Duckworth v. City of Bonney Lake
| Decision Date | 16 November 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 44779,44779 |
| Citation | 586 P.2d 860,91 Wn.2d 19 |
| Parties | S. Lloyd DUCKWORTH and Jean Duckworth, his wife, Respondents, v. CITY OF BONNEY LAKE, a Municipality, Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
George S. Kelley, Tacoma, for appellant.
Rutherford, Kargianis & Austin, Russell A. Austin, Jr., Seattle, for respondents.
This is an appeal from a summary declaratory judgment holding unconstitutional a portion of the Bonney Lake zoning ordinance.
Respondents, Mr. & Mrs. S. Lloyd Duckworth (Duckworths), own a lot in the RS zone of appellant City of Bonney Lake. In 1976, the City granted a building permit which authorized the Duckworths to place a mobile home on their lot. Thereafter the City apparently revoked the permit on the ground that placement of mobile homes in the RS single family residence zone is not a permitted use. The Duckworths sought a declaratory judgment that there is "no prohibition in the Bonney Lake Ordinances nor could such a prohibition constitutionally exist, prohibiting placement of plaintiffs' mobile home as a single family residence" on their lot.
At the close of all pleadings the Duckworths moved for a summary judgment to declare that there is no legal prohibition against their placement of the mobile home on their lot. After considering "the pleadings, the statements of counsel . . . the briefs . . . and any admission(s) . . . made," the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. Based thereon, the trial court granted the Duckworths' motion and entered a summary judgment declaring that the zoning code is unconstitutional insofar as it excludes mobile homes from RS zones (single family residence areas).
The City has appealed.
Initially it is necessary to clarify those facts which are properly before us. Although the Duckworths rely heavily upon the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law to support the summary judgment, this reliance is misplaced. The function of a summary judgment proceeding is to Determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. It is Not, as appears to have happened here, To resolve issues of fact or to arrive at conclusions based thereon. State ex rel. Zempel v. Twitchell, 59 Wash.2d 419, 424-25, 367 P.2d 985 (1962). Consequently, the findings of fact and conclusions of law entered here are superfluous and may not be considered to the prejudice of the City. Optometric Ass'n v. County of Pierce, 73 Wash.2d 445, 438 P.2d 861 (1968); State ex rel. Carroll v. Simmons, 61 Wash.2d 146, 377 P.2d 421 (1962); State ex rel. Zempel v. Twitchell, supra, 59 Wash.2d at 425, 367 P.2d 985. See Gwinn v. Church of the Nazarene, 66 Wash.2d 838, 405 P.2d 602 (1965).
One who moves for summary judgment, in this case the Duckworths, must prove By uncontroverted facts that no genuine issue of material fact exists. This is true whether the opponent, I. e., the City, has the burden of proof on the issue at trial. Hudesman v. Foley, 73 Wash.2d 880, 441 P.2d 532 (1968); Peninsula Truck Lines, Inc. v. Tooker, 63 Wash.2d 724, 388 P.2d 958 (1964); American Universal Ins. Co. v. Ranson, 59 Wash.2d 811, 370 P.2d 867 (1962); Preston v. Duncan, 55 Wash.2d 678, 349 P.2d 605 (1960). In support of a motion for summary judgment the movant may rely on pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, affidavits and admissions on file to determine whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact. CR 56(a), (b), (c).
In the instant case there are no depositions, answers to interrogatories, affidavits, or admissions on file to establish the requisite Uncontroverted facts. Moreover, although the trial court considered factual matters raised solely in the Duckworths' trial brief and oral argument, it was not entitled to give Weight to them to resolve factual issues. 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice 56.11(1.08), p. 56-202 (2d ed. 1948).
The Duckworths have made many broad, interesting, and self-serving statements in their pleadings, trial briefs and appellate brief. Nevertheless, those which are not supported by Uncontroverted facts are not properly before us on summary judgment. Thus, our review must be limited to considering only the Uncontroverted facts developed by the pleadings, or by factual concessions made in the City's brief.
