gasoline pumps and underground storage tanks as an accessory, customarily incidental and subordinate use on the same lot, to the operation thereon of a grocery/superette at the corner of Broadway and Burleigh Roads, in Bangor, Maine, the area being zoned C-1 as a neighborhood commercial zone under the city's ordinance. Nite Owl challenges the Superior Court's decision on the grounds that summary judgment was inappropriate in this case and that the court misconstrued the zoning ordinance. We find no merit in the appellant's arguments and therefore deny the appeal.

Standing

Before discussing the issues raised on appeal, we must first determine whether Ruthanne Singal, the appellee, initially had the necessary standing to appeal the Board's decision. 30 M.R.S.A. § 2411(3)(F) provides that, in zoning cases,

(a)n appeal may be taken, within 30 days after the decision (of the Board of Zoning Appeals) is rendered, by any party to Superior Court from any order, relief or denial in accordance with the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 80B. The hearing before the Superior Court shall be without a jury. (Emphasis supplied).

Rights of appeal from decisions of administrative tribunals are statutory, and capacity of any appellant to prosecute an appeal therefrom, i.e. standing to appeal, must needs depend on the particular wording of the specific appeal statute involved. The reference zoning appeal statute gives appeal standing to a party at the administrative level, i.e. before the administrative agency, here the Zoning Board of Appeals. Not only must it appear that the appellee, Ruthanne Singal, was a party before the Board, but she must further demonstrate that by reason of the Board's action or inaction she suffered a particularized injury. See Matter of Lappie, Me., 377 A.2d 441 (1977).

Even though the issue of standing was not raised by the parties, the matter is jurisdictional and will be examined by the court on its own motion for the first time at the appellate level. McNicholas v. York Beach Village Corp., Me., 394 A.2d 264, 266 (1978). See also Desmond v. Persina, Me., 381 A.2d 633, 637 (1978); State v. Joey F., Me., 438 A.2d 1273 (1982). Indeed, deficiency in standing to appeal, whether arising from failure of party status before the agency or from the absence of particularized aggrievement as a result of agency action or inaction, gives rise to a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction in the courts sitting on appeal, whether at the initial appellate level in the Superior Court, or at the final stage of the appeal in the Law Court. See Walsh v. City of Brewer, Me., 315 A.2d 200, 210-11 (1974).

This Court has already construed the term "party" as used by the Legislature in 30 M.R.S.A. § 2411(3)(F), the zoning appeal statute. We viewed the statutory scheme as using the word "party" in the broad sense of meaning any participant in the proceedings who is aggrieved by the action or inaction of the zoning board of appeals. Pride's Corner Concerned Citizens Assn. v. Westbrook Board of Zoning Appeals, Me., 398 A.2d 415, 417-18 (1979).

The appellee in the instant case did appear by her attorney at the hearing on Nite Owl's application before the Zoning Board of Appeals, where, as an owner of property and resident on Burleigh Road in Bangor in the neighborhood of the proposed business undertaking, she opposed a construction of the pertinent ordinance provisions which would permit the sale of gasoline from two self-service pumps with storage tanks as an accessory use in connection with the operation of a grocery/superette at the corner of Burleigh and Broadway Roads in a neighborhood commercial zone classified as C-1. Through her attorney she participated in the proceedings in opposition to the grant of a permit to Nite Owl, arguing strenuously to the Board that the zoning ordinance if properly interpreted did not allow the sale of gasoline in a C-1 zone.

Nite Owl's appeal of the Code Enforcement Officer's denial of its application for a permit to install the gasoline pumps and tanks undoubtedly caused the Zoning Board of Appeals pursuant to Article 24, Section 2(a) of the zoning ordinance to notify by U.S. mail all abutting owners and owners of properties within 100 feet of the exterior boundaries of the appellant's property. Presumably, Singal's status as a proper party in opposition was knowingly recognized by the Board and, thus, her capacity to appeal to the Superior Court from the Board's adverse decision by reason of her participation in the administrative hearing must follow, provided the record also shows that she suffered a particularized injury from the Board's decision.

It is generally conceded that the operation of gasoline service stations do cause such problems in the vicinity as traffic congestion, noise, danger of fire and depreciation of surrounding property values. See, e.g. P. Rohan, Zoning and Land Use Controls, § 40.04(4) (1981). The sale of gasoline from self-service pumps at an island in front of a grocery/superette establishment, although different in degree from such commerce at full-fledged gasoline service stations, do pose similar problems of traffic congestion, noise, fire hazards and property depreciation of some consequence. Given the potential for such a particularized injury of some appreciative magnitude, the appellee is an aggrieved party having standing to seek judicial review of the Board's decision. Pride's Corner Concerned Citizens Assn., supra, at 418; Matter of Lappie, supra, at 443.

Summary Judgment

Under Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P., summary judgment may be granted only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that a party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Nite Owl argues that the issue, whether or not the sale of gasoline by means of the operation of self-service pumps as an accessory use to the operation of a grocery/superette is permissible in a C-1 zone under the zoning ordinance of the City of Bangor, is one of fact on which the parties are in disagreement, and that this legally precluded the grant of summary judgment as was done in this appeal at the Superior Court level. We disagree.

This Court has consistently held that the meaning of terms or expressions in zoning ordinances calls for the construction of legislation and is a question of law for the court. LaPointe v. City of Saco, Me., 419 A.2d 1013, 1015 (1980); Moyer v. Board of Zoning Appeals, Me., 233 A.2d 311, 318 (1967). Whether a proposed use, principal or accessory, falls within a given categorization contained in zoning regulations is a question of law, on which the zoning board's determination as well as that of the single justice is subject to review. Moyer, supra, at 318. Hence, summary judgment was appropriate in the present appeal under Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P.

Construction of the Ordinance

The Bangor zoning ordinance provides that a grocery/superette is a permitted use in a C-1 zone. Also permitted are accessory uses on the same lot with, and of a nature customarily incidental and subordinate to, the principal use, here a grocery/superette. Although neither grocery nor superette is defined by the ordinance, Article 3, Section 1 thereof ordains that terms not defined shall have their customary dictionary meanings. Webster's Third International Dictionary used by the Presiding Justice to construe the ordinance defines "superette" as a supermarket operating on a scale smaller than usual as measured by space occupied or outdoor storage, and "grocery" as a place of...