Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co. v. Fain

• Decision Date: 20 November 1902
• Citation: 70 S.W. 813,109 Tenn. 56
• Parties: DUCKTOWN SULPHUR, COPPER, & IRON CO., Limited, v. FAIN et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

70 S.W. 813

109 Tenn. 56

DUCKTOWN SULPHUR, COPPER, & IRON CO., Limited, v. FAIN et al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

November 20, 1902

Appeal from chancery court, Polk county; Thos. M. McConnell Chancellor.

Bill by the Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Company, Limited, against J. B. Fain and others, to enjoin 21 suits at law to recover damages for nuisance. From an order of the court of chancery appeals reversing an order overruling demurrers to the bill complainant appeals. Affirmed.

James G. Parks and Mayfield & Son, for appellant.

W. A.

Guinn B. B. C. Witt, and Ingersoll & Peyton, for appellees.

McALISTER J.

The object of this bill was to enjoin the defendants from prosecuting separate suits against the complainant corporation to recover damages alleged to have been inflicted upon their property by the sulphurous smoke and noxious vapors emitted from the works of complainant. Demurrers to the bill were overruled by the chancellor, and defendants permitted to appeal. The court of chancery appeals reversed the decree of the chancellor, sustained the demurrers, and dismissed the bill. The cause is before this court on the appeal of the complainants from the decree of the court of chancery appeals.

The material allegations of the bill are that there are now pending against complainant in the circuit court, 21 separate suits brought by the defendants, and the amount of damages sought to be recovered aggregates over $42,000; that the gravamen of said suits is the alleged injury to timber standing on the respective tracts of land of defendants alleged to have been caused by the smoke and gases emitted from complainant's works; that defendants, in bringing this action, unlawfully combined to vex, harass, and annoy complainant with a multiplicity of suits; that they made and entered into champertous and unlawful agreements with their attorneys, by which the latter's fees were made contingent and to depend upon the recoveries to be had in the several actions, if at all; that the complainant does not know, and has no means accessible in Tennessee to ascertain what estates, if any said defendants hold in said lands upon which their respective damage suits aforesaid are predicated; that the records in Polk county were destroyed several years ago, and but few title papers have been registered, and hence complainant is unable to determine what rights, if any, the defendants have in the premises; and it insists that it is entitled to have a discovery from defendants, and each of them, as to the quantities of estate held, and by what title, if any, and how evidenced and acquired, and to have a proper reference in this behalf, which cannot be had and made in said actions at law. It is alleged that the gravamen of each of said suits against complainant is identical, and arises from the same identical cause (that is, from alleged injuries occasioned by smoke and gases emitted from the roast piles and works of complainant, which defendants in their said suits insist constitutes an actionable nuisance); that, as before stated, defendants in their said suits are making common cause of their actions, co-operating and having themselves subp naed as witnesses, and manipulating the cases so as to pile up enormous bills of costs, which they seek to cast upon complainant. It is further alleged that, even assuming the naked legal right of defendants to be in some sense impaired, the matters involved form rather the basis of an equitable accounting, under proper orders, than grounds for actions at law by a multiplicity of suits, seeking recovery of compensatory and punitive damages by the unmeasured and uncertain modes applicable to trials at law. It is, moreover, insisted that inasmuch as the alleged right of action in said suits originates from the same cause, constituting, as insisted, a nuisance, a court of equity, exercising rightful jurisdiction, will intervene in order to prevent a multiplicity of suits, and stay by injunction actions at law, and administer relief in its own court, according as the parties may be entitled. As already stated, each of the defendants interposed a demurrer to this bill, assigning 12 different causes. The main assignment of demurrer is that a court of chancery has no jurisdiction of the matters and grievances alleged in the bill, and the same are purely cognizable in a court of law. The fourth ground of demurrer is that the bill is multifarious on its face, and seeks a joinder of parties whose interests are distinct, whose legal rights are distinct, and in which the recovery of one plaintiff does not depend upon the law and evidence of any other litigant; each plaintiff relying for a recovery of damages in an action at law for injuries done to his property. The sixth demurrer is that a court of law has full and plenary jurisdiction of all champertous contracts, and the bill alleges no ground showing that it has not a full and complete remedy at law to prove said champertous contracts, if any existed. Moreover, there is to-day no law against such contracts in force in Tennessee, since the champerty law was repealed by Acts 1899, c. 173, and has been declared not in force. The ninth ground of demurrer is that the discovery of title and quantity of estate owned by defendants, which...