The Uncontroverted facts before us on appeal are the following: Bonney Lake is a third class city incorporated in Pierce County. In 1967 the City adopted a zoning code which was amended in 1969. Insofar as applicable the code provides:
§ 2. Location. Mobile homes shall be permitted in the City of Bonney Lake . . . Only in those areas designated by the comprehensive plan or ordinances To be mobile home areas.
Bonney Lake Zoning Ordinance No. 295 (1969).
R.S. Single Family Residential Districts.
22-01 Uses Permitted Outright. The following uses may be . . . permitted outright in an R.S.-Zone . . .
(a) Single family residences,
(b) Churches . . .
Bonney Lake Zoning Ordinance 241 (1967).
R.D. Duplex and trailer residential district.
23-01 Uses Permitted Unconditionally. The following uses may be operated as uses permitted unconditionally in an R.D. Zone . . .
(a) Single family residences,
(b) duplexes (two family residence).
(c) Trailers (mobile homes)
Bonney Lake Zoning Ordinance No. 241 (1967). (Italics ours.)
The zoning code does not define "mobile home" but it does provide that words are to be "given their usual and customary meanings except where the context clearly indicates a different meaning." Bonney Lake Ordinance 241, ch. II(c) (1967).
The Duckworths own a city lot which is zoned R.S. (single family residence). On October 28, 1976, the City issued the Duckworths a building permit authorizing them to place a 24' X 64' mobile home on their lot. The mobile home has a living area of approximately 1500 sq. ft. and was manufactured in compliance with state and federal construction safety standards for such homes. See RCW 43.22.340-.420; 42 U.S.C. 5401, 5402, 5403; 24 C.F.R. 280.01 et seq. Such compliance with state and federal construction safety standards is deemed compliance with local building code standards of safety for mobile homes. The Duckworths planned to place the mobile home upon a permanent foundation and attach it to existing utilities.
On November 16, 1976, following delivery of the mobile home, the Duckworths were notified that the City had revoked their building permit. According to the City, the zoning code authorized the Duckworths to place their mobile home only in the R.D. zone because mobile homes could be placed only in "designated" areas and the R.D. zone was the only area so "designated" vis-a-vis R.S. and R.D. zones.
In addition to raising numerous factual matters which are not properly before us on appeal the Duckworths also have improperly raised many legal issues. Failure to reject them from our consideration of the motion for summary judgment could embroil us unnecessarily in emotional nonissues. We thus make clear that the following substantive issues are not before us because they were not raised below or are unsupported by uncontroverted facts. (A) Whether a mobile home is a "single family residence" as permitted in an R.S. zone is not before us because the parties expressly abandoned this issue. At the express request of the parties the trial court ruled exclusively on the constitutional issue. 1 (B) The content or nature of the building permit and whether revocation of the permit was based upon a proper administrative interpretation of the ordinance are not before us on summary judgment. (C) Whether a city may constitutionally exclude All mobile homes is not an issue, there being No claim of total exclusion. (D) The timeliness of the City's revocation of the building permit was not raised below and is not an issue. (E) Whether the ordinance is overbroad or void for vagueness is not before us. (F) The desirability of the R.S. zone vis-a-vis the R.D. zone was not raised below and is not an issue. (G) The record properly before us on summary judgment does not raise the financial, utilitarian, architectural, structural or aesthetic desirability of mobile homes in general or the Duckworths' mobile home in particular. (H) There is no issue raised on summary judgment concerning the Duckworths' income group, race, class, caste or creed. In fact, the subject of low income housing or persons is not present.
As we have indicated, the trial court ruled solely on the constitutionality of the City's exclusion of mobile homes from the R.S. (single family residence) zone. The primary issue on appeal thus becomes whether a city may constitutionally exercise its police power to adopt a zoning code which prohibits placement of mobile homes in one residential area while authorizing their use in another area not shown to be undesirable. A secondary issue raised by this appeal is whether the City abused its police power by enacting the exclusion in the challenged zoning code.
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN HOLDING UNCONSTITUTIONAL A ZONING
AND CONVENTIONAL HOMES FOR THE PURPOSE
The Duckworths challenged as unconstitutional the City's use of its Legislative power to exclude mobile homes from the R.S. zone and to restrict their location to the R.D. zone. On this issue, the trial court ruled the City had the burden of proof to demonstrate that the exclusion of mobile homes from the R.S. zone was a reasonable exercise of its police power. Further, the trial court determined the City had failed to meet its burden and thus the exclusion was unconstitutional. In the context of a summary judgment, the trial court's determination was erroneous.
The power of the City to plan for its physical development through zoning stems from RCW 35.63.080 which provides in part:
For this...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Yakima County v. Yakima County Law Enforcement Officers Guild
...dismissal. And, incidentally, findings of fact in a summary judgment order are superfluous. See, e.g., Duckworth v. City of Bonney Lake, 91 Wash.2d 19, 21-22, 586 P.2d 860 (1978). ¶ 61 Even if res judicata is then a threshold question of arbitrability for the courts, we conclude that the co......
-
State v. Lee
...840, 505 P.2d 801 (1973).78 Id.79 City of Seattle v. Montana, 129 Wash.2d 583, 592, 919 P.2d 1218 (1996); See Duckworth v. City of Bonney Lake, 91 Wash.2d 19, 586 P.2d 860 (1978).80 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712-713, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 1166, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976).81 State v. Gunwall, 106 Was......
-
Weden v. San Juan County
...Washington case law.") (citing Polygon Corp. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wash.2d 59, 70, 578 P.2d 1309 (1978) and Duckworth v. City of Bonney Lake, 91 Wash.2d 19, 30, 586 P.2d 860 (1978)). If the purpose of the ordinance were in reality an effort to enforce the cultural preferences of the island......
-
City of Seattle v. Montana
... ... Duckworth v. City of Bonney Lake, 91 Wash.2d 19, 27, 586 P.2d 860 (1978). It is presumed that the ... ...
-
§52.6 Analysis
...cert, dismissed, 554 U.S. 941 (2008); Sherman v. Kissinger, 146 Wn.App. 855, 864 n.3, 195P.3d539 (2008); Duckworth v. City of Bonney Lake, 91 Wn.2d 19, 22, 586P.2d860 (1978) (findings are superfluous and may not be considered to the prejudice of the nonmoving party); cf. Shoulberg v. Pub. U......
-
Table of Cases
...(2010):14.2(4)(d) Downtown Traffic Planning Comm'n. v. Royer, 26 Wn. App. 156, 612 P.2d 430 (1980):7.6 Duckworth v. City of Bonney Lake, 91 Wn.2d 19, 586 P.2d 860 (1978): 8.1, 8.2(2), 8.9 Durland v. San Juan Cnty., 182 Wn.2d 55, 340 P.3d 191 (2014): 8.9(1) Durocher v. King Cnty., 80 Wn.2d 1......
-
§ 8.9 - Constitutional Zoning Considerations
...denied, 137 Wn.2d 1030 (1999); see also Granat v. Keasler, 99 Wn.2d 564, 568, 663 P.2d 830 (1983); Duckworth v. City of Bonney Lake, 91 Wn.2d 19, 33, 586 P.2d 860 Courts typically will not reach a constitutional claim when a statutory remedy is otherwise available. Isla Verde Int'l Holdings......
-
Between Scylla and Charybdis: Growth Management Act Implementation That Avoids Takings and Substantive Due Process Limitations
...189. Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 331, 787 P.2d at 913 (emphasis added). 190. See, e.g., Duckworth v. Bonney Lake, 91 Wash. 2d 19, 26-27, 586 P.2d 860, 865-66 (1978) (If legislation tends to promote public health, safety, morals or welfare, "the wisdom, necessity and policy of the law are ma......